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The School of Economics
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Seung Hoon Lee, Co-advisor
The School of Economics





Research Economist and Senior Adviser
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Dr. Usha Nair-Reichert
The School of Economics
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date approved: June 16, 2021
For my husband and my parents. I could not be where I am today without their
never-ending support, love, and understanding.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My six years’ journey at Georgia Institute of Technology has been memorable and
would not be complete without the generous support from many people. First, I would
like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors Dr. Tibor Besedeš and Dr. Seung
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SUMMARY
This dissertation examines how a negative income shock induced by globalization af-
fected US local economies through various channels, including labor market outcomes,
crime rates, and poverty.
The first chapter provides empirical results that trade liberalization with China reduced
gender gaps in local U.S. labor markets. In MSAs with higher exposure to trade liber-
alization, the simple wage gender gap decreased, while the residual wage gap increased,
indicating important selection effects in labor force participation decisions. The reduction
in the gender labor force participation gap was driven by higher entry of women, in particu-
lar more educated women, and exit of the less educated men. This results in intrahousehold
adjustments in work dynamics, with women entering the labor force to offset the lost in-
come of male partners who left the labor force. We show that trade liberalization increased
female workers’ unemployment rate and reliance on part-time jobs.
The second chapter provides empirical evidence that regions with higher minimum
wage experienced reductions in crime after trade liberalization with China. Estimation
shows that a negative income shock resulting from trade liberalization with China caused
a rise in property crimes, while a higher minimum wage had a buffering effect on crimes.
Notably, the most significant impact was on young adults aged 20-29. A higher minimum
wage may bring younger workers to the labor market, thereby reducing potential property
crime rates. This chapter suggests that a higher minimum wage could function as a form
of insurance as it reduces crime in the presence of a negative income shock.
The third chapter examines US-China trade liberalization’s effect on socioeconomic
indicators. We employ the Multidimensional Deprivation Index (MDI) and estimate the
difference-in-difference model. Results show that young adults aged 17-24 experienced
significant multidimensional deprivation mainly due to highschool education deprivation.
There may also exist inter-generational spillover effects within the household - parents’
xii
labor market displacement due to trade liberalization may impact their children’s wellbe-
ing. Additionally, minimum wage and social welfare expenditures do not help alleviate the
multidimensionally deprived population. This finding confirms that there was not much
overlap between the income poor and those who were multidimensionally deprived.
xiii
CHAPTER 1
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND GENDER GAPS IN LOCAL LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES: DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The following chapter is a reprint of a published chapter:
Besedeš, T., S. H. Lee, and Yang (2021). Trade liberalization and gender gaps in local labor
market outcomes: Dimensions of adjustment in the United States. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 183, 574-588.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the impact of trade liberalization on gender inequality in local labor
markets. We examine the effect of the US granting China Permanent Normal Trade Rela-
tions (PNTR) on the gender wage and labor-force-participation gaps in the US. We show
that the liberalization of US trade relationship with China reduced both gaps in local labor
markets. These changes occurred because women entered the labor force, while men left
the labor force as the exposure to China receiving PNTR status affected manufacturing in-
dustries more which tend to employ relatively more men. Our results indicate that women
entered the labor force in part to offset the reduction in family income that occurred as their
male partners lost jobs and left the labor market.
We use the Pierce and Schott (2016, 2020) approach to measure a local labor mar-
ket’s exposure to trade liberalization. Pierce and Schott (2016) show that granting perma-
nent normal trade relations to China in 2001 caused a sharp decline in US manufacturing
employment in the 2000s. They argue that Chinese exporters faced significant risks of
increased tariffs before 2001 since China’s Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status, guar-
anteeing low tariffs when exporting to the US, required annual renewals by the Congress.
Pierce and Schott (2016) define PNTR exposure as the difference between the high non-
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NTR tariffs and the much lower NTR tariffs, which averages to 33 percentage points in
1999. The conferral of PNTR status to China eliminated tariff uncertainty and brought the
decline in US employment by encouraging Chinese exporters to scale up and US firms to
do more offshoring/outsourcing. In a follow-up paper, Pierce and Schott (2020) calculate
the exposure level to PNTR for each US county and show that a county’s higher exposure to
PNTR is associated with increases in mortality from stress-related causes (e.g., suicides),
specifically among white males. Our investigation focuses on Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas (MSAs), which are defined along the lines of local labor markets with sufficiently high
population density at their core. We find that a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) with
higher PNTR exposure experienced a decrease in gender gaps in wage and labor force
participation rates (LFPR) after trade liberalization with China. We examine both the sim-
ple and residual wage gender gaps. The simple gender wage gap decreased after China
received PNTR status, and this finding is unaffected once we control for selection. How-
ever, we also show that there were some selection effects in the wake of China receiving
PNTR status. The residual wage gap actually increased, showing that, once controlling
for observable worker characteristics such as education levels, men earned higher wages
than women. The two results are reconcilable as long as this shock made the male labor
market relatively more competitive by generating different selections for the two genders
as less educated men left the labor force or more educated women entered the labor force
in greater numbers. We find evidence of both of these effects. MSAs with higher PNTR
exposure experienced larger increases in female relative labor force participation rates, and
this increase was largely driven by the entry of more educated women into the labor force,
where the more educated women are those with at least some college-level education. We
also find that labor force participation rates decreased for men, somewhat more strongly
for the less educated men.
The greater participation in the labor force by women was a response to how China
receiving PNTR status affected households. We show that MSAs with higher exposure did
2
not experience change in the share of households with both spouses working, but there was
a significant decrease in the share of households with only the husband (or male partner)
working and an increase in households with just the wife (or female partner) working. In
addition, the share of family income accounted for by the female partner has increased in
MSAs with greater exposure to China’s PNTR status. The greater labor force participa-
tion rates of women also resulted in higher unemployment for women, while males exiting
the labor force did not prevent higher unemployment among them which was also accom-
panied by a reduction in employment among men. Furthermore, in MSAs with higher
PNTR exposure, female workers spent more time in part-time employment. The increase
in part-time employment is a consequence of individuals not being able to find full-time
employment, rather than wanting to work only part-time.
Other studies have found significant effects of trade liberalization on labor market out-
comes and gender inequality using different methodologies. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson
(2013) explain the decline in US manufacturing employment with Chinese import penetra-
tion. Their estimation strategy, to instrument the growth of Chinese exports to the US by
the growth of Chinese exports to other high-income countries, was adopted by a number
of follow-up papers. Following their identification strategy, Brussevich (2018) shows that
US commuting zones with higher import penetration show greater reduction in the gender
wage gap and that wage and welfare gains from trade are higher for female workers since
the import competition shock in manufacturing sector disproportionally affected the labor
market outcomes of the two gender groups. Greenland, Lopresti, and McHenry (2019)
found that commuting zones with greater exposure to China gaining PNTR status experi-
enced reduced population growth, particularly for men. Benguria and Ederington (2017)
show that increased competition from China lowered the gender wage gap in Brazil, which
is driven by the underperformance of male workers. Other trade liberalization episodes
have also been found to have reduced gender wage gaps. Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2014)
show that tariff reductions, accompanied by the North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA), increased the demand for female labor and raised their relative wage in Mex-
ico. Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2014) find that NAFTA raised the relative wage
and employment of female workers, especially in blue-collar tasks in Mexico. They explain
that higher competition encouraged firms to modernize their technology, thus reducing their
dependence on physical ability. Ederington, Minier, and Troske (2009) report that tariff re-
ductions in Chile, as a result of Chile’s entry into GATT/WTO, raised the number of female
workers (relative to male ones) in blue-collar jobs. Similar to Brussevich (2018), Black and
Brainerd (2004) show that import penetration is associated with greater reductions in the
gender wage gap in the US.
Some researchers have shown that gender inequality can increase with trade liberaliza-
tion. Sauré and Zoabi (2014) report that the formation of NAFTA widened the gender gaps
in the US labor market. Since female intensive sectors tend to be capital intensive, trade
liberalization between capital-rich and capital-poor countries may raise the gender gap in
the capital-rich country (i.e., the US) by reallocating male workers into capital intensive
sectors. Bøler, Javorcik, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018) report higher wage gaps for export-
ing firms compared to non-exporters in Norway. They claim that exporters may require
a greater commitment from employees. Hence, female workers, who tend to have less
flexible schedules, receive lower relative wages.
Gender inequality and trade liberalization have been an important issue investigated in
the literature. This chapter shares similar insights and findings with previous papers in part.
Our chapter shares similar insights with Sauré and Zoabi (2014), Benguria and Ederington
(2017), and Brussevich (2018), in that trade liberalization affects gender inequality in the
labor market through reallocation of male labor from the male-intensive sector. However,
our chapter makes an important contribution since we explain how the various channels are
connected by examining both the simple and residual wage gaps. We explore gender gaps
both in wage and labor force participation whereas most existing papers focus on wage
inequality. We also propose possible mechanisms through multiple channels including
4
education level and marital status, the former of which help explain the selection effects
induced in local labor markets by China receiving PNTR status. We also provide additional
insights into the effects of trade liberalization in developed economies and show that with
respect to the effect on gender gaps, trade liberalization has similar effects in developed
and developing countries. The latter conclusion is based on the similarity between our
results for the US and Benguria and Ederington (2017)’s results for Brazil. We show that
trade liberalization has affected the overall quality of female jobs by increasing part-time
work at the expense of full-time employment. Our chapter is related to Charles, Hurst, and
Schwartz (2019), who show that the manufacturing decline in a local labor market in the
2000s had negative effects on local employment rates, hours worked, and wages. They
find larger negative effects employment of men and for the less educated workers. Their
findings are consistent with ours in that the negative effects from China gaining permanent
normal trade relations are larger for male workers and the less educated group.
Lastly, our chapter is related to a set of papers which examine intrahousehold or in-
trafamily adjustments to trade liberalization and offers new and interesting findings. Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2015) find that local labor markets more exposed to Chinese imports
experience a decrease in employment, especially in manufacturing and among non-college
workers. Dorn, Hanson, et al. (2019) examine the effects of increased competition from
China on young adults in the US finding an increase in male idleness and premature mor-
tality as well as reductions in marriage and fertility, and an increase in the fraction of single
mothers who are heads of households, as well as an increase in the number of children liv-
ing in poverty. Keller and Utar (2018) show that increased competition from Chinese im-
ports in Denmark resulted in a shift towards the family, with an increase in parental leave,
fertility, marriage, and a reduction in divorce rates.1 We find opposite results the married
women in the US entering the labor force and to some extent shifting away from the fam-
ily. Hakobyan and McLaren (2017) show that the impact of trade liberalization on female
1Using our data, we examined the effect on divorce rates and childbirth rate, but find no significant effects.
These results are available on request.
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wages depends on marital status. They observe that married low-skilled women experi-
enced larger reductions in wage growth with respect to NAFTA tariff reductions than other
demographic groups since high-skilled women drop out of the labor market. Our chap-
ter indicates that the shock due to China gaining PNTR status was different than NAFTA
as the former induced more educated and higher-skilled women to enter the labor force.
Thus, our results stand in contrast to both Hakobyan and McLaren (2017) and Keller and
Utar (2018) as we examine the reduction in gender gaps by exploring monetary incentives
of married females who had to compensate for lost family income from the negative in-
come shock. The shock created by China receiving PNTR status is well recognized to have
brought important changes to the US society. Our chapter provides a good understanding
of this important event from the perspective of female workers.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Labor Market Outcomes
We measure labor market outcomes using Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Annual So-
cial and Economic Supplement (ASEC), a nationally representative household data with
detailed information of each household member’s earnings, work hours, gender, and race,
among other indicators. We restrict our sample to individuals who are older than 25 and
younger than 64 and are either in or out of the labor force for reasons not related to being
on active military duty or having a disability.2 Our sample in 2000 includes 49,700 individ-
uals who resided in 272 MSAs with trade liberalization exposure data. Table 1.1 shows the
demographic characteristics of our sample in three years, 1990, 2007, and 2013. Women
account for 52 percent of our sample in every year. Male workers’ dependency on manu-
facturing in the labor market is almost twice as large as female workers’ before and after the
2For variables that require only those who are working, we further restrict the sample to include workers
with a stronger attachment to the labor market - worked for more than 20 weeks in the previous year, and
more than 35 hours per week in the previous year (both inclusive), following Maasoumi and Wang (2019).
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conferral of permanent trade relations to China.3 Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010)
show that high switching costs across sectors slow down the readjustment of an economy in
response to a trade shock. Hence, the heavier dependency on manufacturing sector on the
part of male workers may have aggravated the impact on the male labor market. Table 1.1
displays the familiar patterns by now: the share of manufacturing in the US economy has
steadily declined, from 15.2% of individuals in 1990 to 9.2% in 2013. This decrease has
occurred at the expense of services which have grown from 53.7% of individuals to 61.3%.
To understand the differential impact by educational attainment, we divide all individ-
uals in our sample into two levels of education, those without any college education and
those with at least some, even if they do not have a college degree.4 About 43 percent of
our sample had some college education in 1990 while the education levels of two gender
groups are not significantly different from each other. By the end of our sample the share
of individuals without college education has declined to 37%, with women comprising a
larger share of individuals with some education by 2013.
Table 1.1: CPS sample composition across time
1990 2007 2013
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
By sector
Manufacturing 5.3% 9.9% 15.2% 3.4% 7.0% 10.4% 2.8% 6.4% 9.2%
Services 29.7% 24.0% 53.7% 34.0% 26.4% 60.4% 34.3% 27.1% 61.3%
Other 17.2% 14.0% 31.2% 14.8% 14.4% 29.2% 15.2% 14.2% 29.4%
By education
No college experience 31.0% 26.1% 57.1% 20.1% 20.5% 40.6% 17.9% 19.1% 37.0%
Has college experience 21.2% 21.7% 42.9% 32.1% 27.3% 59.4% 34.4% 28.7% 63.0%
Total 52.2% 47.9% 100.0% 52.2% 47.8% 100.0% 52.3% 47.8% 100.0%
Our variables of interest, summarized in Table 1.2, include the average hourly wage,
3We can observe a worker’s industry from industry codes provided by CPS. We classify a worker’s in-
dustry as services if she or he is in transportation, communications, public utilities, wholesale trade, retail
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, business and repair services, personal services, entertainment and recre-
ation services, or professional and related services. If the worker does not belong to either manufacturing or
services, we assign her or him “other” sector.
4Our definition for education group follows Maasoumi and Wang (2019), who split their samples into
four classes: below high school education, high school degree, some college experience, and above college
degree. We aggregate their classifications into two groups, at least some college education and less than
college education, due to the insufficient number of individuals in an MSA if we apply the same classification
as Maasoumi and Wang (2019).
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wit, the number of total hours worked, hit, and labor force participation status, lit, of an
individual i in year t. The number of total work hours, hit, is calculated by multiplying
“Usual work hours worked per week last year” and “Weeks worked last year,” and reflects
the total number of hours the individual spent working in the previous year. The hourly
wage, wit, is calculated as “Wage and salary income” divided by the number of total hours
worked, hit. We directly observe an individual’s labor participation status, lit, from the
variable “Labor force status” and consider individual i is in the labor force if she or he
worked, was looking for a job, or was temporarily absent/laid-off during the reference
period.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of CPS variables (means)
1990 2007 2013
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
Wage 9.52 12.66 10.79 17.96 22.62 21.41 20.47 25.65 23.16
(1.69) (2.29) (2.61) 3.62 5.50 13.35 4.35 5.80 6.55
Work Hours 1,705.6 2,113.6 1,920.8 1,818.6 2,132.9 1,994.0 1,794.5 2,081.1 1,937.9
(139.8) (123.4) (113.2) 127.0 107.8 91.3 140.1 146.3 99.7
Labor Force Participation Rate 70.18% 89.92% 79.72% 77.67% 91.64% 84.41% 77.37% 89.76% 83.33%
(0.10) (0.05) (0.07) 0.08 0.05 0.52 0.09 0.06 0.06
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses.
In 1990, the average hourly wage for the whole population was $10.79, with the av-
erage female hourly wage of $9.52, equivalent to 75 percent of the average male hourly
wage. In 2007, the female worker’s average wage increased to about 79 percent of the male
worker’s and to 80 percent in 2013.5 We observe similar patterns for other variables. In
1990 female workers’ average work hours were equivalent to 81 percent of male average
work hours. It increased to 85 percent by 2007 and 86 percent in 2013. In 1990 the labor
force participation rate (LFPR) of female workers was about 20 percentage points lower
than that of their male counterparts. In 2007, the gap decreased to about 15 percentage
points and to 13 percent by 2013. Our data reveal the well-known patterns: while male
workers tend to outperform female workers, gender gaps have been on the decline.
We are interested in regional differences in changes in gender gaps. For this purpose,
5The median female wage increased from 75 percent of the male wage in 1990 to 80 percent in 2010.
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where m indicates an MSA, S refers to demographic groups, NSmt is the number of
individuals of group S who resided in MSA m in year t, and N̂Smt is the number of indi-
viduals with a positive wit. For example, if we let F be the set of females, then lFmt refers
to labor force participation rate of females in MSA m and year t. Unlike Pierce and Schott
(2020) who conduct their analysis using county-level data, we perform our analysis using
MSA-level data. As we are interested in labor market outcomes, we conducted our analysis
at the MSA level since they are largely defined by boundaries of local labor markets.7
1.2.2 NTR Gap
Our measure of exposure of an MSA to trade liberalization follows Pierce and Schott
(2020). Their measure is based on the difference between two tariff rates in the US tar-
iff schedule that could be assessed on imports from China. Imports from a country which
does not have normal trade relations with the US are assessed tariff rates established by
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These rates are significantly higher than the normal
trade relation tariffs rates, which are assessed on imports from countries that are members
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China was first granted temporary NTR status
in 1980 with a provision that its status be reaffirmed on an annual basis. The uncertainty
associated with renewal was a function of various crises in US-China relations during the
1990s. China was finally granted permanent normal trade relations with the US in October
2000 as a prelude to its entry into the WTO in December 2001.
We follow Pierce and Schott (2020)’s methodology to measure a local labor market’s
6When we calculate MSA-level variables, we use ASEC asecwt weights as CPS suggests.
7Using commuting zones (CZs), which cover the entire country, may be a better option, but not a feasible
one since CPS’s county identifier needed to calculate CZ-level labor market outcomes is only available since
1996.
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exposure to trade liberalization. We start with their industry-level measure, NTRGapj ,
defined as the difference between non-NTR rates and NTR rates in a six-digit NAICS sector
j:
NTRGapj = non−NTRtariffj −NTRtariffj
NTRGapj refers to the potential tariff increase on Chinese imports and captures the un-
certainty faced by Chinese exporters in industry j.
Table 1.3: MSAs with the highest and lowest NTR Gaps
Rank Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) NTR Gap
1 Hickory-Morganton, NC 0.235
2 Burlington, NC 0.212
3 Danville, VA 0.198
4 Elkhart-Goshen, IN 0.170
5 Rocky Mount, NC 0.165
316 Bismarck, ND 0.038
317 Billings, MT 0.038
318 Great Falls, MT 0.036
319 Las Vegas, NV 0.034
320 Farmington, NM 0.031
Using NTRGapj , Pierce and Schott (2020) calculate a county’s exposure to PNTR.







where L1990jm refers to the number of employees in sector j in MSA m in the year 1990 and
L1990m refers to the total number of workers in MSA m. The information about employment
weights, L1990jm and L
1990
m , are from the County Business Patterns (CBP), an annual dataset
with information on employment and payroll by sector and county. Higher NTRGapm
indicates a higher exposure of MSA m to trade liberalization with China. NTRGapm has a
mean 0.145 and standard deviation 0.05. Table 1.3 lists the MSAs with the highest and low-
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est NTRGapm, while Figure 1.1 illustrates the geographical distribution of NTRGapm.
MSAs in the mid-Atlantic and Midwest regions are more exposed to trade liberalization.
Figure 1.1: Geographic distribution of NTRGapm
1.3 Estimation
1.3.1 DD identification Strategy
Our estimation strategy follows Pierce and Schott (2020). Our baseline difference-in-
differences (DD) specification examines whether MSAs more exposed to PNTR (first dif-
ference) experience differential changes in gender gaps in wage and labor force participa-
tion rates after the change in US trade policy versus before (second difference),
LHSmt = θ · PostPNTRt ×NTRGapm + βXmt (1.1)
+γ · PostPNTRt ×Zm + δm + δm + εm,t.
The dependent variable LHSmt, a local labor market outcome such as the gender wage
or labor-force-participation-rate gap, is defined in year t for an MSA m. The first term on
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the right-hand side is the DD term of interest, an interaction of a post-PNTR (i.e., t > 2000)
indicator with the (time-invariant) MSA-level NTR Gap. Xmt represents the (time-varying)
overall US import tariff rates associated with the industries active in the MSA as well
as exposure to the elimination of the Multi-Fibre Agreement quotas which took place in
2002 and 2005. Zm represents the initial-period MSA attributes, 1990 median household
income, 1990 share of population without any college education, 1990 share of population
that are veterans, and its exposure to changes in Chinese imports tariffs. δm and δt refer to
MSA and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at MSA levels. The sample period
is 1990 to 2013 as in Pierce and Schott (2020).
1.3.2 Estimates of the Gender Wage Gap
We begin our analysis by focusing on the gender wage gap. We find that MSAs with higher
NTR Gap and higher exposure to PNTR have lower labor market gender gaps after the
conferral of PNTR in 2001. We use Equation 3.1 with female-male wage ratio, wFmt/w
M
mt,
the gender wage gap, as the dependent variable and estimate the DD point estimate of
interest, θ. The first and second columns of Table 1.4 report the results for the female-male
wage ratio. The first column reports coefficient estimates for a specification containing
just the DD term of interest and fixed effects. The second column adds controls for policy
changes Xmt and demographic variables Zm.8 The DD point estimates of interest are
positive (θ > 0) and statistically significant at conventional levels across all columns. Our
empirical results suggest that higher import competition from China is associated with a
lower gender wage gap in US labor market outcomes, as in Brussevich (2018).
Our main question is to understand which changes in local labor market outcomes drive
changes in gender gaps. As a first step, we examine changes in wages of women and men.
We estimate Equation 3.1 by using the log value of the wage, log(wSmt), for each gender
S ∈ F,M as dependent variables and collecting results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4.
8Given the number of tables and results in the chapter, in certain tables we only report the estimates from
the specification with additional controls out of concerns for space. All other results are available on request.
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Our results suggest that female wages increased, while that of men may have decreased,
though the latter coefficient is not estimated with much statistical precision. The reduction
in the gender wage gap is likely a consequence of both an increase in female wages and a
decrease in male wages, but our data preclude us from identifying those changes in wages
precisely. To put it differently, the increase in female wages and the decrease in male wages
on their own may be statistically insignificant, but taken together their changes in opposite
directions combine to result in a statistically meaningful reduction in the gender wage gap.
Table 1.4: Gender wage gap and wages
All data (Benchmark sample) Machado sample
Female Wage/Male Wage Female Wage Male Wage Female Wage/Male Wage
Post * NTR Gap 0.418* 0.678** 0.597* -0.206 -0.705 1.447*
(0.241) (0.338) (0.343) (0.413) (0.948) (0.828)
NTR rate 1.632* 1.166 -0.567 7.261*
(0.854) (0.749) (0.780) (3.875)
MFA rate 1,567 -628.0 -2,391 9929
(3,202) (3,180) (4,623) (13200)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.0371 0.834 0.942 2.965
(0.605) (0.720) (0.841) (3.202)
Post * No College -0.000324 -0.167*** -0.169*** 0.211
(0.0638) (0.0595) (0.0612) (0.274)
Post * Veteran 0.235* 0.235* -0.00420 0.890
(0.141) (0.120) (0.107) (0.794)
Post * Median HHI 0.0291 0.0639*** 0.0318 0.198
(0.0221) (0.0209) (0.0252) (0.121)
Observations 5,429 5,356 5,356 5,357 5,372 5,302
R2 0.124 0.129 0.781 0.741 0.067 0.071
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Before examining selection and the residual wage gap, we examine whether there are
sectoral differences in the behavior of the wage gap and wages themselves. To that end,
we take advantage of the information on the sector in which employed individuals were
working and classify them as either manufacturing, services, or other in Table 1.1. We
then estimate for each of the three sectors the wage gap as well as female and male wages
and collect results in Table 1.5.9 The reduction in the wage gap in the wake of China at-
taining permanent normal trade relations seems to be largely driven by the services sector
9To conserve space for the remainder of the chapter we present results only from the specification which
includes additional explanatory variables. Complete results are available on request from authors.
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which experienced a large and significant reduction in the gender gap, while the manu-
facturing sector experienced a widening gender wage gap. Unfortunately, similar to our
wage regressions pooling across all sectors, our results for changes in wages in each sector
are not precise enough, preventing us from drawing strong conclusions. Changes for male
and female workers alone are not precisely estimated, but taken together they indicate a
reduction in the gender gap in the services sector and an increase in the gender gap in the
manufacturing sectors. Our estimates suggest that while both male and female wages de-
cline in manufacturing, female wages decline more. That wages in manufacturing declined
is not a surprise given the Pierce and Schott (2016) finding of a reduction in manufacturing
employment.
In order to consider the role of selection and entry/exit dynamics in our wage outcomes,
we estimate Equation 3.1 with samples restricted as Machado (2017) who proposed an es-
timator for the wage gap that allows for arbitrary and unobserved heterogeneity in selec-
tion. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, she found that the “always
employed” female subpopulation has similar characteristics as the male subpopulation in
terms of labor market experience and cognitive tests. Following her methodology of re-
stricting CPS samples, we restrict our sample to individuals who worked 50 weeks per year
and 35 hours per week in the previous year to perform an apple-to-apple comparison and
re-estimate coefficients regarding the gender wage gaps in Table 1.4, collecting results in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.4. The estimated DD coefficient for the sparse specification is
no longer significant, while the estimated coefficient for the specification with additional
controls is marginally statistically significant and larger in magnitude, suggesting that even
after controlling for sample selection issues, the gender wage gap has decreased in the
wake of China receiving permanent normal trade relations status. The reduction in the pre-
cision of our estimates could be due to the selection effect, in that some of the reduction is
due to changes in characteristics of individuals in the labor market, not by the changes in
performance of “always employed” workers. We will return to this point later.
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Table 1.5: Sectoral differences in the wage gender gap and wages
Wage
Manufacturing Services Other
Manufacturing Services Other Female Male Female Male Female Male
Post * NTR Gap -1.670** 0.891** -0.847 -1.111 -0.0863 0.541 -0.358 1.107 0.761
(0.836) (0.444) (1.020) (0.814) (0.646) (0.401) (0.460) (0.875) (0.517)
NTR rate -3.198* 3.028** 0.803 -2.657 -1.483 1.009 -1.749 2.042 1.433
(1.785) (1.196) (2.025) (1.769) (1.308) (0.818) (1.085) (1.733) (1.202)
MFA rate 11,610 5,562 -25,908** 9,438 -4,745 -2,283 -8,433 -3,426 15,760**
(8,335) (4,847) (12,471) (8,926) (7,078) (3,977) (6,363) (8,353) (6,311)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.559 -0.0815 0.919 0.611 1.018 0.679 0.899 2.083 0.979
(1.470) (0.868) (2.089) (1.302) (1.156) (0.794) (1.019) (1.441) (1.079)
Post * No College -0.0855 0.0231 -0.0610 -0.201 -0.189* -0.190*** -0.212** 0.0599 0.0678
(0.232) (0.0818) (0.171) (0.159) (0.108) (0.0649) (0.0829) (0.121) (0.0962)
Post * Veteran 0.223 0.288* -0.130 -0.181 -0.342* 0.286** 0.0825 -0.284 -0.217
(0.403) (0.174) (0.374) (0.310) (0.199) (0.136) (0.146) (0.239) (0.197)
Post * Median HHI -0.0150 0.0353 -0.0438 0.0834 0.0237 0.0684*** 0.0262 0.00343 0.0561
(0.0753) (0.0319) (0.0661) (0.0571) (0.0448) (0.0244) (0.0344) (0.0484) (0.0360)
Observations 4,613 5,353 4,865 4,658 5,192 5,355 5,355 4,865 5,301
R2 0.108 0.106 0.094 0.482 0.506 0.734 0.631 0.431 0.459
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
We next examine the residual wage gap between males and females. The simple wage
gap analyzed above may mask the effect of having different occupations, education, tenure,
etc, on the wage gap. Following Lemieux (2006) we define residual wage as the residual
term from a regression of individual worker’s wage on his or her observed characteristics.
To obtain the residual wage we regress wages using individual level data on the following
variables: age, sex, marriage status, veteran status, occupation, level of education, industry
of employment, and MSA where the individual resides. We then use the obtained residuals
to estimate a variant of Equation 3.1 at the individual level. The dependent variable is
the residual wage of a worker and along with the usual control variables, we include a
dummy variable identifying males in the post-PNTR period, as well as an interaction of
the post-PNTR dummy, the NTR gap, and the male dummy, effectively estimating a triple
difference specification.10 Our results are collected in Table 1.6.
10Note that as with all out regressions we estimate MSA and year fixed effects as well as a sex fixed effect.
The addition of the sex fixed effect is only so that this specification is econometrically a true difference-
in-differences-in-differences specification. Since the wage regression we estimate to obtain residual wages
includes sex as an explanatory variable, it usually would not be used in the residual wage regression. Not
surprisingly, its inclusion does not affect our estimates in a material way. It is possible to group occupations
and we examined one such approach grouping “Managerial and Professional Specialty” and “Technical,
Sales, and Administrative Support” occupations. Similar to sectoral regressions, we found no significant
results. Out of concern for space, these results are not reported and are available on request.
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Table 1.6: Residual wage gender gap
Post * NTR Gap * Male 0.185***
(0.064)
Post * NTR Gap -0.098
(0.087)






Post * Chinese tariff -0.000
(0.006)
Post * No College 0.000
(0.014)
Post * Veteran -0.000
(0.031)




Note. Standard errors clustered on MSA×Sex×Year in parentheses, MSA, year, and sex fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Our results indicate that the residual gender wage gap has increased. Taken together,
our results indicate that while the relative female wage has increased, the residual female
wage has decreased. The implication is that the relative female wage may have increased
due to the China PNTR shock generating selection effects, which would be consistent with
how controlling for selection effects affected our simple wage gap regression results. It is
possible that the relative female wage has increased because more educated women entered
the labor force, or similarly, that more educate men left the labor force. The residual wage
regression results, which control for the level of education, indicate that the quality of
the male labor force has increased, as long as we assume that wages are correlated with
labor productivity. Thus, the shock created by China being granted PNTR status may have
had a more negative effect on the male labor market, by increasing import competition in
sectors where male participation is relatively higher such as manufacturing, inducing more
women to enter the labor force to compensate for the reduction in family income due to men
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leaving the labor force. However, there was a selection effect in the female subpopulation
with more educated women more likely to enter the labor force. To better understand these
effects, we now turn our attention to labor force participation effects.
1.3.3 Estimates of the Gender Labor Force Participation Gap
We begin our investigation of the gender gap in labor force participation rates (LFPR) by
estimating Equation 3.1 using the LFPR gap as the dependent variable and collecting our
result in the first two columns of Table 1.7. The last two columns estimate Equation 3.1
separately for female and male labor force participation rates. Our estimates for changes in
labor force participation rates are much more precise. The gender gap in labor force par-
ticipation rates has declined in the more exposed MSAs. This reduction is driven by both
a statistically significant decline in male and a statistically significant increase in female
labor force participation rates as reported by results in Table 1.7. Such changes are poten-
tially indicative of female workers replacing male workers in the labor force or may be a
consequence of a structural change in available jobs skewed in favor of women. While the
latter change is beyond the scope of our chapter, later in the chapter we examine whether
this shock precipitated women replacing men in the labor force within households.
In the previous subsection we noted that the results from the residual wage regression
could be explained by the negative shock of China receiving PNTR status may have induced
not only greater labor force participation on the part of women, but a particular pattern in
selection, namely that it was the more educated women who tended to enter the labor
force. We now examine whether trade liberalization had a different effect on individuals
with different levels of education. We estimate Equation 3.1 with labor force participation
rates of different education groups and report the estimated coefficients in Table 1.8.11 We
separate our sample by education into less and more educated, where the less educated
are those with no college education and more educated are those individuals with at least
11As defined earlier, individuals with less education are those with no college experience while those with
more education are those with at least some college education.
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Table 1.7: Gender gap and labor force participation rates
Female LFPR/Male LFPR Female LFPR Male LFPR
Post * NTR Gap 0.424*** 0.671*** 0.395** -0.206**
(0.139) (0.200) (0.166) (0.0973)
NTR rate 1.020*** 0.751*** -0.154
(0.364) (0.263) (0.212)
MFA rate -2,552 1,498 4,206**
(2,124) (1,700) (1,806)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.156 0.338 0.233
(0.326) (0.289) (0.171)
Post * No College -0.000118 0.0532 0.0345*
(0.0361) (0.0372) (0.0189)
Post * Veteran -0.0184 -0.0381 -0.0624
(0.0747) (0.0616) (0.0413)
Post * Median HHI -0.0152 0.0311* 0.0323***
(0.0146) (0.0159) (0.00800)
Observations 5,400 5,400 5,401 5,400
R2 0.308 0.310 0.433 0.273
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
some college education. The reduction in the gender gap in labor force participation rates
identified in pooled results in Table 1.7 is largely driven by the increased participation of
the more educated women, while the estimate for less educated women is also positive but
imprecisely estimated. Labor force participation rates of all men decreases, while only that
of less educated men is precisely estimated.
One interpretation of these changes is that the negative income shock experienced by
families may have induced some of the more educated women who chose to be stay-at-
home parents to re-enter the labor force. This is related to Hakobyan and McLaren (2017)
finding that married high-skilled females drop out from labor market with respect to wors-
ened labor market conditions due to NAFTA tariff reductions. Our results indicate that the
effects of NAFTA tariff reductions and granting of PNTR status to China have at least some
different effects and highlight that high-skilled females are the demographic group whose
labor supply is relatively elastic with respect to negative income shocks.
With respect to the observed sectoral results, as we discussed in Section 1.2.1. and seen
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Table 1.8: Labor force participation gap and labor force participation by sex and education
Female LFPR/Male LFPR Female LFPR Male LFPR
Less educated More educated Less educated More educated Less educated More educated
Post * NTR Gap 0.497 0.701** 0.162 0.388** -0.346* -0.204
(0.379) (0.279) (0.233) (0.193) (0.182) (0.130)
NTR rate 0.045 1.122** 0.097 0.867** -0.377 -0.196
(0.954) (0.459) (0.567) (0.362) (0.413) (0.285)
MFA rate -6,183* -3,466 1,477 -798.8 6,311*** 2,022
(3,737) (3,254) (2,350) (2,193) (2,153) (2,007)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.370 0.125 0.312 0.239 0.115 0.196
(0.639) (0.450) (0.427) (0.358) (0.360) (0.254)
Post * No College 0.038 0.010 0.084* 0.078* -0.001 0.085***
(0.063) (0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.030) (0.031)
Post * Veteran -0.004 0.091 -0.106 0.034 -0.087 -0.004
(0.129) (0.107) (0.089) (0.072) (0.061) (0.067)
Post * Median HHI 0.026 -0.042** 0.035* 0.029 0.005 0.064***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 5,394 5,398 5,397 5,401 5,396 5,399
R2 0.174 0.143 0.326 0.213 0.215 0.180
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
from Table 1.1, the service sector tends to employ more women. Hence, the more educated
women tend to find jobs in the service sector. By the same logic, many of the less edu-
cated men seem to lose their jobs in the manufacturing sector. We conjecture that the less
educated women in the manufacturing sector are less affected than the less educated men
since their roles are different. Pierce and Schott (2016) show that US firms in sectors more
exposed to trade liberalization introduced more labor-saving technologies. Less educated
men are more affected since their roles may depend more on physical abilities. This is
consistent with Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2014) who show that NAFTA tariff
reductions raised the relative wage of female workers in blue-collar tasks in Mexico. They
explain that higher competition encouraged Mexican firms to modernize their technology
and thus reduced their dependence on physical ability of workers. Changes we observe
in how labor force participation rates are affected across different levels of education are
consistent with our conjecture based on residual wage regression results. The increase in
the observed relative female wage, coupled with higher residual wages for men, are due
to the effect of China being granted PNTR status being stronger for the male labor market
and inducing more women to join the labor force. A selection effect operated in the female
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labor market which favored the entry of more educated women. In the next section we
investigate whether women entered the labor force in order to substitute the lost income
from their partners leaving the labor force, voluntarily or involuntarily.
1.3.4 Intra-household Adjustments
China receiving PNTR status resulted in more women joining the labor force, while men
became discouraged and left the labor force or left the more exposed MSAs, as shown
by Greenland, Lopresti, and McHenry (2019). An interesting question we can ask is how
intra-household employment dynamics were affected. If men become discouraged and do
not move from their current MSA, the increase in female labor force participation may
be indicative of women taking on a larger role of earning an income in households with
married or cohabiting couples. We examine whether there are changes in the fraction of
households with both spouses working, or just one spouse, either husband or wife work-
ing, estimating Equation 3.1 with the respective ratios as dependent variables. We restrict
the sample to only those households with married or cohabiting couples. Our results are
collected in Table 1.9.
From the first column, we can see that there does not seem to be a significant change
in the fraction of households with both spouses working. At the same time, there is a
significant reduction in the fraction of households with only the husband working and a
significant increase in the fraction of households with only the wife working. These results
should not necessarily be surprising. The reduction in labor force participation on the part
of men as they become discouraged creates the need within households for women to play
an increasingly important role in income generation. As a result, women enter the labor
force in growing numbers to make up for the shortfall created by men leaving the labor
force.
To further examine whether such intra-household adjustments took place we examine
changes in the share of income earned by women in married or cohabiting households. To
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Table 1.9: Intrahousehold work dynamics
Working spouses Share of female income in
Both Husband only Wife only household income
Post * NTR Gap 0.0455 -0.171* 0.148*** 0.228*
(0.205) (0.102) (0.0503) (0.138)
NTR rate 0.772* -0.386* 0.000165 0.433*
(0.421) (0.205) (0.141) (0.256)
MFA rate 3,467 -340.1 -1,393 -2,683*
(2,601) (1,290) (1,030) (1,430)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.0679 -0.241 0.207** 0.165
(0.356) (0.177) (0.0983) (0.202)
Post * No College 0.00503 -0.0202 0.0177* 0.0155
(0.0334) (0.0157) (0.0102) (0.0217)
Post * Veteran -0.115* -0.00393 0.0616*** 0.00584
(0.0665) (0.0302) (0.0195) (0.0355)
Post * Median HHI 0.0509*** -0.0169*** -0.00854** -0.00353
(0.0122) (0.00630) (0.00408) (0.00755)
Observations 5,401 5,401 5,401 5,398
R2 0.351 0.316 0.223 0.239
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
that end we estimate Equation 3.1 with all control variables and use the share of female in-
come in household income as the dependent variable. Results are shown in the last column
of Table 1.9. As we can see from the table, in MSAs that were more exposed to the effects
of China receiving PNTR status, the female share of household income did increase.
Our results contrast with Keller and Utar (2018). They show that lower labor market
opportunity due to the growing Chinese import competition raised gender inequality in
Denmark by inducing female workers to stay away from the labor market (more parental
leave, higher fertility, more marriage, and fewer divorces). The different outcomes may be
explained by Denmark’s better social safety net or the more flexible labor market in the
US. If the latter is the main reason, the change in female labor force participation may not
depend on marital status. Table 1.10 reports the impact of PNTR with China on labor force
participation rate changes in our sample for males and females with different marital status.
This table shows that labor force participation rate of females in married or cohabiting
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households significantly increased while those in single households were not significantly
affected, supporting the claim that women entered the labor force to replace the lost income
from their male partners’ leaving the labor force. While the effect on married male labor
force participation rates is not statistically significant, it is estimated with a negative sign,
which is in line with the substitution hypothesis.
Table 1.10: Labor force participation rate by marital status
Single households Married or cohabiting household
Male LFPR Female LFPR Male LFPR Female LFPR
Post * NTR Gap -0.335* 0.207 -0.152 0.458**
(0.183) (0.237) (0.107) (0.222)
NTR rate -0.696 -0.110 0.0933 1.276***
(0.434) (0.456) (0.260) (0.399)
MFA rate 4,969* 2,655 2,525 1,014
(2,668) (2,921) (1,890) (2,309)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.172 -0.0119 0.224 0.476
(0.348) (0.397) (0.201) (0.408)
Post * No College 0.0430 -0.00268 0.0350* 0.0804*
(0.0377) (0.0380) (0.0197) (0.0444)
Post * Veteran -0.154** -0.0245 -0.0409 -0.0432
(0.0780) (0.0766) (0.0466) (0.0752)
Post * Median HHI 0.0231* 0.0250* 0.0321*** 0.0437**
(0.0131) (0.0150) (0.00854) (0.0191)
Observations 5,386 5,395 5,400 5,401
R2 0.179 0.234 0.215 0.359
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
1.3.5 Other Changes in Local Labor Markets
Our approach precludes us from drawing welfare implications due to both modeling and
data limitations. However, we can take advantage of additional data to better understand
the driving forces behind the increased labor force participation of women and decreased
participation of men. Labor force participation numbers reflect both individuals who are
working and those who are not working but are actively seeking employment. Thus, in-
creases in labor force participation could come from the ranks of the officially unemployed:
those actively seeking employment. The other possibility is that even if the increase in la-
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bor force participation comes from more individuals working, it is not clear whether the
increase comes from individuals holding full- or part-time jobs. Granting China PNTR sta-
tus may have resulted in a redistribution of jobs from full- to part-time employment, which
would be indicative of structural changes in local labor markets which were more exposed
to the shock.
Table 1.11: Unemployment and employment rates
Unemployment rate Employment rate
Female Male Female Male
Post * NTR Gap 0.231*** 0.168* 0.197 -0.347**
(0.0742) (0.0997) (0.180) (0.144)
NTR rate -0.134 -0.210 0.780*** 0.0665
(0.262) (0.260) (0.291) (0.300)
MFA rate -1,536 -1,798 2,360 5,527***
(1,034) (1,143) (1,601) (1,903)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.143 0.0432 0.222 0.162
(0.145) (0.189) (0.312) (0.249)
Post * No College 0.00373 0.0159 0.0475 0.0184
(0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0353) (0.0233)
Post * Veteran -0.0208 0.0430 -0.0172 -0.0948**
(0.0299) (0.0317) (0.0570) (0.0453)
Post * Median HHI -0.0266*** -0.0171** 0.0504*** 0.0455***
(0.00706) (0.00711) (0.0149) (0.0100)
Observations 5,400 5,400 5,401 5,400
R2 0.259 0.320 0.458 0.368
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
We begin by examining how unemployment and employment for both female and male
workers have changed because of China being granted permanent normal trade relations
with the US. Our results, collected in Table 1.11, show that unemployment rates for both
female and male workers rose. The last two columns of Table 1.11 indicate that the employ-
ment rate of men decreased in MSAs with greater exposure while the female employment
rate was not significantly affected. Taken together, these changes imply that much of the
increase in the female labor force participation comes from more women joining the labor
force and searching for jobs. Since our data do not allow us to track individuals across
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time, we cannot decompose net changes in labor force participation into its separate con-
stituents. In other words, understanding how many women who join the labor force due to
China receiving PNTR status are unable to find jobs, but keep looking for one, is beyond
our scope. For men, the conclusion is clear cut. Male unemployment rate increases, while
their employment rate decreases. Both changes have likely resulted in some men becoming
discouraged and dropping out of the labor force or moving out of the MSA, the latter being
consistent with the findings of Greenland, Lopresti, and McHenry (2019).
Table 1.12: Total hours worked and part-time work
Total hours worked (log value) Weeks in part-time work (log value)
Female Male Female Male
Post * NTR Gap -0.188 -0.409*** 2.597* 2.440
(0.172) (0.148) (1.333) (1.747)
NTR rate 0.470 -0.286 2.076 0.607
(0.393) (0.296) (1.848) (3.624)
MFA rate 806.9 3,017* -2,653 -26,460
(1,630) (1,739) (17,361) (21,831)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.0438 0.00605 0.993 -0.368
(0.310) (0.248) (2.037) (3.046)
Post * No College 0.0320 0.00845 -0.191 0.0892
(0.0272) (0.0225) (0.188) (0.318)
Post * Veteran -0.0336 0.0675 -0.532 0.700
(0.0477) (0.0499) (0.393) (0.632)
Post * Median HHI 0.00687 0.0207** -0.0247 0.0697
(0.0107) (0.00914) (0.0719) (0.107)
Observations 5,358 5,357 5,348 5,249
R2 0.299 0.296 0.275 0.175
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
To examine the kinds of jobs individuals in our sample hold, we take advantage of two
additional variables, total hours worked and weeks spent in part-time employment. The for-
mer reflects the number of hours spent working in both full- and part-time jobs in a calendar
year, while the latter reflects the number of weeks individuals spent in part-time employ-
ment, defined as working less than 35 hours a week. We estimate Equation 3.1 with total
hours worked and weeks in part-time employment as dependent variables collecting our
results in Table 1.12. While our results indicate that both men and women spend less time
working after China is granted PNTR, only for men is the coefficient estimated precisely.
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Similarly, while our results indicate both men and women spent more time in part-time
employment, only the coefficient for women is estimated precisely. Taken together, these
results indicate that both men and women experience a change in the fundamental nature
of jobs they held, facing limited opportunities for full-time work and greater reliance on
part-time work.
Table 1.13: Reasons for part-time work
Cannot find a full-time job WWanted a part-time job
Female Male Female Male
Post * NTR Gap 0.573** 0.537* -0.663 0.270
(0.251) (0.310) (0.464) (0.389)
NTR rate -0.328 0.135 0.479 0.168
(0.449) (0.655) (0.985) (0.833)
MFA rate 602.4 -3,472 4,242 10,070
(3,375) (3,294) (5,308) (6,567)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.319 -0.576 -1.895** 0.463
(0.424) (0.551) (0.768) (0.647)
Post * No College 0.065 -0.005 -0.026 0.031
(0.041) (0.051) (0.071) (0.074)
Post * Veteran -0.129 0.047 0.390*** -0.072
(0.080) (0.110) (0.118) (0.124)
Post * Median HHI -0.020 0.001 0.025 -0.004
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026)
Observations 5,348 5,249 5,348 5,249
R2 0.177 0.125 0.235 0.147
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
To better understand whether the nature of jobs held changed because individuals started
preferring part- to full-time employment, we take advantage of our data asking respon-
dents to identify the reasons behind their working a part-time job focusing on two of them:
whether they reported being unable to find a full-time job and whether they reported pre-
ferring a part-time job. We then estimate Equation 3.1 with the proportion of individuals
who could not find full-time employment and then the proportion who wanted part-time
employment,12 separately for women and men, collecting our results in Table 1.13. During
12The denominator for both measures is the number of individuals in each gender group who held a part-
time job in the previous year.
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our sample, there is no significant change in the proportion of either women or men who
want part-time work. However, granting China PNTR status is associated with a large and
statistically significant increase in the proportion of both women and men who state that
they were unable to find full-time employment and settled for part-time work instead. Thus,
the change in the nature of jobs occurred due to labor market conditions and increased ex-
posure to import competition from China, rather than due to changes in preferences.
1.4 Robustness
We conduct several robustness exercises. The first one replicates the two exogeneity ro-
bustness checks of Pierce and Schott (2016). The use of NTR gap to identify the effect
of granting China PNTR status relies on the exogeneity of the NTR gap. As Pierce and
Schott (2016) argue, most of the variation in NTR gap is due to the variation in non-
NTR tariff rates which were set in 1930 and any increase in NTR to protect industries
would result in a smaller NTR gap. They perform two checks of exogeneity of NTR gap.
One was to instrument the baseline DD term, PostPNTRt × NTRGapm, with an in-
teraction of the post-PNTR indicator and the Smoot-Hawley-based non-NTR tariffs rates,
PostPNTRt×non−NTRTariffj . The second one was to re-estimate the baseline spec-
ification using the NTR gap observed in 1990, ten years prior to PNTR implementation.
The second robustness exercise adds several additional explanatory variables to our
benchmark regressions. We interact the share of foreign-born individuals with the Post
PNTR indicator since a larger immigrant population may be associated with higher labor
force participation among higher-skilled workers (Peri, 2014). We control for the MSA’s
share of employment in routine occupations given that areas exposed to import competi-
tion are also more susceptible to worker displacement by automation. We add the share of
employment in manufacturing in an MSA interacted with a Post PNTR indicator as man-
ufacturing jobs are at greatest risk according to Pierce and Schott (2016). Finally, we add
the average offshorability index to control for the exposure to offshorability of jobs for an
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MSA (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013).
Table 1.14: Robustness checks
Benchmark 2000 NTR Gap NNTR IV Additional variables
female wage/male wage 0.678** 0.595* 0.596** 2.192*
female wage 0.597* 0.582 0.579** 1.192*
male wage -0.206 -0.115 -0.117 -0.145
female LFPR/male LFPR 0.671*** 0.617*** 0.629*** 0.673***
female LFPR 0.395** 0.352** 0.356*** 0.404**
male LFPR -0.206** -0.207** -0.214** -0.180*
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In the interest of space, we present only the estimates of the DD term, PostPNTRt ×
NTRGapm, in regressions involving the wage and labor-force-participation gaps, as well
as for gender-specific wage and labor force participation rates in Table 1.14.13 Across all
three robustness checks, our results are qualitatively similar. Robustness results for wage
related regressions are the least precisely estimated. In each regression, the wage gap de-
creases in the most exposed MSAs, while the male wage decreases and the female wage
increases. In all three robustness checks the gender labor-force-participation gap decreases
in the most exposed MSAs, with similar magnitudes across all regressions and is precisely
estimated. Female labor force participation in the more exposed MSAs is also precisely
estimated to increase by a similar magnitude across all regressions. Male labor force par-
ticipation is decreasing by a similar magnitude in all regressions and is precisely estimated.
Thus, our robustness results confirm our main conclusions: the gender wage gap and the
gender labor-force-participation gap both decrease in the wake of China receiving PNTR
status, with the labor force participation results more precisely estimated. The last robust-
ness check we perform is to examine to what extent our results are affected by the Great
Recession which started in 2008. To that end we add a new variable to our regression spec-
ification given by Equation 3.1 which is the interaction of the PostPNTRt ×NTRGapm
variable and a dummy variable identifying the 2008 through 2013 period. In Table 1.15
13Complete results are available on request.
27
we only present the estimated coefficients for the PostPNTRt × NTRGapm term and
the new triple interaction term to identify what effect the Great Recession had for the four
key regressions, simple wage gap in the full and Machado sample, residual wage gap, and
labor force participation gap.14 As can be seen, the simple wage gender gap decreased
prior to the Great Recession which had no statistically significant effect on it. The results
for the Machado sample indicate that there is no change in the wage gap prior to the Great
Recession, but the Great Recession had a large effect on the wage gap decreasing it in the
post-2008 period. The residual wage regression indicates that the residual wage gap in-
creased prior to the Great Recession, which had no additional effect on the residual wage
gap. The results for the simple wage gap in the Machado sample taken together with the
residual wage regression results indicate that there was important selection effect in the
post-PNTR period and prior to the Great Recession as discussed earlier in the chapter. Fi-
nally, in terms of the labor force participation gender gap, the gap decreased prior to the
Great Recession, which decreased it further by roughly a similar amount.
Table 1.15: Wage and labor force participation rate gap and the Great Recession
Full Sample Machado Sample Residual Wage† LFPR
Post * NTR Gap 0.671* 0.154 0.189*** 0.480**
(0.379) (0.933) (0.066) (0.192)
Post * NTR Gap * (2008-13 Dummy) 0.114 3.111** -0.007 0.445**
(0.394) (1.402) (0.032) (0.225)
Note. †The independent variable reported for the residual wage regression are
PostPNTRt ×NTRGapm ×MaleDummy and
PostNTRt ×NTRGapm ×MaleDummy × (2008− 13Dummy).
Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
14The residual wage regression is the exception as the dependent variable of interest here is the male
wage in the post-2001 period interacted with NTR Gap, the triple-difference term. Therefore, the additional
independent variable is the interaction between that variable and a dummy identifying the 2008-2013 period.
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1.5 Conclusion
China being granted PNTR status caused several important changes in local labor markets.
Gender wage and labor-force-participation gaps both declined. We show that the simple
gender wage gap decreased, but that there were also important selection effects in the wake
of the PNTR change. Our residual wage regression shows that the male residual wage
increased which is indicative of increased quality of the male labor force. Our results
further show that less educated men left the labor force in greater numbers and that more
educated women entered the labor force in greater numbers, both of which help explain
the residual wage gap result. As a result of both of these forces, the gender gap in labor
force participation decreased in the most exposed MSAs due to more women joining the
labor force, while men became discouraged and left the labor force. These changes were
accompanied by increased unemployment among women and men, while the employment
rate of women did not change and that of men decreased. Concurrently, both women and
men spent less overall time working. While the reduction in time spent working for women
is imprecisely estimated, women did spend more time in part-time employment indicating
a reduction in full-time work. Our results indicate both women and men spent more time in
part-time work because they were unable to find full-time employment, rather than because
they preferred part-time employment. This episode induced changes in intrahousehold
work dynamics. While there were no changes in the number of households where both
spouses worked, in the more exposed MSAs there was a decrease in the households with
just the husband working and an increase in the households with only the wife working. In
addition, the share of family income accounted for by the female partner increased in the
more exposed MSAs. We show that labor force participation rates increased among married
women, while those of single women did not change. Thus, our results indicate that women
entered the labor force to replace the lost family income due to husbands leaving the labor
force or becoming unemployed.
29
Lower gender gaps in labor markets are often interpreted as female welfare improve-
ment. However, if a negative shock in the labor market affected male workers more severely
or forced more females to work as shown by this chapter, this conclusion would be too
hasty. While it is tempting to use our results to form conclusions about welfare implica-




DOES MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE OR REDUCE CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM
A NEGATIVE INCOME SHOCK
2.1 Introduction
There is a common conception that irregularities in the business cycle lead to higher crime
rates. The US officially granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China upon
its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001. This episode,
commonly known as the China Shock, has brought dramatic changes to the US labor mar-
ket and is extensively studied in the literature. The economic hardship further brought
mental/psychological frustration to the people who used to work in the manufacturing sec-
tors in the US due to a loss of disposable income (Kim, 2018; Pierce and Schott, 2016;
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016; Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro, 2019b). Exposed workers
experienced reduced lifetime income and depressed wage levels for at least a full decade
after the China Shock commenced (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016). The standard of living
for most fell considerably, which put tremendous pressure on maintaining their accustomed
lifestyle. This negative income shock is believed to have caused a significant increase in
crime rates in US counties that have higher exposures to the China Shock (Pierce and
Schott, 2016).
Increasing incarceration and police can be an effective (Levitt, 2004; Corman and Mo-
can, 2005; Chalfin and McCrary, 2018; Fone, Sabia, and Cesur, 2019) but expensive policy
strategy (Kearney et al., 2014) to reduce crime rates. Expenditures on police and the crim-
inal justice system are estimated to be more than $286 billion per year (Bureau Of Justice
Statistics, 2018). Executive Office of the President (2016)1 from the White House Council
1This report claimed that raising the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $12 per hour could reduce
crime by 3 to 5 percent, generating substantial social benefits.
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of Economic Advisers contrasted the high public costs of deterring crime via the criminal
justice system with lower-cost alternatives. It recommended a novel policy strategy for
combating crime: raising the minimum wage. Subsequently, on July 18, 2019, the House
passed the Raise the Wage Act to increase the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $15 by
2024 and index future increases to median wage growth and eliminate the sub-minimum
wage for tipped workers, teenage workers, and individuals with disabilities.2
This chapter answers two questions empirically: 1) Did the China Shock increase crime
rates in the US, and 2) would higher state-level minimum wage help alleviate this impact?
The role of the minimum wage on crime rates is usually hard to estimate under a typical
environment. In this chapter, we employ a negative income shock - the China Shock - to in-
vestigate this relationship. Specifically, we exploit the measure of different trade exposures
to Chinese imports in commuting zones, and there are two steps to the analysis. First, we
study the link between PNTR and crime rates, which provides evidence that PNTR brought
labor market disruptions. We estimate the China Shock’s impact on property crime and
violent crime, and the breakdown of these crimes within gender, age, and racial groups.
Second, we examine the role of minimum wage on local crime rates in the presence of the
China Shock to see if it played a role in keeping people away from criminal activities.
Following Pierce and Schott (2016), we adopt the measure of trade exposure of local
communities as the Normal Trade Relation (NTR) gap at the commuting zone (CZ) level.
NTR gap - the difference between non-NTR tariff rates and NTR tariff rates - effectively
captures the amount of uncertainty of a trade policy change that a CZ faced. After China’s
accession into WTO in 2001, the NTR gap was reduced to zero. This sudden drop serves
as an ideal exogenous shock of a trade policy change in 2001. The higher the NTR gap, the
CZ experienced more labor market disruptions due to trade liberalization with China.
We use data from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the National Incident-Based
Reporting System from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with years ranging from 1990
2An alternative set of policies to deter crime, which are often less costly to taxpayers, includes those that
improve labor market conditions and incentivize greater human capital acquisition.
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to 2013. We compute an index of overall property crimes3 and overall violent crimes,4 both
of which are normalized per 1,000 residents in a CZ. We also calculate the breakdown of
crime rates by gender, age, and racial groups.
As the baseline estimation, we use the difference-in-difference (DD) identification strat-
egy to examine whether CZs that are more exposed to Chinese import competition (first
difference) experienced differential changes in crime rates after the China Shock (second
difference). The specification includes controls for CZ-level demographic and economic
attributes, as well as fixed effects that capture time-invariant characteristics of CZs and
aggregate shocks that affect all CZs in a particular year.
The baseline results confirm that the China shock indeed statistically significantly in-
creased overall property crimes, while it had no effect on violent crimes. Specifically, the
China Shock induced an estimated $10,151 more in social costs from an 8.4 percent in-
crease in property crimes for an interquartile change in trade exposures across CZs. The
results are consistent with our expectation since property crimes are usually tied to finan-
cial needs and motives. As increased import competition from China caused the loss of
disposable income and job-loss induced idleness among manufacturing workers, they may
commit property crimes due to monetary concerns. Those without a steady income have a
greater incentive to commit crimes than those with a steady income, who may have more to
lose if caught (Ajimotokin, Haskins, and Wade, 2015). Specifically, we find the magnitude
of this effect is unusually large for young adults (age 20-29). The implied impact shows
young adults in CZs heavily impacted by the China Shock (75th percentile in NTR gap
distribution) committed 1.82 times more property crimes than those in less-impacted CZs
(25th percentile in NTR gap distribution). Moreover, the overall property crimes from both
male and female perpetrators increased. In terms of race, results show that people identified
as white, Asian, and American Indians all committed significantly more property crimes.
People identified as black committed more violent crimes. These findings are consistent
3Summation of burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
4Summation of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
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with Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D’alessio (2006) and Pierce and Schott (2020).
In the second part of the chapter, we further explore if higher state-level minimum
wages had a dampening effect on overall CZ-level crime rates. We estimate a difference-
in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification. The results show that higher state-level
minimum wages had a significant dampening effect on overall property crimes, resulting
in less property crime in the more exposed areas due to the China Shock. Its impact is sig-
nificant across all sub-categories of property crimes - burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft,
and arson. This effect corresponds to a reduction in social costs of $ 34,823, $ 1,475, $
1,546, $ 1,748, and $ 234 respectively for an interquartile shift in the minimum wage dis-
tribution. Moreover, higher minimum wages reduced property crimes committed by young
adults the most in terms of magnitude. In general, a one-dollar increase in the federal-level
minimum wage witnessed a 22 percent decrease in property crimes committed by young
adults across all CZs. Young adults, typically characterized as vulnerable workers, are usu-
ally low-skilled workers who are paid the minimum wage. Thus, higher minimum wages
may bring young workers to the legitimate labor market, resulting in fewer potential prop-
erty crime perpetrators. Furthermore, we find that higher minimum wages reduced overall
property crime and overall violent crime from both male and female perpetrators. In terms
of racial groups, higher minimum wages decreased property crime committed by whites.
We do not find a significant impact of social welfare spending. The results consolidate the
claim that a higher level minimum wage plays a significant role in reducing crime rates due
to the China Shock.
We examine the robustness of these results in two ways. First, we consider the pos-
sibility that pre-existing trends could drive the results by employing an alternate empiri-
cal specification that places no restrictions on the timing of any potential decreases in the
crime rate. Second, we account for the concurrent opioid epidemic that may lead to spuri-
ous crime rate increases by including state-level opioid regulation with the full set of year
dummies in the regression. The results sustain for both of these two robustness checks.
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In the final part of the chapter, we present evidence supporting labor market disruption
as a plausible mechanism for minimum wages’ impact on crime rates in the China Shock’s
presence. We employ the unemployment rate as the measure of job availability and two
types of disability measures - total disability payments and the number of disabled workers
- to examine potential mechanisms through the labor market. Results show the China Shock
brought a significant increase in the unemployment rate and disability transfers. A higher
level of minimum wages drew vulnerable workers back to the legitimate labor market,
reducing their reliance on Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income, as well
as potential substance abuse, which ultimately leads to crime rate reduction.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This research differs from the literature that examined the link between minimum wage
and crime and highlights three key innovations. First, we incorporate a negative income
shock to study the association between minimum wage and crime. By doing this, we can
identify whether higher minimum wage reduces crime rates, especially during times of
financial/income crisis. Second, we measure the China Shock’s impact on the commuting
zone level, which clusters US counties characterized by strong within-cluster and weak
between-cluster commuting ties. It provides a local labor market geography that covers
the entire land area of the United States. Third, this study accounts for social welfare
spending, another policy tool to reduce crime rates, to separately identify the impact of
minimum wages from the general social safety net.
This study contributes to the literature in trade and labor economics in several ways.
The literature that examines the relationship between minimum wage and crime is recent
and small. The previous studies in labor economics provide some potential channels of
influence. Becker’s theory of rational crime (Becker, 1968) posits that criminal behavior
is responsive to labor market conditions and human capital acquisition. Criminal behav-
ior is negatively related to employment opportunities (Mustard, 2010; Schnepel, 2018),
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wages (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002; Yang, 2017), and educational attainment
(Machin and Meghir, 2004; Anderson, 2014). For example, lack of employment opportu-
nities, as found in Nordin and Almén (2017), such as minimum-wage-induced job loss or
hours reductions may lead to more property crime for economic reasons, and more violent
crime for despair-related, emotionally expressive reasons. Hashimoto (1982) found neg-
ative impacts of higher minimum wage on young workers by reducing their job training
opportunity. Neumark and Nizalova (2007) examined the exposure to minimum wages at
young ages could lead to adverse long-run effects via decreased labor market experience
and tenure, and diminished education and training, while beneficial long-run effects could
arise if minimum wages increase skill acquisition.
This chapter incorporates a discussion of negative income shock as a method for iden-
tifying the relationship between minimum wage and crime. The existing literature found
the China Shock induced a robust negative income effect. Brussevich (2018) found wage
and welfare losses of male workers in the manufacturing sector for a CZ hit by the China
Shock due to heterogeneous switching costs between industries.
Other studies investigated the link between minimum wages and crimes. Besedeš, Lee,
and Yang (2021) showed the China Shock contributed to a decline in male wages in the
manufacturing and service sectors. Results also indicated that women entered the labor
force to replace the lost family income due to husbands leaving the labor force or becom-
ing unemployed. Hansen and Machin (2002)’s paper provided an empirical evaluation of
whether one can uncover a link between crime and the labor market variables using a re-
search methodology that is different from that utilized in existing work. They exploited a
massive regulatory change made to the UK labor market when a national minimum wage
was introduced in April 1999. Contrary to their research, we uncover a statistically signifi-
cant negative relationship, showing relative crime reductions in areas that initially had more
low wage workers. In a relevant recent research, Fone, Sabia, and Cesur (2019) argued that
a higher minimum wage raised overall property crime rates for the young age group. Dif-
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ferent from this research, they looked at correlations between minimum wage changes and
crime rates, while in this chapter, we examine the role of minimum wage against a negative
income shock. Additionally, we provide important insights on the role of minimum wage
in current discussions.
As a policy tool targeted towards low-skilled workers, the minimum wage is often sub-
ject to a debate of whether it is a substitute for or a complement to expenditure oriented
social welfare policies. Among those, social welfare spending is considered as an effective
tool to reduce crime in a large body of theoretical empirical research (Fender, 1999; Fish-
back, Johnson, and Kantor, 2010; Chioda, De Mello, and Soares, 2016; Loureiro, 2012).
These studies argued that social safety net programs reduced crime via channels such as
supplemental security income, job training, and housing assistance help, which alleviated
distress by providing work and income opportunities for the unemployed. This study disen-
tangles the effect of minimum wages from social welfare spending by incorporating social
welfare spending in the identification strategy. Therefore, we can separately identify the
impact of minimum wage from the general social safety net while comparing their impacts
on crime rates under a negative income shock.
This research builds on trade literature and adds to the growing research that studies
the impacts of trade liberalization on multiple US socio-economic aspects. We employ
Pierce and Schott’s (2016) approach to measure a local labor market’s exposure to trade
liberalization. This chapter showed that granting PNTR to China in 2001 caused a sharp
decline in US manufacturing employment in the 2000s. In a follow-up paper, Pierce and
Schott (2020) calculated the exposure level to PNTR for each US county. They showed
that a county’s higher exposure to PNTR was associated with increases in mortality from
stress-related causes, specifically among white males, and an increase in property crimes.5
Other studies found significant trade liberalization effects on labor market outcomes and
crime rates using different methodologies. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) explained the
5Similar research that examine the relationship between the China Shock and crime rates are found in
Feler and Senses (2017a) and Che, Xu, and Zhang (2018).
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decline in US manufacturing employment with Chinese import penetration. Their esti-
mation strategy, to instrument the growth of Chinese exports to the US by the growth of
Chinese exports to other high-income countries, was adopted by several follow-up papers.
Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2019a) found a positive impact of the China Shock, which
lowered the price level, but the effects were heterogeneous across regions due to moving
frictions. Feler and Senses (2017b) found similar results that the China Shock lowered
housing prices, leading to decreases in the quality of public goods. Greenland and Lopresti
(2016) investigated the human capital aspect of the China Shock: higher CZ’s exposure to
the China Shock led to high school graduation rates increases. Greenland, Lopresti, and
McHenry (2019) estimated population change. Higher CZ’s exposure to the China Shock
led to slower population growth, especially for the young age and low education individu-
als. Similarly, Feenstra, Xu, and Ma (2019) and Byun and Lee (2019) investigated China
Shock’s mitigation effects through the housing market and the local banking system.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the back-
ground and the data used for the analysis. Section 2.3 presents the models and identification
strategy, followed by Section 2.4, discussing the estimation results. Section 2.5 discusses
the robustness of the results. Section 2.6 investigates potential mechanisms and Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Background and Data
2.2.1 Background
In the past thirty-five years, China jumped from being an insignificant contributor to world
GDP to the second-largest economy and the largest trading country. In 2007, China became
the US’ largest import source, accounting for 17 percent of all imports versus just 3 percent
in 1990. As indicated in Pierce and Schott (2016), the US’ growing imports from China
coincide with a sharp, 18 percent decline in US manufacturing employment from 2001 to
2007, with more than 80 percent of the decline occurring between 2001 and 2004. This
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decline was steeper in industries more exposed to the US granting permanent normal trade
relations to China. Exposed workers experienced reduced lifetime income and depressed
wage levels for at least a full decade after the China Shock occurred (Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson, 2016).
The US operates two tariff systems depending on the status given to its trading part-
ner. Countries with Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status are eligible to receive low tariff
rates (NTR rates), which are reserved for members of the WTO. The NTR rates are sig-
nificantly lower than tariff rates for countries without NTR status (non-NTR rates) by, on
average, around 30 percentage points. The non-NTR rates are often applied to non-market-
economy countries. Although China’s status had been a non-market economy, US imports
from China had been subject to the NTR rates since 1980. China’s NTR status was tempo-
rary in the sense that such NTR status required renewal by the US Congress on an annual
basis. The renewal had continued successively on a year-over-year term, although the suc-
cess of the annual renewal procedure was highly uncertain ex-ante for market participants,
including US importers and Chinese exporters. Simply put, high uncertainty was a major
obstacle to long-term investment in China. Hence, the bill’s passage granting Permanent
Normal Trade Relation (PNTR) status to China in October 2000 eliminated the uncertainty
for potential tariff hikes.6
Pierce and Schott (2016) quantify an industry-level exposure to the imposition of PNTR
(NTRGapj) as a difference between the non-NTR rate and the NTR rate;
NTRGapj = non−NTR tariffj −NTR tariffj , (2.1)
which captures a degree of the trade uncertainty that firms within an industry would have
faced prior to the bill’s passage. Given industry-level exposure, Pierce and Schott (2020)
suggest a county-level exposure to the China Shock by using a county’s employment shares
across industries. Following their approach, we construct a CZ-level exposure (NTRGapc)
6In this chapter, we use the year 2001 to characterize pre-PNTR period and post-PNTR period.
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where Lj,c refers to the number of employees for an industry j at a commuting zone c
and Lc refers to the total number of employees for a commuting zone c in the year 1990.7
Figure 2.1 reports geographical distribution of NTRGapc.
Figure 2.1: Number of arrests per 1,000 residents by commuting zone in 2000
2.2.2 Data
The crime data comes from Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the National Incident-Based
Reporting System from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1990-2013. We use the data
organized by Kaplan (2018), which provides the annual number of arrests at the law-
enforcement-agency level and we aggregate the number of arrests at the CZ level. Fol-
lowing UCR’s crime categories, Kaplan classifies each crime into two main categories,
7We use the US Department of Agriculture definition of commuting zones as of 1990 and the concordance
of counties in commuting zones provided by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). The employment information
is obtained from County Business Patterns (CBP) provided by U.S. Census Bureau (1990-2013b). Regarding
the missing observations for a few industries in the CBP dataset, we impute those values following Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013), which also provides codes to aggregate employment.
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property crime and violent crime, and four sub-categories for each: burglary, theft, motor
vehicle theft, arson; and murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault.8 The number of arrests
is also separately reported by the offender’s demographics such as age, sex, and race. The
main focus of this chapter is on the differential impacts on five age groups: under 20, 20-29,
30-39, 40-49, and over 49 years old. We normalize the number of arrests using the popula-
tion for each age group provided by U.S. Census Bureau (2015), and derive the number of
arrests per 1,000 individuals for each CZ × year × crime type, which builds the dependent
variables.
Figure A.2 plots the distributions of overall property crime and violent crime rates
across CZs in 1990, 2007, 2010, and 2013. The figure shows that the support of prop-
erty crime is relatively wider than that of violent crime and that property crime rates vary
substantially across CZs. This pattern can be confirmed from Table 2.1. It reports the
summary statistics of property crime and violent crime, and the breakdown of them by de-
mographic groups of gender, age, and race. The statistics show that overall, property crime
rates are higher than violent crime rates. Males in general committed more crimes than
females. Young adults aged 20-29 are more likely to commit crimes, and the likelihood
to commit crimes is decreasing as age increases. Moreover, black crime perpetrators are
larger than other racial groups, in terms of both property crime and violent crime.
We use the state-level minimum wage in the year 2000, one year before the China
Shock. In the case that the state-level minimum wage was higher than the federal-level
minimum wage, we assign a CZ minimum wage of the state that it belongs to.9 We collect
the federal and state-level minimum wages from the US Department of Labor. To sepa-
rate the impact of minimum wage from the general social safety net, we control for social
welfare spending per capita of the state where a CZ is located. Following II − 1 in De-
8Table A.1 shows the CZs with the highest and lowest NTR Gaps, and Figure A.1 shows geographic
distributions of overall property crimes and overall violent crimes in 2000. The overall property crime refer
to the summation of burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson; similarly the overall violent crime refer to
the summation of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
9We are aware that there are 46 cities and 6 counties have local ordinances. However, in 2000, all of the
local ordinances are lower than the state level. All CZs are subsets of a state.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of crime rates, 1990-2013
(a) By All and Gender
All Male Female
Property Crime 0.004 (0.004) 6.48 (5.39) 2.6 (2.47)
Burglary 0.001 (0.001) 1.57 (1.24) 0.19 (0.21)
Theft 0.003 (0.003) 2.3 (2.25) 2.77 (2.53)
Motor Vehicle Theft 0 (0.001) 0.49 (0.64) 0.1 (0.43)
Arson 0 (0) 0.08 (0.16) 0.01 (0.05)
Violent Crime 0.001 (0.001) 2.16 (1.92) 0.4 (0.44)
Murder 0 (0) 0.06 (0.09) 0.01 (0.02)
Rape 0 (0) 0.15 (0.17) 0 (0.01)
Robbery 0 (0) 0.29 (0.36) 0.03 (0.05)
Aggravated Assault 0.001 (0.001) 1.66 (1.61) 0.36 (0.41)
(b) By age
Under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 Over 40
Property Crime 7.06 (6.18) 9.57 (10.83) 5.1 (4.85) 2.8 (5.85) 0.64 (0.55)
Burglary 1.5 (1.4) 2.04 (1.92) 0.89 (0.92) 0.39 (0.46) 0.05 (0.08)
Theft 4.94 (4.31) 6.8 (9.93) 3.87 (4.22) 2.25 (5.72) 0.56 (0.5)
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.52 (1.64) 0.64 (0.88) 0.3 (0.42) 0.13 (0.23) 0.02 (0.05)
Arson 0.09 (0.18) 0.08 (0.27) 0.05 (0.17) 0.03 (0.13) 0.01 (0.03)
Violent Crime 1.02 (0.95) 3.49 (3.22) 2.14 (2.11) 1.18 (2.12) 0.26 (0.32)
Murder 0.02 (0.05) 0.1 (0.2) 0.05 (0.12) 0.03 (0.13) 0.01 (0.03)
Rape 0.07 (0.11) 0.21 (0.33) 0.12 (0.19) 0.06 (0.14) 0.02 (0.05)
Robbery 0.21 (0.29) 0.44 (0.57) 0.19 (0.27) 0.08 (0.13) 0.01 (0.03)
Aggravated Assault 0.72 (0.71) 2.75 (2.78) 1.78 (1.91) 1.01 (2.06) 0.22 (0.3)
(c) By race
White Asian Black American Indian
Property Crime 3.81 (3.03) 3.7 (32.93) 17.56 (53.32) 5.72 (23.01)
Burglary 0.75 (0.61) 0.55 (10.66) 3.08 (21.27) 1.07 (10.05)
Theft 2.77 (2.53) 2.79 (29.28) 12.67 (38.48) 3.89 (11.02)
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.24 (0.27) 0.33 (8.6) 1.68 (17.9) 0.65 (8.78)
Arson 0.04 (0.09) 0.03 (1.05) 0.14 (2.16) 0.11 (7.61)
Violent Crime 0.96 (0.93) 0.79 (8.52) 6.42 (23.76) 1.63 (12.29)
Murder 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.9) 0.15 (2.66) 0.04 (0.43)
Rape 0.06 (0.09) 0.06 (1) 0.54 (6.57) 0.09 (0.94)
Robbery 0.08 (0.11) 0.07 (1.4) 0.99 (2.48) 0.13 (1)
Aggravated Assault 0.79 (0.84) 0.63 (8.1) 4.74 (22.2) 1.38 (12.14)
Note. Statistics are generated from the 1990-2013 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Crimes rates are calcu-
lated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The number of
observation is 17,784.
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partment of Health and Human Services (2004), we calculate the social welfare spending
of a state using Annual Survey of State Government Finances Datasets provided by U.S.
Census Bureau (1990-2013a).10 Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for minimum wages
and social welfare spending in 2000. Panel (a) compares two groups of states where the
first row shows the states with the minimum wage higher than the federal level, and the
second row shows the others. This panel shows that 75 CZs in 10 states had the minimum
wage higher than the federal minimum wage in 2000. These 10 states also spent more on
social welfare than the other 10 states. Panel (b) shows the detailed minimum wages and
the states’ social welfare spending for the 10 states with higher minimum wages than the
federal level. Many of them are located on the west coast. Interestingly, this panel shows
variations exist in terms of minimum wage and social welfare spending within this group
of states.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of minimum wage and social welfare spending per capita in
2000
(a) Treated and control groups
States Avg min wage Avg SW spending N of CZs N of States
with min wage > Fed min 5.89 917.93 75 10
with min wage = Fed min 5.15 705.95 666 40
All states 5.30 748.34 741 50
(b) States with min wage > Fed min
State Min wage SW spending N of CZs
Oregon 6.50 869.20 14
Washington 6.50 855.78 12
Connecticut 6.15 885.26 1
Massachusetts 6.00 982.07 5
California 5.75 544.61 18
Vermont 5.75 1148.04 3
Alaska 5.65 1278.05 15
Delaware 5.65 696.09 2
Rhode Island 5.65 1080.91 1
Hawaii 5.25 839.33 4
10Social welfare expenditure includes expenditures on cash assistance (E67, E68), Medicaid (E74), and
non-health social services (E75, E77, F77, G77, E79, F79, G79). Following Department of Health and
Human Services (2004), we exclude expenditures on public hospitals since the Census views spending on




To explore how China shock affected the US local communities’ crime rates, we first revisit
empirical findings by Pierce and Schott (2020) - that increased import competition from
Chinese imports led to higher crime rates for all residents in local communities in the US.
Then, we further study how this impact differs across demographic groups.
Denoting by yc,t the number of crimes per 1,000 individuals in CZ c and year t, we per-
form the baseline empirical exercises by estimating the following difference-in-difference
(DD) model:
yc,t = θ · PostPNTRt ×NTRGapc + PostPNTRt ×Z ′cγ (2.3)
+Z ′c,tλ+ δc + δt + εc,t,
where the first term on the right-hand side is the DD term of interest, an interaction of the
CZ-level exposure to the China Shock and an indicator variable for the post-PNTR period;
PostPNTRt = 1 if t ≥ 2001 and 0 otherwise. That is, a positive estimate for θ indicates
the CZs that are located in highly impacted areas (first difference) result in an increase in
crime rates after the imposition of PNTR (second difference).
The second term interacts with the post-PNTR dummy variable and CZ-level time-
invariant control variables (Zc). The third term captures the impact of time-varying CZ
characteristics (Zc,t). Lastly, δc and δt, represent CZ and year-fixed effects, capturing the
potential impact of any time-invariant characteristics or aggregate shocks that could in-
fluence all CZs’ activities within the same period (Dachis, Duranton, and Turner, 2012).
Following Pierce and Schott (2020), Zc,t in this chapter includes CZ’s exposure to the over-
all US import tariff (NTR Rate) and the phasing out of the global Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA). Zc includes all time-invariant controls used by Pierce and Schott (2020), such as
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Chinese import tariff changes weighted by local employment, the 1990 share of popula-
tion without a college degree, the 1990 share of military veterans, and the 1990 median
household income. We further include more control variables in Zc that may potentially
affect crime rates, such as the 1990 share of residents younger than 25 years old, the 1990
share of whites, the 1990 share of blacks, and the 1990 share of males.11 The estimation
specifications are similar to the ones in Pierce and Schott (2020) but differs in the following
aspects. First, Pierce and Schott look at crime rates by all residents while we look at them
by demographic groups by age, gender, and race. Second, Pierce and Schott use county
as a unit of observation whereas CZ is the unit of observation in this chapter, which are
clusters of US counties characterized by strong within-cluster and weak between-cluster
commuting ties. It provides a local labor market geography that covers the entire land area
of the United States. Lastly, we include more variables Zc.
Specifically, since the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted directly from
the estimates, we adopt the method from Pierce and Schott (2016) that calculated the im-
plied impact of the coefficient estimates, which shows how the impact changes if we move
a CZ from a heavily impacted area (75th percentile of the NTR Gap distribution) to a
less-impacted area (25th percentile of the NTR Gap distribution). Recall that in the DD
specification, θ is the coefficient of interest,




where θ captures the slope of NTRGap on y change with respect to PostPNTR. Under
a linearlity assumption between y changes and NTRGap, we can calculate the implied
11The time-invariant CZ-level attributes are obtained from the 1990 Decennial Census. These data




impact = θ̂ (NTRGap75th −NTRGap25th) (2.5)
where θ̂ refers to the estimated coefficient for θ, and NTRGap75th refers to the 75th per-
centile of the NTRGap distribution. Equation 2.5 calculates the associated y-change if we
move a CZ from 25th percentile to 75 percentile of the NTRGap distribution.
2.3.2 Difference-in-difference-in-difference Model
This chapter aims to examine if higher state-level minimum wage results in lower CZ-level
crime rates in the China Shock’s presence. Therefore, based on the DD specification, we
added the third difference of minimum wage to the identification strategy. We estimate the
following difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) regression model of the form:
yc,t = PostPNTRt ×NTRGapc × (µ1 ·MWc + µ2 · SWEc) (2.6)
+ PostPNTRt × (θ ·NTRGapc + β ·MWc + β2 · SWEc +Z ′cγ)
+Z ′c,tλ+ δc + δt + εc,t,
where MWc refers to the log value of minimum wages and SWEc refers to the log of
state-level social welfare spending that a CZ c belongs to in the year 2000, one year prior
to the shock. The coefficient of interest µ1 measures the minimum wage’s effect on local
crime rates. A negative estimate for µ1 indicates that a CZ located in a highly impacted
area (first difference) with a higher level of minimum wage (third difference), would result
in a lower crime rates after the imposition of PNTR (second difference). µ2 controls for
social welfare spending, which allows us to identify the impact of minimum wage that is
free from confounding CZ-level characteristics.12
12Note the difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-difference estimations used in this
chapter only measure the immediate effect of crimes. They do not provide any information beyond the
immediate point.
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According to Equation 2.7, a higher minimum wage helps reduce crimes against nega-
tive income shock if µ1 is negative.




Likewise, to interpret the coefficient estimates from the DDD model, we calculate the
implied impact for the minimum wages based on Equation 2.7. The implied impact of
minimum wages can be derived by taking the slope of NTRGap on y change with respect
to PostPNTR, conditioning on MWc :
∂ (E [yc,t|PostPNTR = 1,MWc]− E [yc,t|PostPNTR = 0,MWc])
∂NTRGapc
= θ+ µ1 × MWc
(2.8)
Thus the implied impact can be defined as:
impact (MWc) =
(
θ̂ + µ̂1 × MWc
)
(NTRGap75th −NTRGap25th) (2.9)
where the implied impact now depends on the value of minimum wage of a CZ c, MWc.
Therefore, we can now calculate and report the result obtained from the following equation:
impact (MW75th)− impact (MW25th) (2.10)
= µ̂1 ((MW75th)− (MW25th)) (NTRGap75th −NTRGap25th) .
In the case where there is not much variation in the state-level minimum wages, i.e.,
MW75th =MW25th, we can calculate
µ̂1 ((MWFed + 1)− (MWFed)) (NTRGap75th −NTRGap25th) (2.11)
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which implies the change by raising minimum wage of $1 from the federal level.
2.4 Estimation Results
2.4.1 Baseline Results
Following Equation 2.3, we first estimate the China Shock’s impact on property crimes.
Table 2.3 reports the estimated DD coefficient θ from Equation 2.3 using the number of
crimes per 1,000 residents as the dependent variable. The first column reports coefficient
estimates for overall property crimes, which is a summation of the breakdown categories
of crime reported in columns 2-5: burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
As for economic significance, we report the implied impact of an interquartile shift in a
CZ’s exposure to PNTR on crime rates from Equation 2.5 and the social cost of crime.13 We
obtain the unit cost of index crimes in 2010 in the US from Chalfin (2015) and Heeks et al.
(2018), and the statistics are reported in Table A.2. By multiplying the unit cost of crime
with the corresponding implied impact, we can examine the magnitude of each crime’s
social costs due to the China Shock. While these are back-of-the-envelope estimates, the
statistics provide references as to how much social costs these index crimes are associated
with.
As indicated in Table 2.3 the DD point estimate of interest is positive and statistically
significant for overall property crime and this significant pattern is mainly driven by larceny.
To demonstrate the economic significance of the baseline DD results, we consider two CZs
having different degrees of exposure to the China Shock: 0.057 for CZ A and 0.106 for
CZ B. The former and the latter numbers, respectively, correspond to the first and third
quartiles. When controlling for their different characteristics, CZ B exhibits a 0.37414
lower increase in property crimes per 1,000 residents than CZ A, as indicated in the row of
13For each index crime, the cost employed is the median among estimates in the extant literature, including
estimates on defensive expenditure, insurance administration, property stolen or damaged, lost output, health
services, victim services, and police costs, etc.
140.374 = 7.594× (0.106− 0.057).
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implied impact. This change implies that the China Shock induced a $10,151 higher social
cost from an 8.4 percent increase in property crime rates across CZs. Coefficient estimates
for initial CZ attributes indicate that CZs with higher shares of the population aged 25 or
more, higher percentages of people who did not attend college, and lower shares of veterans
had larger increases in property crimes.
Table 2.4 reports estimates for the China Shock’s impact on violent crimes. Compared
to coefficient estimates from property crimes, these estimates are weaker in terms of signif-
icance and magnitude. The first column shows that the impact on overall violent crime is
positive but insignificant. At the same time, murder and robbery, whose motives are often
associated with financial concerns, significantly increased in CZs with higher exposure to
the China Shock. The implied impact on overall violent crime is only about one-tenth of
overall property crimes, 0.039. However, social costs induced by violent crimes are much
more extensive than property crimes, since the cost of pain and suffering to violent crime
victims is usually higher, likewise with associated health services and police costs (Chalfin,
2015). The results are consistent with Pierce and Schott (2020) in terms of statistical sig-
nificance and magnitude.
There is a common conception that crime is linked to the economic climate - irregulari-
ties in the business cycle lead to higher crime rates. Ajimotokin, Haskins, and Wade (2015)
argue that economic recessions lead to loss of jobs. High unemployment rate brings frustra-
tion to individuals due to a loss of disposable income and falling standard of living, which
leads to people committing crimes. In this case, property crime significantly increased af-
ter the China Shock mainly due to financial crisis. Such findings are consistent with the
criminal motivation theory, which suggests that economic stress increases criminal behav-
ior (Landau, 1997; Hoover, 2000; Roberts and LaFree, 2001; Fergusson, Swain-Campbell,
and Horwood, 2004; Weatherburn and Lind, 2006; Malby et al., 2012). According to these
findings, illicit behaviors are caused by structurally induced frustrations at the gap between
aspirations and expectations during an economic downturn.
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Post * NTR Gap 7.594** 0.541 6.654** 0.435 -0.037
(3.585) (0.512) (3.259) (0.404) (0.055)
NTR rate -14.517 -4.470 -10.946 1.106 -0.207
(15.473) (3.078) (11.160) (4.150) (0.405)
MFA rate -12.085 2.446 -15.804 1.689** -0.415
(17.648) (1.802) (16.977) (0.798) (0.278)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.444 0.557 0.223 -0.289 -0.048
(2.903) (0.932) (2.011) (0.388) (0.062)
Post * Age 25+ 5.548** -0.190 5.855*** -0.123 0.007
(2.493) (0.531) (1.859) (0.356) (0.062)
Post * White 2.049* 0.719** 1.273* 0.062 -0.004
(1.048) (0.311) (0.705) (0.139) (0.029)
Post * Black -0.154 0.118 -0.130 -0.163 0.021
(1.157) (0.315) (0.803) (0.136) (0.036)
Post * Male 18.488** 2.831* 13.476** 1.897** 0.284
(7.176) (1.564) (5.472) (0.796) (0.218)
Post * No College 6.067*** 1.063*** 4.289*** 0.672*** 0.043
(1.194) (0.281) (0.899) (0.144) (0.031)
Post * Veteran -16.633*** -3.035*** -12.413*** -1.099** -0.087
(4.250) (0.922) (3.278) (0.451) (0.134)
Post * Median HHI 0.472 0.225* 0.164 0.072 0.011
(0.480) (0.119) (0.341) (0.070) (0.011)
Implied impact: .374 .027 .328 .021 -.002
Impact/Average: .084 .031 .1 .074 -.039
Social Cost $10,151 $139 $650 $186 $-22
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.447 0.572 0.393 0.202 0.200
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.4: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the violent crime
overall violent murder rape robbery aggravated assault
Post * NTR Gap 0.786 0.052* 0.051 0.291* 0.391
(1.049) (0.029) (0.059) (0.154) (0.939)
NTR rate -6.032 -0.104 -1.464 -1.901** -2.562
(9.855) (0.207) (1.290) (0.830) (8.866)
MFA rate 0.740 -0.037 0.409 0.712 -0.343
(2.666) (0.138) (0.275) (0.489) (2.349)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.258 -0.008 -0.048 -0.243 0.042
(1.449) (0.068) (0.110) (0.218) (1.430)
Post * Age 25+ -1.116 -0.008 0.100 -0.383** -0.825
(0.831) (0.029) (0.083) (0.185) (0.730)
Post * White 0.441 0.024** -0.080 0.138*** 0.360
(0.643) (0.011) (0.088) (0.049) (0.639)
Post * Black -1.729*** -0.063*** -0.203** -0.208*** -1.256**
(0.651) (0.015) (0.082) (0.061) (0.628)
Post * Male 6.534** 0.066 0.742*** 1.284*** 4.443
(3.109) (0.091) (0.254) (0.378) (2.926)
Post * No College 0.856 -0.008 0.051 0.107* 0.706
(0.522) (0.014) (0.034) (0.059) (0.480)
Post * Veteran -1.609 -0.020 -0.424*** 0.064 -1.229
(1.701) (0.045) (0.146) (0.367) (1.486)
Post * Median HHI -0.194 -0.013* -0.010 -0.099** -0.073
(0.201) (0.007) (0.011) (0.049) (0.170)
Implied impact: .039 .003 .003 .014 .019
Impact/Average: .03 .078 .033 .091 .019
Social Cost $218,139 $15,960 $449 $545 $1,611
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.513 0.353 0.331 0.712 0.461
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
Given the DD estimation results, we further explore whether higher state-level mini-
mum wages reduce overall CZ-level crime rates controlling for social welfare spending.
Table 2.5 reports DDD regression estimates for property crime, confirming the mitigating
role of minimum wages. Coefficient estimates in the first row show that higher minimum
wages significantly reduced overall property crime and its four sub-categories. In terms
of economic significance, the implied impact shows that an interquartile shift in the mini-
mum wage distribution (from the first to the third quantiles) is associated with a decrease
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in overall property crime rates of 28.7 percent, and 33.3, 23.9, 67.7, and 43.7 percent for
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson respectively. This corresponds to a reduc-
tion in social costs of $34,823, $1,475, $1,546, $1,748, and $234 respectively. The effect
of social welfare spending on crime rates is reported in the second row in Table 2.5. The
results show that more social welfare spending will increase property crimes, while it is
only significant for burglary. The estimates from Table 2.5 confirm that minimum wage is
the main driver for lower property crimes due to the China Shock.
Table 2.6 reports minimum wage’s effect on violent crimes. Results show a weaker
impact of minimum wage in reducing violent crimes. However, it still seems effective in
reducing some types of violent crimes such as robbery and murder.15 Financial motives
may often cause this pattern. The results on minimum wage are consistent with previous
papers that propose mechanisms to soften the China Shock’s negative impact using similar
DDD estimation strategies. Feenstra, Xu, and Ma (2019) show that the China Shock’s
effect on the housing market absorbs opposing forces from the labor market. Byun and
Lee (2019) claim that a CZ with a better functioning local financial market experiences
less increase in unemployment concerning the exposure to the China Shock. Economic
reasoning suggests that higher minimum wage may reduce the possibility of being idle and
lead youth to substitute from crime to legal work. Moreover, higher minimum wage may
raise the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed (Hansen and Machin,
2001; Beauchamp and Chan, 2012; Beauchamp and Chan, 2014; Agan and Makowsky,
2018).
15Robbery: taking or attempting to take anything of value by force, threat of force, or by putting the victim
in fear. Murder: unlawful killing of another human without justification or valid excuse.
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Table 2.5: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the property crime
overall
property
burglary larceny motor vehicle
theft
arson
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -273.333** -60.946*** -166.052* -41.913*** -4.423**
(120.704) (20.394) (97.271) (10.652) (1.852)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 13.413 2.895** 10.487 0.113 -0.083
(9.004) (1.417) (7.975) (0.856) (0.164)
Post * NTR Gap 461.768** 101.742*** 283.472* 69.351*** 7.202**
(199.544) (33.445) (161.493) (17.448) (3.028)
Post * SWspending -0.071 -0.014 -0.154 0.079 0.018
(0.713) (0.123) (0.613) (0.070) (0.014)
Post * MinWage 12.485 3.621** 6.355 2.305*** 0.204
(9.584) (1.598) (7.777) (0.798) (0.139)
NTR rate -16.876 -4.708 -12.902 0.960 -0.226
(15.279) (2.993) (11.101) (4.157) (0.393)
MFA rate -14.219 1.902 -17.121 1.436* -0.437
(17.901) (1.703) (17.338) (0.747) (0.277)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.223 0.670 -0.089 -0.302 -0.055
(2.742) (0.900) (1.939) (0.342) (0.071)
Post * Age 25+ 6.053** -0.116 6.267*** -0.109 0.010
(2.475) (0.520) (1.866) (0.360) (0.062)
Post * White 1.533 0.670** 0.807 0.062 -0.006
(1.076) (0.300) (0.774) (0.130) (0.026)
Post * Black -0.716 0.055 -0.595 -0.192 0.015
(1.128) (0.305) (0.803) (0.124) (0.034)
Post * Male 15.804** 2.105 12.090** 1.383* 0.227
(6.797) (1.461) (5.230) (0.765) (0.217)
Post * No College 4.286*** 0.765*** 3.025*** 0.480*** 0.016
(1.177) (0.261) (0.922) (0.135) (0.030)
Post * Veteran -12.689*** -2.520*** -9.405*** -0.731* -0.032
(4.145) (0.919) (3.192) (0.437) (0.135)
Post * Median HHI 0.166 0.147 -0.019 0.032 0.005
(0.442) (0.105) (0.325) (0.065) (0.010)
Implied impact (MinWage): -1.283 -.286 -.78 -.197 -.021
Implied impact (SWspending): .909 .196 .711 .008 -.006
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.287 -.333 -.239 -.677 -.437
Impact/Average (SWspending): .204 .228 .218 .026 -.118
Social Cost (MinWage): $-34,823 $-1,475 $-1,546 $-1,748 $-234
Social Cost (SWspending): $24,672 $1,011 $1,409 $71 $-67
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.450 0.576 0.395 0.205 0.201
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.6: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the violent crime
overall
violent
murder rape robbery aggravated
assault
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -63.839 -1.573* -0.371 -14.704*** -47.191
(48.798) (0.849) (2.762) (5.233) (44.822)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 1.093 -0.009 -0.386* 0.309 1.179
(3.501) (0.085) (0.211) (0.424) (3.236)
Post * NTR Gap 106.098 2.633* 0.525 24.559*** 78.381
(79.702) (1.400) (4.515) (8.666) (73.214)
Post * SWspending 0.137 0.014* 0.041* 0.012 0.070
(0.310) (0.007) (0.023) (0.041) (0.286)
Post * MinWage 3.512 0.108* -0.052 1.014** 2.443
(3.650) (0.062) (0.213) (0.406) (3.342)
NTR rate -6.228 -0.091 -1.450 -1.897** -2.791
(9.622) (0.206) (1.264) (0.786) (8.714)
MFA rate 0.263 -0.055 0.420 0.591 -0.693
(2.653) (0.137) (0.277) (0.476) (2.368)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.199 0.004 -0.054 -0.202 0.053
(1.592) (0.070) (0.124) (0.210) (1.558)
Post * Age 25+ -1.047 -0.005 0.104 -0.381** -0.765
(0.834) (0.028) (0.087) (0.190) (0.733)
Post * White 0.404 0.024** -0.081 0.147*** 0.315
(0.559) (0.010) (0.087) (0.050) (0.567)
Post * Black -1.796*** -0.064*** -0.206** -0.207*** -1.319**
(0.609) (0.014) (0.082) (0.059) (0.593)
Post * Male 5.688** 0.028 0.708*** 1.082*** 3.870
(2.869) (0.089) (0.237) (0.376) (2.690)
Post * No College 0.497 -0.021 0.030 0.060 0.429
(0.455) (0.013) (0.030) (0.052) (0.419)
Post * Veteran -0.990 -0.011 -0.393*** 0.113 -0.699
(1.722) (0.046) (0.148) (0.356) (1.511)
Post * Median HHI -0.282 -0.018*** -0.015 -0.116** -0.133
(0.174) (0.007) (0.010) (0.045) (0.144)
Implied impact (MinWage): -.3 -.007 -.002 -.069 -.222
Implied impact (SWspending): .074 -.001 -.026 .021 .08
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.235 -.226 -.023 -.439 -.22
Impact/Average (SWspending): .058 -.018 -.342 .133 .079
Social Cost (MinWage): $-1,677,995 $-37,240 $-299 $-2,684 $-18,823
Social Cost (SWspending): $413,905 $-5,320 $-3,890 $817 $6,783
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.514 0.355 0.332 0.714 0.462
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
2.4.2 Results on Age Groups
This section provides empirical evidence that the negative income shock disproportionately
raised crime rates for young adults. The mitigating role of the minimum wage was also
larger for them. The results suggest that a higher minimum wage may be useful in reducing
young workers’ criminal behavior who tend to be in the entry-level labor market and more
likely to hold minimum wage jobs.
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We run DD regression (Equation 2.3) with age groups of under 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-
49, and over 49. Table 2.7 reports results for overall property crime. The estimated DD
coefficient with the 20-29 group is the largest and decreases as the age group gets older.
The implied impact for the 20-29 age group is 1.816. It means a CZ on the 75th percentile
of the NTR Gap distribution experienced 1.816 times higher increase in overall property
crimes per 1,000 residents aged 20-29 years old than that on the 25th percentile. This
change represents a 19 percent increase in property crimes across CZs. Estimates from
Table 2.7 also show that the impact from the China Shock decreases as age increases, with
those aged over 49 being the lowest - only 6 percent increase in property crimes due to the
China Shock.
Table 2.8 reports the estimated DD coefficient θ for violent crimes. In comparison,
violent crimes are less affected by the exposure to the China Shock than property crimes.
Young adults aged 20-29 are still the most affected group, with the economic significance
of a 6 percent increase in violent crimes after the China Shock. Results in Table 2.7 and
Table 2.8 in combination suggest that negative income shock is more likely to drive young
adults to commit crimes associated with the acquisition of property or economic gain.
This substantial impact on young adults is noteworthy. Pierce and Schott (2020) show
the largest China Shock’s impact on the middle-aged group in terms of mortality rates.
However, the negative effects on the young-age group are not well documented. Greenland
and Lopresti (2016) show that a CZ with higher exposure to the China Shock experienced
a relative increase in high school graduation rate. A possible reason for this weaker impact
on the young-age group could be their higher mobility across regions. Greenland, Lopresti,
and McHenry (2019) show that population growth was slower in a CZ with higher exposure
to the shock pronounced in young individuals. If entry-level workers’ financial motives
drive this more substantial impact on the young-age group, young adults should not have
this considerable impact on violent crimes. Consistent with this conjecture, the strongest
influence on young adults is not very clear for violent crimes where the 20-29 age group is
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Table 2.7: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the property crime by age group
under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 over 49
Post * NTR Gap 0.674 36.860*** 18.421*** 14.925** 0.796**
(4.274) (12.584) (4.682) (7.328) (0.345)
NTR rate 3.324 -60.380 -25.431 -39.393*** -6.296**
(35.353) (40.671) (18.940) (14.509) (3.137)
MFA rate 8.160 -73.465 -20.645 -31.187 -2.197
(10.116) (68.245) (24.872) (41.526) (1.443)
Post * Chinese tariff 3.003 6.482 -0.541 1.330 0.209
(5.691) (7.472) (3.914) (2.199) (0.554)
Post * Age 25+ 9.969** -3.619 -2.418 -0.975 1.300***
(5.062) (5.483) (2.577) (1.972) (0.414)
Post * White 2.043 5.238*** 3.398*** 0.702 0.068
(1.766) (1.718) (0.853) (0.643) (0.144)
Post * Black 3.239* -4.276** -6.189*** 0.850 0.766***
(1.807) (2.087) (1.169) (0.680) (0.180)
Post * Male 41.181*** 33.511** 14.266** -0.600 0.701
(12.910) (13.356) (6.923) (4.790) (1.085)
Post * No College 12.337*** 8.006*** 4.279*** -0.092 0.151
(2.132) (2.770) (1.286) (1.188) (0.173)
Post * Veteran -38.004*** -15.383 -5.455 -2.376 -2.183***
(7.611) (10.716) (5.034) (4.847) (0.625)
Post * Median HHI 1.626* 0.654 -0.802 -0.162 0.130**
(0.846) (1.028) (0.492) (0.425) (0.062)
Implied impact: .033 1.816 .907 .735 .039
Impact/Average: .005 .19 .178 .263 .061
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.497 0.252 0.445 0.133 0.551
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
still the most affected, with the 40-49 age group being second.
If the China Shock raised crime rates of young-age groups through monetary motiva-
tion, the minimum wage should be more effective in reducing crimes committed by young
adults. To explore this effect, we run DDD regression (Equation 2.6) for each age group. As
shown in Equation 2.7, a negative sign of µ1 indicates a mitigating role of minimum wage
on crimes, and its magnitude represents the size of mitigation. The results may not be
solely driven by minimum wage itself but by a better social safety net of the local commu-
nity. Therefore, in this section, we also include the social welfare spending in estimation.
Results for property crime are reported in Table 2.9. Coefficient estimates for the min-
imum wage are significant for age groups of under 20, 20-29, and 30-39, with the largest
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Table 2.8: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the violent crime rates by age group
under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 over 49
Post * NTR Gap 0.807 4.640* 1.470 3.708** 0.795**
(0.697) (2.644) (1.660) (1.734) (0.322)
NTR rate 1.205 1.515 -3.788 6.273 -0.665
(5.056) (20.348) (13.715) (18.845) (1.949)
MFA rate -0.639 1.231 2.467 1.449 -0.592
(2.024) (7.969) (4.941) (3.104) (0.731)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.824 -1.889 -2.368 2.831 0.837
(0.960) (3.093) (2.445) (2.159) (0.821)
Post * Age 25+ -0.222 -3.243 -2.452* -0.905 0.038
(0.814) (2.373) (1.445) (1.097) (0.184)
Post * White 0.383 0.692 0.835 -0.301 -0.146
(0.266) (0.858) (0.684) (0.363) (0.095)
Post * Black -1.162*** -4.800*** -2.925*** -1.913*** -0.404***
(0.327) (1.151) (0.804) (0.428) (0.127)
Post * Male 7.933*** 14.841** 6.202 2.536 0.227
(2.182) (6.660) (4.863) (2.972) (0.838)
Post * No College 1.098*** 0.376 0.539 0.258 -0.090
(0.312) (1.033) (0.673) (0.440) (0.104)
Post * Veteran -2.331 -3.176 -2.064 -0.594 -0.195
(1.503) (4.715) (3.045) (1.847) (0.399)
Post * Median HHI -0.199 -0.669 -0.559** -0.038 -0.042
(0.184) (0.447) (0.282) (0.203) (0.044)
Implied impact: .04 .229 .072 .183 .039
Impact/Average: .039 .065 .034 .155 .152
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.568 0.554 0.543 0.189 0.396
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
magnitude on those who are under 20. The magnitude decreases as age increases. In terms
of economic significance, the implied impact shows the change by raising the minimum
wage of one dollar from the federal level will reduce overall property crime rates of 28.9
percent, and 21.6, 23.9, and 25.3 percent for the age group of under 20, 20-29, and 30-39
respectively, given an interquartile shift in exposure to PNTR. Social welfare spending does
not present a significant pattern except for those aged 30-39, and all coefficient estimates
on social welfare spending are positive. Table 2.10 reports estimates for violent crimes.
Higher minimum wages statistically significantly mitigated violent crimes committed by
those under 20, 40-49, and over 49.
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Figure A.3 visualizes the estimated DDD coefficients with minimum wage µ1 from
Equation 2.6. The first column figures show estimated DDD coefficients for all property
crimes and subcategories of property crimes of burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and
arson. The second column shows DDD coefficients for all violent crimes and its subcate-
gories of violent category, including murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
For property crimes, figures in the first row present negative coefficients for all age
groups, but the magnitudes decrease as the sample group gets older. We observe this pat-
tern for all subcategories in property crimes except for arson, a crime that may not be
committed out of financial reasons. In the second column of violent crimes, the signs of µ1
are consistently negative but do not show a particularly more substantial impact on young
adults.
Our estimates suggest that youth behavior is responsive to price incentives and that
falling real wages may have been an essential determinant of rising youth crime during the
1970s and 1980s. Moreover, wage differentials explain a substantial component of both the
racial differential in criminal participation and crime’s age distribution. The mechanism of
this phenomenon is studied in a series of research. Young adults’ behavior is responsive to
financial motives, and that increasing real wage may have been a vital determinant of falling
youth crime (Grogger, 1998). While a minimum wage hike reduces crime’s attractiveness
as a source of income relative to legitimate work (Kallem, 2004), higher minimum wage
may improve the legitimate labor market by enticing those who would commit crimes to
enter the legitimate labor market (Loonam, 2020).
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Table 2.9: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the property crime by age group
under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 over 49
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -435.177** -439.200* -275.482*** -127.158 -20.397
(210.678) (246.596) (99.384) (93.233) (18.155)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 8.051 45.434 21.378* 17.885 0.072
(11.178) (28.511) (11.260) (16.348) (1.040)
Post * NTR Gap 719.042** 775.545* 478.995*** 230.326 34.340
(346.145) (416.654) (166.889) (164.274) (29.857)
Post * SWspending 0.726 -1.002 -0.143 -0.703 0.049
(0.963) (2.065) (0.853) (1.139) (0.090)
Post * MinWage 16.552 16.959 14.983* 9.552 1.163
(16.739) (19.241) (7.717) (6.920) (1.395)
NTR rate -0.758 -66.013 -27.006 -39.850*** -6.342**
(34.939) (40.865) (18.869) (15.045) (3.139)
MFA rate 5.656 -78.103 -23.649 -33.080 -2.332
(9.445) (69.870) (25.184) (42.593) (1.426)
Post * Chinese tariff 1.793 6.400 0.200 2.200 0.221
(5.443) (7.197) (3.782) (2.247) (0.539)
Post * Age 25+ 10.683** -2.015 -1.696 -0.669 1.310***
(5.081) (5.532) (2.533) (2.028) (0.412)
Post * White 1.259 3.516* 2.791*** 0.477 0.068
(1.813) (1.881) (0.876) (0.759) (0.155)
Post * Black 2.266 -5.795*** -6.744*** 0.707 0.753***
(1.765) (2.032) (1.123) (0.688) (0.183)
Post * Male 36.820*** 29.906** 10.960 -1.989 0.429
(12.699) (13.062) (6.809) (4.758) (1.096)
Post * No College 9.192*** 4.165 2.369* -0.607 0.053
(2.087) (2.975) (1.350) (1.259) (0.184)
Post * Veteran -30.662*** -6.762 -2.102 -1.801 -2.016***
(7.480) (10.125) (4.765) (4.447) (0.631)
Post * Median HHI 1.178 -0.012 -1.289*** -0.372 0.106*
(0.796) (1.018) (0.483) (0.424) (0.063)
Implied impact (MinWage): -2.043 -2.062 -1.293 -.597 -.096
Implied impact (SWspending): .546 3.079 1.449 1.212 .005
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.289 -.216 -.253 -.214 -.15
Impact/Average (SWspending): .077 .322 .284 .434 .008
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.501 0.254 0.448 0.133 0.552
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.10: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the violent crime by age group
under 20 20-29 30-39 40-49 over 49
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -55.681** -116.532 -55.161 -82.357*** -14.524*
(22.087) (77.566) (50.785) (29.246) (8.195)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 0.596 3.929 2.352 0.031 1.383*
(2.056) (8.622) (5.683) (4.019) (0.803)
Post * NTR Gap 92.539** 197.646 93.055 138.954*** 25.139*
(36.615) (128.412) (84.041) (48.317) (13.519)
Post * SWspending 0.243 0.275 0.200 -0.006 -0.126*
(0.184) (0.683) (0.457) (0.288) (0.066)
Post * MinWage 3.191* 5.238 1.657 6.574*** 1.274**
(1.663) (5.960) (3.831) (2.309) (0.643)
NTR rate 1.208 0.798 -4.329 6.510 -0.709
(4.893) (19.949) (13.454) (18.805) (1.927)
MFA rate -1.118 0.280 2.000 0.894 -0.736
(1.980) (7.971) (4.910) (3.053) (0.718)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.665 -1.859 -2.422 3.058 0.886
(1.029) (3.191) (2.645) (2.126) (0.804)
Post * Age 25+ -0.131 -2.974 -2.240 -1.037 0.017
(0.815) (2.384) (1.449) (1.127) (0.185)
Post * White 0.345 0.460 0.629 -0.104 -0.123
(0.256) (0.833) (0.665) (0.368) (0.089)
Post * Black -1.222*** -5.054*** -3.127*** -1.791*** -0.385***
(0.311) (1.134) (0.792) (0.414) (0.122)
Post * Male 7.021*** 13.364** 5.513 1.439 0.132
(2.131) (6.440) (4.737) (2.938) (0.819)
Post * No College 0.719** -0.541 -0.074 0.256 -0.053
(0.300) (1.018) (0.662) (0.444) (0.105)
Post * Veteran -1.811 -1.420 -0.819 -0.837 -0.267
(1.513) (4.759) (3.060) (1.871) (0.396)
Post * Median HHI -0.313* -0.867** -0.678** -0.083 -0.037
(0.171) (0.428) (0.272) (0.202) (0.041)
Implied impact (MinWage): -.261 -.547 -.259 -.387 -.068
Implied impact (SWspending): .04 .266 .159 .002 .094
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.256 -.157 -.121 -.328 -.264
Impact/Average (SWspending): .04 .076 .074 .002 .363
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.571 0.555 0.544 0.190 0.397
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
2.4.3 Results on Gender
We also examine the differential impacts of the China Shock on gender and race. Table 2.11
reports the DD regression results on gender. The China Shock witnesses a significantly
positive increase in property crime, but no impact on violent crime. For property crime,
both males and females are affected significantly, while the magnitude for males is larger.
On average, the China Shock brings an 8.6 percent increase in property crimes across CZs
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for males and an 11.6 percent increase for females.
Table 2.11: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the property crime by gender
Property crimes Violent crimes
male female male female
Post * NTR Gap 11.369** 6.135*** 2.288 0.554
(5.101) (2.346) (1.591) (0.358)
NTR rate -24.441 -8.777 -0.863 0.712
(20.638) (11.886) (12.363) (3.093)
MFA rate -18.965 -9.256 -0.356 -0.557
(24.847) (11.306) (4.003) (1.059)
Post * Chinese tariff 1.330 1.515 -1.036 0.284
(4.493) (1.807) (2.038) (0.628)
Post * Age 25+ 11.109*** 0.959 -1.675 -0.231
(3.773) (1.443) (1.371) (0.291)
Post * White 2.062 1.353*** 0.786 -0.125
(1.392) (0.492) (0.517) (0.149)
Post * Black -0.855 0.053 -3.258*** -0.595***
(1.607) (0.552) (0.709) (0.177)
Post * Male 37.589*** 6.467* 10.148** 1.479
(9.926) (3.636) (4.221) (1.030)
Post * No College 7.680*** 2.909*** 0.772 0.223
(1.687) (0.671) (0.629) (0.143)
Post * Veteran -27.081*** -5.959** -3.068 -0.235
(6.314) (2.451) (2.832) (0.645)
Post * Median HHI 0.173 0.396 -0.577* -0.077
(0.673) (0.253) (0.300) (0.061)
Implied impact: .56 .302 .113 .027
Impact/Average: .086 .116 .052 .067
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.471 0.411 0.599 0.540
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
The China shock’s impact on males has been well documented in research. The import
competition from China, along with its accession into WTO, brought frustration to people
who used to work in the manufacturing sectors due to a loss of disposable income (Kim,
2018; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016; Caliendo, Dvorkin, and
Parro, 2019b). The standard of living for most fell considerably, which put tremendous
pressure on maintaining the accustomed lifestyle. This negative income shock is believed
to have caused a significant increase in crime rates for males (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer,
2001; Lin, 2008; Mustard, 2010; Che, Xu, and Zhang, 2018).
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Table 2.12: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the violent crime by gender
Property crimes Violent crimes
male female male female
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -388.151** -133.360** -80.683* -33.879***
(165.976) (56.958) (45.022) (11.249)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 22.978* 6.552 1.938 1.538
(12.398) (5.992) (5.011) (1.191)
Post * NTR Gap 657.801** 227.742** 135.642* 56.749***
(274.726) (94.993) (74.534) (18.577)
Post * SWspending -0.282 0.131 0.274 -0.094
(0.976) (0.442) (0.406) (0.097)
Post * MinWage 16.857 6.332 3.523 2.650***
(13.209) (4.458) (3.367) (0.880)
NTR rate -28.256 -9.667 -1.310 0.704
(20.169) (11.851) (12.072) (3.001)
MFA rate -22.138 -10.432 -0.994 -0.852
(25.182) (11.510) (3.953) (1.051)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.958 1.600 -1.018 0.394
(4.242) (1.722) (2.234) (0.625)
Post * Age 25+ 11.956*** 1.265 -1.483 -0.255
(3.755) (1.435) (1.369) (0.290)
Post * White 1.163 1.081** 0.627 -0.082
(1.419) (0.505) (0.487) (0.140)
Post * Black -1.775 -0.230 -3.437*** -0.569***
(1.537) (0.531) (0.683) (0.172)
Post * Male 33.999*** 4.892 9.059** 1.098
(9.603) (3.512) (4.129) (0.982)
Post * No College 4.978*** 1.931*** 0.101 0.204
(1.701) (0.679) (0.609) (0.138)
Post * Veteran -20.965*** -4.063* -1.814 -0.267
(6.117) (2.348) (2.844) (0.635)
Post * Median HHI -0.273 0.185 -0.725** -0.096*
(0.630) (0.241) (0.285) (0.056)
Implied impact (MinWage): -1.822 -.626 -.379 -.159
Implied impact (SWspending): 1.557 .444 .131 .104
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.281 -.241 -.175 -.393
Impact/Average (SWspending): .24 .171 .061 .258
Observations 17,736 17,736 17,736 17,736
R2 0.475 0.413 0.600 0.542
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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When turning to the DDD regression results on gender, as reported in Table 2.12, we
can see higher state-level minimum wages significantly mitigated the increasing pattern for
both property and violent crimes. This mitigating effect is larger for males. The economic
significance of the DDD coefficient estimates for minimum wages shows that a one-dollar
increase in the (federal-level) minimum wage would decrease property crimes by 28.1 and
24.1 percent for males and females, and 17.5 and 39.3 percent of decrease in violent crimes
for males and females respectively.16
Figure A.4 visualizes the estimated DDD coefficients with minimum wage on males
and females. For property crimes, figures in the first row present similar patterns - there are
negative coefficients for both genders, and the magnitude is larger for males. Patterns for
violent crimes are a bit irregular - the negative coefficients are larger for males in murder,
robbery, and aggravated assault.
2.4.4 Results on Race
Table 2.13 and Table 2.14 report results that show differential impacts of the China Shock
on race. Except for blacks, we witness a significant increase for all races in terms of prop-
erty crimes. The largest magnitude of the coefficient estimates falls on Asians. The eco-
nomic significance shows that an interquartile shift in exposure to PNTR is associated with
increases in property crime rates of 5, 40.5, and 30.8 percent among whites, Asians, and
American Indians. Only black people experience a significant increase in violent crimes -
an average of 36.6 percent increase across CZs.
Table 2.15 and Table 2.16 report DDD estimates for minimum wages and social wel-
fare spending and Figure A.5 visualizes the coefficient estimates. Higher minimum wage
significantly mitigated property crime increase for white and black people. A one-dollar
increase in the federal-level minimum wage reduces property crime by 26 and 126 percent
for whites and blacks, respectively. This economic significance is substantial. In contrast,
16See Equation 2.11. There is not much variation in the 2000 state-level minimum wage sample, with the
25th and the 75th distribution both $5.15.
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social welfare spending has no impact on racial groups, except for American Indians. How-
ever, we should interpret the coefficient estimates for American Indians with caution due
to a small sample size. We do not see any significant patterns for violent crimes.
The differential impacts of the China Shock on racial groups may be relevant to racial
unemployment rates. According to Massourakis, Rezvani, and Yamada (1984) and Smith,
Devine, and Sheley (1992), black unemployment seems to exert a more substantial in-
fluence on crimes than white unemployment. Prolonged structural unemployment that hit
blue-collar workers may weaken the legitimacy of legal earning activities and consequently
push these people towards crime.
Table 2.13: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the property crime by race
white black asian american indian
Post * NTR Gap 6.116** 35.758 51.333** 40.941**
(2.712) (45.361) (24.102) (17.242)
NTR rate -20.182 -315.623* -96.704 113.564
(12.579) (175.226) (93.622) (104.410)
MFA rate -7.647 13.220 -52.127* 13.188
(12.708) (122.842) (28.516) (24.527)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.752 77.115 -30.352 -4.333
(3.037) (74.081) (18.526) (21.539)
Post * Age 25+ 6.683*** 23.597 -41.827 -36.189
(2.165) (107.171) (32.070) (27.996)
Post * White 1.736** 0.052 -6.595 -13.357***
(0.757) (20.311) (5.445) (2.861)
Post * Black 2.976*** 34.186* -0.569 -8.846**
(0.871) (17.577) (6.701) (3.444)
Post * Male 12.213** -62.873 -145.939 -69.174
(5.934) (126.730) (98.781) (61.081)
Post * No College 4.586*** 12.215 8.697 8.331*
(0.955) (19.310) (7.275) (4.807)
Post * Veteran -14.039*** -44.016 0.063 91.000**
(3.809) (102.179) (51.104) (41.480)
Post * Median HHI 0.476 16.285 13.058*** 4.781**
(0.356) (10.348) (3.518) (1.859)
Implied impact: .301 1.761 2.529 2.017
Impact/Average: .05 .366 .405 .308
Observations 17,736 17,379 17,557 17,676
R2 0.537 0.179 0.078 0.208
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.14: (Diff-Diff) PNTR and the violent crime by race
white black asian american indian
Post * NTR Gap 0.964 47.729** 6.477 10.212
(0.743) (22.868) (4.301) (6.561)
NTR rate 0.702 -125.581* -6.618 45.072*
(7.383) (72.761) (21.903) (25.433)
MFA rate -0.065 -38.018 -15.003 -6.151
(1.776) (30.478) (9.509) (14.286)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.794 117.676 -1.242 6.011
(0.889) (90.810) (5.255) (8.335)
Post * Age 25+ 0.092 -24.055 -4.672 -17.012
(0.613) (19.618) (8.040) (13.091)
Post * White 0.281 0.623 -0.596 -1.915
(0.242) (4.613) (1.184) (1.419)
Post * Black -0.405 -1.803 -0.011 -0.523
(0.277) (5.610) (1.397) (1.284)
Post * Male 3.596* -110.325 -6.293 6.208
(2.136) (69.274) (13.882) (18.825)
Post * No College 0.266 2.548 0.735 4.001**
(0.289) (5.047) (1.115) (1.930)
Post * Veteran -1.395 38.035 11.598 28.861**
(1.417) (25.788) (11.277) (12.824)
Post * Median HHI -0.109 -1.660 1.197 1.834
(0.120) (2.164) (1.197) (1.758)
Implied impact: .047 2.351 .319 .503
Impact/Average: .05 .366 .405 .308
Observations 17,736 17,379 17,557 17,676
R2 0.564 0.101 0.079 0.083
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.15: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the property crime by race
white black asian american indian
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -210.591** -4713.445* 1261.466 -240.335
(102.669) (2812.840) (1571.145) (360.665)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 9.975 105.997 -47.462 88.534*
(7.041) (98.411) (60.229) (45.955)
Post * NTR Gap 355.975** 7816.774* -2038.903 466.928
(169.577) (4628.862) (2589.671) (612.135)
Post * SWspending -0.031 -8.982 1.231 -10.567**
(0.561) (8.792) (5.733) (4.468)
Post * MinWage 7.785 326.230* -74.327 25.378
(8.210) (184.155) (124.364) (27.698)
NTR rate -22.603* -329.087* -89.541 106.103
(12.351) (173.165) (94.404) (101.919)
MFA rate -9.111 -16.073 -42.193 10.447
(12.852) (120.684) (28.304) (24.536)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.211 83.122 -30.618 -5.343
(2.711) (74.688) (19.013) (22.093)
Post * Age 25+ 7.142*** 18.990 -42.449 -37.254
(2.158) (106.966) (32.512) (27.774)
Post * White 1.208 5.844 -6.115 -13.100***
(0.796) (20.595) (6.701) (2.999)
Post * Black 2.414*** 36.777** 0.476 -8.386**
(0.841) (17.765) (7.403) (3.558)
Post * Male 10.412* -114.054 -131.735 -62.970
(5.756) (133.356) (100.954) (60.503)
Post * No College 3.007*** 7.215 13.613* 12.639**
(0.978) (22.452) (8.161) (4.927)
Post * Veteran -10.219*** -28.293 -9.971 87.733**
(3.692) (97.413) (52.009) (41.620)
Post * Median HHI 0.264 15.006 14.065*** 6.352***
(0.340) (10.433) (3.807) (2.158)
Implied impact (MinWage): -.989 -22.129 5.922 -1.128
Implied impact (SWspending): .676 7.184 -3.217 6
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.26 -1.26 1.603 -.197
Impact/Average (SWspending): .177 .409 -.87 1.049
Observations 17,736 17,379 17,557 17,676
R2 0.541 0.180 0.078 0.209
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.16: (Diff-Diff-Diff) Minimum wage and the violent crime by race
white black asian american indian
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -26.964 -486.532 41.028 29.490
(22.282) (305.013) (88.952) (97.480)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 1.042 45.320 -11.332 -20.438
(2.685) (37.285) (7.594) (20.882)
Post * NTR Gap 45.677 862.666* -65.077 -45.887
(36.930) (516.351) (147.641) (163.252)
Post * SWspending -0.004 -6.437 0.990 0.539
(0.208) (4.026) (0.686) (2.295)
Post * MinWage 0.846 45.368* -1.283 -0.674
(1.681) (26.290) (6.923) (8.226)
NTR rate 0.339 -128.422* -5.020 46.278*
(7.330) (74.130) (21.900) (26.335)
MFA rate -0.219 -41.141 -14.559 -4.606
(1.751) (31.096) (9.598) (14.161)
Post * Chinese tariff -0.909 118.773 -0.866 5.305
(0.929) (90.277) (5.273) (8.116)
Post * Age 25+ 0.147 -26.251 -4.755 -17.692
(0.618) (20.107) (8.075) (13.211)
Post * White 0.210 2.152 -0.349 -1.237
(0.237) (4.860) (1.208) (1.380)
Post * Black -0.483* -0.579 0.186 -0.061
(0.273) (5.440) (1.430) (1.294)
Post * Male 3.398 -112.629 -6.813 6.573
(2.092) (68.958) (14.428) (17.968)
Post * No College 0.060 6.007 0.804 4.934*
(0.287) (6.002) (1.248) (2.676)
Post * Veteran -0.855 34.933 10.610 27.277**
(1.432) (25.681) (11.332) (12.506)
Post * Median HHI -0.129 -0.704 1.097 2.094
(0.115) (2.211) (1.183) (1.982)
Implied impact (MinWage): -.127 -2.284 .193 .138
Implied impact (SWspending): .071 3.072 -.768 -1.385
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.132 -.356 .244 .085
Impact/Average (SWspending): .074 .478 -.974 -.849
Observations 17,736 17,379 17,557 17,676
R2 0.564 0.101 0.079 0.083
Note. i) Dependent variable is calculated as the number of crimes per 1,000 residents. ii) Error terms are
clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of observations is 17,736. iv) The number of CZs is 741. v) Im-
plied/Average reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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2.5 Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of the DD and DDD results from two dimen-
sions. First we include a full set of year dummies in Equation 2.3 to account for the poten-
tial serial correlation problem. Second we control for the opioid supply that may lead to
surging crime rate.
Since DD specification is usually subject to serial correlation in the error terms when
using data spanning several years, especially when including both a level and trend effect
in the same estimation when using time series data (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan,
2004; Galster, Tatian, and Pettit, 2004). Following Pierce and Schott (2016), we replace
the PostPNTRt indicator used in Equation 2.3 with interactions of the NTRGapc and
the full set of year dummies to determine whether there is a relationship between the NTR




θt · 1{year = t} ×NTRGapc +
∑
t
γt · 1{year = t} ×Z ′c (2.12)
+Z ′c,tλ+ δc + δt + εc,t
Likewise for the DDD model, we estimate a version of Equation 2.6 with interactions
of an indicator variable for each year of 1990-2013,
yc,t = NTRGapc × (
∑
t
µ1t · 1{year = t} ×MWc +
∑
t




θt · 1{year = t} ×NTRGapc +
∑
t




β2t · 1{year = t} × SWEc +
∑
t
γt · 1{year = t} ×Z ′c+
+Z ′c,tλ+ δc + δt + εc,t
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Surging opioid abuse may also be a contributing factor to the crime rate increases. The
United States has experienced an unprecedented crisis related to the misuse and addiction
to opioids. The crisis, which is often referred to as the opioid epidemic, started in the 1990s
and continued through 2010 with a massive increase in prescribed opioids associated with
lax prescribing regulations and aggressive marketing efforts in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Hammersley et al. (1989) and Dave, Deza, and Horn (2018) found that the concurrent
opioid epidemic may bring an accompanying rise in crime. Opioid-related criminal of-
fenses include crimes directly related to supporting one’s addiction, such as stealing to pay
for drugs. Moreover, many people abusing opioids lead a lifestyle that prompts them to
associate with others engaged in illicit activity, including violent crimes, trafficking, and
prostitution. Therefore, exogenous increases in opioid supply in areas more exposed to
PNTR could lead to a spurious increase in the crime rate. Following Pierce and Schott
(2020), we include in Equation 2.12 and Equation 2.13 the interaction of opioid regulation
in Z ′c with the full set of year dummies in
∑
t γt1{year = t} as a robustness check. These
opioid regulation data track a variety of types of legislation covering categories such as
prescription monitoring databases, prevention of “doctor-shopping” for prescriptions and
regulation of pain clinics.17
Figure 2.2 presents a matrix of graphs for reviewing the results of these estimations
visually from Equation 2.12. Each panel of the figure uses the estimated DD parameters of
interest θt from a separate regression on overall property crime, overall violent crime, and
the breakdown of socio-economic groups of age, gender and race. The graphs also display
the 95 percent confidence interval associated with an interquartile shift in CZ’s NTR gaps.
17We use data collected and summarized by Meara et al. (2016) and Pierce and Schott (2020) on state-
level legislation pertaining to opioid regulation. For each state, opioid legislation is the sum of all legislation
categories enacted over the years from 2006 to 2012.
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Note. Figures display the 95 percent confidence interval of the implied impact of an interquartile shift in a
CZ’s exposure to PNTR on crime rates using estimates from Equation (Equation 2.12) for overall property
crime, overall violent crime, and the breakdown of socio-economic groups of age, gender and race.
Figure 2.2: Implied impact of PNTR
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Note. Figures display the 95 percent confidence interval of the implied impact of minimum wages using
estimates from (Equation 2.13) for overall property crime, overall violent crime, and the breakdown of socio-
economic groups of age, gender and race.
Figure 2.3: Implied impact of minimum wage
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As indicated in the upper panel of Figure 2.2, we find that the confidence intervals
for overall property crime, different gender and age groups, and whites are statistically
indistinguishable from zero before 2000, but take a spike around the time of the change in
policy in 2000, and remain elevated through 2013. This pattern is robust to the baseline
results reported in Table 2.3. Consistent with Table 2.4, the lower panel of violent crimes
do not show significant patterns. Figure 2.3 reports similar DDD estimation patterns for
the minimum wage from Equation 2.13. The graphs confirm the robustness of the DDD
regression results that higher minimum wage may play a mitigating role in property crime
increase.
2.6 Potential Mechanisms
The previous sections show that CZs with higher trade liberalization exposure experienced
a significant increase in overall property crime. A higher minimum wage may have a
mitigating effect on increasing crime rates. One potential mechanism is via labor market
disruptions through which higher minimum wage might result in a lower crime rate. Peo-
ple without work or with intermittent employment are more likely to engage in criminal or
socially unacceptable behavior, which may be due to financial struggles with unemploy-
ment (Crutchfield, 2011), and this effect is found to be stronger for young adults (Allan
and Steffensmeier, 1989).
Another potential mechanism is via increased disability take-up. Permanent job de-
struction has a significant effect on disability program participation. The rise in expendi-
tures on Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) coincided with
a sharp reduction in the labor-force participation and relative earnings of the low-skilled
men (D. Black and Sanders, 2002). Here it may constitute an additional channel by which
worse economic times are associated with higher opioid use. If workers who were dis-
placed by trade liberalization applied for disability, they might have been introduced to
prescription opioid painkillers as part of the process. Therefore, the opioid-driven crime
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rates would increase after the US trade policy change as argued in the robustness section.
In this section, following Pierce and Schott (2020), we employ the unemployment rate
as the measure of job availability and two types of disability measures - real disability
payments and the number of disabled workers - to examine potential mechanisms through
the labor market.18 We estimate Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.6 with these three variables
as dependent variables. Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 report the results.







Post * NTR Gap 15.860*** 1.603*** 0.630***
(1.531) (0.363) (0.108)
NTR rate 6.892 -1.027 0.226
(12.076) (2.323) (0.891)
MFA rate -40.804*** 1.896** -0.134
(5.686) (0.886) (0.207)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.561 -0.528 -0.032
(2.445) (0.617) (0.128)
Post * Age 25+ 8.337*** 0.081 -0.673***
(1.847) (0.338) (0.132)
Post * White 1.844 -0.574*** -0.054
(1.121) (0.130) (0.051)
Post * Black 3.853*** -0.136 -0.137**
(1.260) (0.148) (0.060)
Post * Male 3.348 0.131 -0.834**
(5.237) (1.045) (0.377)
Post * No College -3.550*** -1.160*** -0.104**
(0.854) (0.157) (0.053)
Post * Veteran -4.848 0.046 0.917***
(2.963) (0.738) (0.190)
Post * Median HHI 1.232*** -0.117** 0.035*
(0.329) (0.056) (0.020)
Implied impact: .781 .079 .031
Impact/Average: .127 .009 .004
Observations 17,736 17,577 10,346
R2 0.821 0.989 0.999
Note. i) Disability transfers and disabled workers are log disability transfer payments and log number of
disabled workers. ii) Error terms are clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of CZs is 741. iv) Implied/Average
reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
18Data used in this section are based on Pierce and Schott (2020)’s calculations. The unemployment rates
are obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at https://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/la/.
Disability transfers data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and data on disabled workers are
obtained from Social Security Administration.
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Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -98.394*** -8.885** 2.734
(22.288) (3.629) (2.277)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending -0.949 0.270 0.430**
(2.005) (0.325) (0.205)
Post * NTR Gap 177.224*** 16.271*** -3.705
(36.782) (5.987) (3.757)
Post * SWspending 0.125 -0.097*** -0.044**
(0.168) (0.027) (0.017)
Post * MinWage 4.348*** 1.390*** -0.172
(1.666) (0.271) (0.170)
NTR rate 6.113 -0.928 0.225
(4.747) (0.777) (0.409)
MFA rate -41.156*** 1.801*** -0.132
(3.990) (0.645) (0.241)
Post * Chinese tariff 0.181 -0.312* -0.039
(0.894) (0.179) (0.091)
Post * Age 25+ 8.336*** -0.009 -0.670***
(0.629) (0.104) (0.064)
Post * White 1.821*** -0.483*** -0.062***
(0.210) (0.036) (0.021)
Post * Black 3.745*** -0.065 -0.140***
(0.252) (0.042) (0.026)
Post * Male 2.438 -0.055 -0.761***
(1.833) (0.304) (0.187)
Post * No College -4.004*** -1.012*** -0.087***
(0.301) (0.049) (0.031)
Post * Veteran -3.623*** -0.291* 0.910***
(1.016) (0.165) (0.104)
Post * Median HHI 1.198*** -0.103*** 0.042***
(0.112) (0.018) (0.011)
Implied impact (MinWage): -.462 -.042 .013
Implied impact (SWspending): -.064 .018 .029
Impact/Average (MinWage): -.075 -.005 .002
Impact/Average (SWspending): -.01 .002 .004
Observations 17736 17577 10346
R2 0.822 0.989 0.999
Note. i) Disability transfers and disabled workers are log disability transfer payments and log number of
disabled workers. ii) Error terms are clustered at CZ-level. iii) The number of CZs is 741. iv) Implied/Average
reports the ratio of the implied impact to the variable average.
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Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 confirm the hypothesis that PNTR might lead to an increased
unemployment rate, which ultimately leads to an increase in crime rates. The economic
significance shows that an interquartile shift in exposure to PNTR is associated with in-
creases in the unemployment rate of 12.7 percent. Furthermore, a higher minimum wage
significantly reduced the unemployment rate, with an economic significance of 7.5 percent.
These results support the literature that poor labor market conditions create a stressful state
that renders individuals susceptible to criminal behavior to overcome their economic prob-
lems or make illegitimate pursuits of an attractive alternative to poorly paid work (Allan
and Steffensmeier, 1989).
Results on disability transfers and the number of disabled workers witness a signif-
icant increase after the China Shock. A higher minimum wage reduced real disability
payments.19 These results substantiate findings in previous literature that the China Shock
brought the US labor market disruptions, leading many laid-off workers to apply for dis-
ability payments and misuse opioid products. Therefore, the crime rate increased. With a
higher level of minimum wages, many vulnerable workers were drawn back to the legit-
imate labor market, reducing their reliance on DI and SSI programs, as well as potential
substance abuse, which ultimately leads to crime rate reduction.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the role of minimum wages on local crime rates in the US upon
China’s accession into WTO in 2001. We find that CZs with higher trade liberalization
exposure experienced a significant increase in overall property crime, and the results are
significant across gender, age, and racial groups. However, results also show that the mini-
mum wage may have a buffering effect on crimes. For CZs with higher state-level minimum
wages before the China Shock, they experienced a reduction in overall property crime, and
this effect is more substantial for young adults and white people. Meanwhile, we do not
19The insignificance result on disability workers for DDD regression might be due to that data is only
available at CZ level after 2000.
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find a significant impact of social welfare spending. We also find the potential mechanism
is via labor market disruptions through which a higher minimum wage results in a lower
crime rate. Results indicate the China Shock brought significant increase in unemployment
rate and disability transfers, while higher minimum wages reduced these two dimensions.
The estimation results are robust to including a full set of year dummies to address the se-
rial correlation problem and controlling the opioid supply that may lead to a surging crime
rate.
Our results suggest that minimum wage played a significant role in reducing crime
rates due to the China Shock. One interpretation of that is that a higher minimum wage
reduces crime in the presence of a negative income shock as it functions as a form of
insurance. What this chapter does not answer is whether increasing the minimum wage
when a negative income shock occurs (or as a result of it) would result in the same effect.
It is possible that in such a circumstance we would not observe a reduction in crime rates.
It may be the case that a higher minimum wage must be in place so that the labor market is
in an equilibrium before the negative income shock hits.
This chapter delivers a more nuanced perspective to literature that studies the link be-
tween minimum wage and crime in the presence of a negative income shock. Understand-
ing the relationship between criminal activity and prime variables such as minimum wage
will allow us to plan the most effective way to make our country, as a whole, a safer place
to live. The ability to lower crime rates nationwide will bring about many benefits such as
increased domestic and foreign investment, better overall quality of education and housing,
and a reduction in inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
MULTIDIMENSIONAL IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON YOUNG
ADULTS
3.1 Introduction
The US-China trade liberalization in 2001 created a considerable economic upheaval in
the manufacturing sector in the United States. Long-term effects may include deteriorated
labor conditions, rise in transfer payments for unemployment, disability, retirement, and
healthcare in more trade-exposed labor markets, and intra-household adjustments in work
dynamics.
There is a growing literature about the impacts of increased import competition from
China on the workers’ labor conditions. The seminal work of Pierce and Schott (2020)
focused on the decline of US manufacturing employment in the 2000s, which showed that
a county with higher exposure to trade liberalization with China tends to have higher mor-
tality due to stress-related causes. The higher mortality is concentrated among middle-aged
white males. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) found that a regional economy with higher
exposure to the trade shock tends to show a higher unemployment rate and lower aver-
age wage. In a similar study, Stuart (2021) examined the long-run effects of the 1980-1982
recession on education and income. The author found that the economic recession is associ-
ated with decreased earnings per capita and four-year college degree attainment reduction.
The deteriorated labor market outcomes may directly impact workers in the trade-
exposed sectors, however, what is often ignored, is that this effect may also incur high social
costs that can extend beyond individuals and families and spill over into the more extensive
social settings where they have connection. This spillover effect is considerable especially
when it is delivered from the older generation to the younger generation. Previous research
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supports the argument that job quality may be a crucial mechanism underlying the inter-
generational transmission of health inequality and well-being. Strazdins et al. (2010) found
that poor quality jobs could pose a health risk to employed parents’ children, such as more
emotional and behavioral difficulties. Li et al. (2014) found parental work schedules link
to four primary child developmental outcomes - internalizing and externalizing problems,
cognitive development, and body mass index.
It is widely believed that the deteriorated labor market outcomes of baby boomers
should have significantly affected the lives of their children generations (i.e., echo boomers)
in many ways, aside from direct labor market outcomes (Flanagan and Eccles, 1993; Kauf-
man and Uhlenberg, 1998). This chapter provides a novel perspective that trade exposure
may not only play a significant impact through the labor market as discussed above, but
also delivers an inter-generational effect on the overall well-being of the younger gener-
ation that resides within the household. This research fills the gap by looking into the
spillover effect on family members of those who are significantly impacted by the US-
China trade liberalization. Specifically, this chapter answers two questions empirically.
First, does trade liberalization have an effect on people’s well-being status, especially the
young adults. Second, do higher minimum wage and general social safety net alleviate the
impact.
Following Mitra and Brucker (2014) and Dhongde and Haveman (2017), we employ
the measure of multidimensional deprivation index of 5 dimensions - disability, education,
health insurance, poverty, and employment status to estimate the influence of trade expo-
sure on the well-being of different age-, race-, and gender groups. In particular, we are
interested in young adults aged 17-24 who tend to be the children generation of the middle-
aged population that is most heavily impacted by the US-China trade liberalization in 2001.
Using Pierce and Schott’s (2016, 2020) measure of trade liberalization exposure, we study
multidimensional deprivation effects of trade liberalization with China across 1990-2013.
As the baseline estimation, we use the difference-in-difference identification strategy to
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examine multidimensional deprivation effects. The baseline results confirm our hypothesis
that the young generation of 17-24 years old is the group that is most significantly affected.
Moreover, the impact on males and females is of similar magnitude. Nonwhites are sig-
nificantly deprived compared to white people. We also conduct intra-household dynamics
regression, and the results suggest there may be an inter-generational spillover effect on the
children generation’s well-being.
Then we further explore if higher minimum wages help alleviate the deprivation impact.
The welfare effects of minimum wage and government programs are mixed. Boadway and
Cuff (2001) found that higher minimum wage can be welfare-improving and employment-
enhancing, while Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006) found that minimum wage, unlike most
government transfer programs, lowered welfare in the 1980s and 1990s. To examine this
effect specifically, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference (triple-difference)
model with two third-differences in the regression: the first is different minimum wages,
and the second is different levels of social welfare spending. Results show that minimum
wage may ease the negative impacts of trade exposure for select groups. In contrast, overall,
the influence of minimum wage and the general social safety net is somewhat limited. A
more comprehensive measure that accounts for health, income, education, insurance, etc.,
might be needed to help those who are multidimensionally deprived.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the back-
ground and data used for the analyses. Section 3.3 presents the models and identification
strategy, followed by Section 3.4, discussing the estimation results. Section 3.5 discusses
the robustness of the results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Multi-Dimensional Deprivation
The primary well-being measure adopted in this chapter is Multidimensional Deprivation
Index (MDI) by Dhongde and Haveman (2017). This measure is based on a methodology
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developed by Alkire and Foster (2011), which gained prominence due to its adoption by
the United Nations (UN) in 2010 to estimate a global Multidimensional Poverty Index
(UN-MPI). The Multidimensional Deprivation Index is in line with the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), which proposes a multidimensional view of an individual’s
well-being depending on their capability of adequately functioning in one’s society. It is
ideal in this research as it extends the traditional single-dimensional poverty measure of
income, expenditure, or wealth, and tracks an individual across multiple dimensions, and
counts the number of deprivations simultaneously experienced by that individual.
We calculate MDI using the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC), a nationally representative individual- and household-level
data by the Census Bureau. CPS contains detailed information of each household mem-
ber’s demographic information, education, insurance status, and income, among other in-
dicators.1 Below is the description of the five dimensions we employed to construct the
index:2
• Standard of Living: a person is considered deprived if he/she is part of a family whose
income is below the threshold specified under the official poverty measure (OPM).3
• Security: if a person does not have any public or private insurance.4
• Health Status: an individual has work disability or reported income from disability
benefits.5
1We restrict our sample to individuals who are older than 17 and exclude those who live in group quarters
(group quarter classifies all housing units as falling into one of three main categories: households, group
quarters, or vacant units).
2Our selection of the indicators is according to Mitra and Brucker (2014). Dhongde and Haveman (2017)
constructed the index with six dimensions with an additional dimension of housing quality, which reports the
number of persons per room in a housing unit. However, CPS does not provide information on that. Thus,
the choice of indicators is restricted by the availability of data.
3Variable name: OFFPOV.
4Variables include “included in employer group health plan (inclugh)”, “covered by Medicaid (himcaid)”,
“covered by Medicare (himcare)”, “covered by military health insurance (hichamp)”, “reported covered by
private health insurance (phinsur)”, “covered by group health insurance (covergh)”, “covered by private health
insurance (coverpi)”.
5CPS collects disability-related variables of hearing, vision, remembering, physical, etc. However, these
variables are only available onwards 2009.
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• Education: an individual is considered deprived if he or she has less than a high
school diploma.
• Personal activities: was unemployed in the past week.
We conducted our analysis at the MSA level. We calculate three multi-dimensional
indices in each MSA. Let i = 1, . . . , n be the number of individuals and j = 1, . . . , d be
the number of welfare dimensions. We assign gmij equal to one if individual i in MSA m





ij /d ≥ 0.33 (according to the UNDP-MPI’s identification of
multidimensional deprivation of an individual). In our case of d = 5, an individual de-
prived in two or more indicators is identified as multidimensionally deprived. Suppose that
q individuals are identified as multidimensionally deprived in a given MSA. The first MDI




A drawback of MDIm is that it does not capture the changes in intensity of deprivations,







which represents the average number of deprivations for the multidimensionally deprived
individuals. To capture both the proportion of deprived individuals and the intensity, the
third measure - adjusted headcount index - is defined as the product of the first two measures





Using the above measures, we examine the MSA’s multidimensional effects of trade
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liberalization with China.6 We study these effects across several demographic attributes of
age, gender, and race.
Table 3.1: CPS sample composition across time
1990 2007 2013 Total
by age
17-24 15.77% 14.60% 14.29% 14.40%
25-40 36.86% 30.95% 28.85% 31.80%
41-55 22.39% 30.27% 29.05% 28.15%
over 55 24.98% 24.18% 27.80% 25.65%
by sex
male 48.08% 48.53% 48.38% 47.37%
female 51.92% 51.47% 51.62% 52.63%
by race
White 83.74% 77.48% 75.64% 82.26%
Black 11.79% 13.25% 13.62% 10.71%
Asian 3.55% 5.99% 7.33% 4.57%
American Indian 0.45% 0.77% 0.79% 1.24%
other 0.48% 2.50% 2.61% 1.22%
No. of Obs 116,801 148,506 149,142 3,130,302
MSA 226 254 254 292
We use CPS data from 1990 to 2013. Our sample in 2007 includes 148,506 individuals
who resided in 254 MSAs with trade liberalization exposure data. Table 3.1 shows the
demographics of our samples. Young adults aged 17-24 account for 14.4% of the sample.
Females account for 52.63% of the sample. In terms of ethnicity, White people account
for 82.26% of the population while blacks represent 10.71%. The middle-class population
account for the largest proportion of the sample, which is 51.92%.
Our variables of interest, summarized in Table 3.2, include three measures of the MDI
index and each of the five dimensions7 of the whole sample. Overall, the first measure
(MDI) and the third measure (A*MDI) are about the equivalent magnitude, while the sec-
ond measure (A) reports the lowest values. On a scale of 0 to 1, the adjusted headcount
index (A*MDI) averages to be 15%. It means that the sample population is deprived in one
6MDI distribution in MSA in 2001 and 2007 are reported in Figure B.1 and Figure B.2.
7“no Insurance” in the table denotes no medical insurance.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of CPS variables (means)
1990 2007 2013 Total
MDI 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.18
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
A 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
A*MDI 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.15
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Disability 7.24% 7.93% 8.78% 8.02%
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
No Insurance 12.64% 15.22% 14.85% 14.30%
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
No Highschool 58.69% 19.04% 16.36% 30.31%
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.21)
Poverty 12.30% 11.99% 14.78% 13.05%
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Unemployment 3.64% 7.86% 10.37% 7.43%
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Note. No. of Observations: 15,407; MSA: 292
dimension on average. Between 1990 and 2013, we do not find variations in the intensity
of deprivation (A), though the proportion of people who experienced deprivation (MDI)
varied over time. In regard to each dimension, Figure 3.1 shows the extent of deprivation
in each dimension. On average, about 10% of the population have more than one disability,
16% lack any form of medical insurance, 18% have no high school diploma, 11% of the
population are below the poverty level, and 8% are unemployed.8
3.2.2 The NTR Gap
We follow Pierce and Schott (2016)’s methodology to measure a local labor market’s expo-
sure to trade liberalization. We start with their industry-level measure, NTRGapj , defined
as the difference between non-NTR rates and NTR rates in a six-digit NAICS sector j
NTRGapj = non−NTRtariffj −NTRtariffj
8We also plot the percent of individuals deprived in ≥ 2 dimensions in Figure B.3.
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Note. Values are given as percent of the population, 17-64 years
Figure 3.1: Extent of deprivation in each dimension
NTRGapj refers to the potential tariff increase on Chinese imports and captures the
uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters in industry j. Pierce and Schott (2016) show that the
elimination of trade uncertainty explains the sharp drop in US manufacturing employment.
Using NTRGapj , Pierce and Schott (2016) calculate a county’s exposure to PNTR. We







where L1990jm refers to the number of employees in sector j in MSA m in the year 1990, and
L1990m refers to the total number of workers in MSA m.
9 In this chapter, higher NTRGapm
9The information about employment weights, L1990jm and L
1990
m , are from the County Business Patterns
(CBP), an annual dataset with information on employment and payroll by sector and county.
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is assumed to indicate higher exposure of MSA m to trade liberalization with China.
NTRGapm shows the distribution with the mean 0.145 and standard deviation 0.05.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
3.3.1 Identification Strategy
Our main estimation strategy follows Pierce and Schott (2016)’s baseline difference-in-
differences (DID) specification:
LHSmt = θ · PostPNTRt ×NTRGapm + βXmt (3.1)
+γ · PostPNTRt ×Zm + δm + δm + εm,t.
The left-hand-side (LHS) variables, defined in year t and MSA m, include MDIm,Am,
A∗MDI , and five MDI dimensions of disability, insurance, highschool education, poverty,
and unemployment. Xmt represents the (time-varying) overall US import tariff rate asso-
ciated with the industries active in the MSA and the phasing out of the global Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA). Zm represents the initial-period MSA attributes, the 1990 median
household income, the 1990 share of the population without any college education, and
the 1990 share of the population that are veterans. δm and δt refer to MSA and year fixed
effects. We cluster standard errors at MSA levels. The sample period is 1990 to 2013.
The first term on the right-hand side is the DID term of interest, the interaction of a
post-PNTR (i.e., t > 2000) indicator with the (time-invariant) MSA-level NTR Gap. The
positive sign of θ implies that MSAs more exposed to PNTR (first difference) experience
differential changes of LHSmt after the change in US trade policy versus before (second
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difference)




Similarly, as in the second chapter, we employ triple-difference estimation to explore the
effect of minimum wage on a more exposed region, specified as follows.
LHSmt = PostPNTRt ×NTRGapm × (µ1 ·MWm + µ2 · SWEm) (3.3)
+ PostPNTRt × (θ ·NTRGapm + β ·MWm + β2 · SWEm +Z ′mγ)
+X ′mtλ+ δm + δt + εmt,
where MWm refers to the minimum wage of MSA m in year 2000, and we use the same
LHS variables and control variables as in Equation 3.1. Here we also control various pa-
rameters of social welfare spending to account for confounding characteristics from finding
an effect on minimum wage.10 The first term on the right-hand side is the primary term of
interest: a triple interaction of PostPNTR indicator, NTR Gap exposure, and the minimum
wage of MSA m.
The implied impact of minimum wages can be derived by taking the slope ofNTRGap
on LHS change with respect to PostPNTR, conditioning on MWm :
∂ (E [LHSmt|PostPNTR = 1,MWm]− E [LHSmt|PostPNTR = 0,MWm])
∂NTRGapm
= θ + µ1 MWm (3.4)
Hence, the negative sign of µ1 suggests that a higher minimum wage may mitigate the
negative impacts of the trade shock.
10For minimum wages in multistate MSAs, we use the weighted average using population share and ASEC





In this section, we discuss the regression results for the entire sample. Table 3.3 reports
estimates for θ in Equation 3.1 for the three deprivation indices (columns 1-3) and each of
the five dimensions (columns 4-8). The difference-in-difference point estimates of inter-
Table 3.3: Baseline results
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.203*** 0.101*** 0.0517*** 0.134*** 0.0799* -0.00209 0.122** 0.173***
(0.0631) (0.0312) (0.0166) (0.0480) (0.0469) (0.0519) (0.0490) (0.0363)
NTR rate 0.197 0.386 0.0982 1.392* -0.565 0.767 -0.783 1.118*
(1.062) (0.550) (0.303) (0.806) (0.914) (0.970) (0.853) (0.674)
MFA rate -1,013 8.255 -313.0 -1,852 3,182** -873.1 183.4 -599.9
(1,550) (772.6) (416.5) (1,384) (1,236) (1,012) (1,443) (1,186)
Post * No College -0.0622*** -0.0412*** -0.0220*** 0.00379 0.00296 -0.223*** -0.0160 0.0258**
(0.0219) (0.0115) (0.00585) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0131)
Post * Veteran 0.147*** 0.0776*** 0.0489*** 0.0501 0.100** 0.0827 0.108** 0.0464
(0.0544) (0.0273) (0.0152) (0.0483) (0.0467) (0.0597) (0.0477) (0.0293)
Post * Median HHI -0.000342 -0.00597 0.00224 -0.0208* -0.00351 -0.0107 0.0272*** -0.0220***
(0.0106) (0.00585) (0.00265) (0.0108) (0.00977) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.00698)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.651 0.725 0.691 0.356 0.621 0.894 0.492 0.572
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
est are positive (θ > 0) and statistically significant at conventional levels across all three
MDI indices (MDI, A, A*MDI). The results confirm that PNTR does have a significant
impact on the well-being of people. Those who live in more exposed regions have higher
deprivation indices, meaning that they tend to be deprived of more dimensions than people
who live in less PNTR-exposed areas. We then explore which of the five MDI dimensions
drive changes in MDI indices. The estimates reported in columns 4-8 suggest that the in-
creased deprivation level is mainly driven by disability, no medical insurance, poverty, and
unemployment, with unemployment being the main contributor. Our estimation results are
consistent with a series of previous studies on PNTR and labor market outcomes (Pierce
and Schott, 2016, 2020; Brussevich, 2018), which indicate that trade liberalization with
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China has brought significant labor market disruptions. Industries/regions more exposed
to the change experienced greater employment loss, higher mortality rate, and crime rate.
This chapter confirms the results and further provides a channel of influence. The results
on MDI indices suggest that the exposed workers experienced multidimensional depriva-
tions, leading to significantly decreased well-being levels, which may induce other serious
outcomes, such as crime, drug, mortality, etc.
Results on Age
Our main question is to understand whether there is an inter-generational effect on the
young people, which may be a spillover effect from their parent generation’s job displace-
ment. We then estimate θ in Equation 3.1 on age groups of 17-24, 25-40, 41-55, and over
56 years old, and report the results in Table 3.4.11
Overall, an MSA with higher exposure to PNTR shows higher levels of MDI for age
groups 17-24, 25-40, and over 56. The largest magnitude is on people aged 17-24, while
25-40 and over 56 year-olds are about the same magnitude. According to the sample year,
the 17-24 sample tend to be echo boomers, and those aged over 56 are baby boomers,
who are usually the parents of echo boomers. The results show significantly positive es-
timates for θ in MDIs, and the absolute values of estimates are even larger than the ones
of the baby boomers. The welfare loss for the middle-aged group, baby boomers, are well
reported (Pierce and Schott, 2020). However, it is surprising that the young generations,
echo boomers, are also significantly affected. These results may suggest that there are inter-
generational spillover effects - parents’ job status and well-being may significantly impact
their children’s lives.
We then look at the change of each welfare dimension to better understand the young
generation’s welfare loss. Columns 4-8 in Table 3.4 show the estimates. Age group 17-
11We use different age group classifications from Chapter 2 since we are interested to know different
generation’s MDI impact. Age classification of 17-24 is widely used to define young adulthood, age 25-40
as early middle age, 41-55 as middle age, and over 56 as the elderly.
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Table 3.4: Age results
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.357*** 0.189*** 0.124*** 0.0758** 0.0235 0.474*** 0.236** 0.133**
(0.123) (0.0538) (0.0400) (0.0353) (0.118) (0.144) (0.0947) (0.0620)
NTR rate -1.320 -0.701 -0.393 0.300 -3.468 2.599 -2.439 -0.496
(2.626) (1.097) (0.884) (0.647) (2.186) (2.697) (1.936) (1.152)
MFA rate -3,127 -750.0 -1,254 564.8 -913.6 -3,296 2,796 -2,900
(3,027) (1,496) (1,049) (1,072) (2,975) (4,079) (2,962) (2,718)
Post * No College 0.0221 0.00268 0.00339 0.00197 0.0165 -0.0825 0.0520 0.0254
(0.0548) (0.0220) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0487) (0.0591) (0.0439) (0.0311)
Post * Veteran 0.0786 0.0194 0.00728 0.0158 0.158 -0.0669 0.00591 -0.0164
(0.134) (0.0588) (0.0469) (0.0360) (0.130) (0.138) (0.0990) (0.0711)
Post * Median HHI 0.0454 0.0154 0.0180* -0.00657 0.00475 0.00555 0.0692*** 0.00388
(0.0300) (0.0121) (0.00982) (0.00870) (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0188) (0.0158)
Observations 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658
R2 0.307 0.348 0.334 0.099 0.295 0.433 0.255 0.148
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.167** 0.109*** 0.0471** 0.0921** 0.118* -0.0701 0.154* 0.252***
(0.0713) (0.0392) (0.0186) (0.0359) (0.0648) (0.0685) (0.0831) (0.0458)
NTR rate -1.158 0.0669 -0.0937 0.524 -1.257 -0.365 -0.393 1.825**
(1.506) (0.768) (0.393) (0.779) (1.238) (1.565) (1.289) (0.853)
MFA rate 358.3 1,033 346.4 -933.5 4,629* 1,214 1,662 -1,406
(3,029) (1,583) (939.5) (1,314) (2,775) (2,535) (2,772) (1,349)
Post * No College -0.0498 -0.0362** -0.0137 0.0112 0.00386 -0.227*** 0.00419 0.0271
(0.0333) (0.0171) (0.00887) (0.0145) (0.0284) (0.0300) (0.0345) (0.0201)
Post * Veteran 0.152* 0.0940** 0.0440* 0.0619 0.134 0.138 0.150** -0.0144
(0.0834) (0.0426) (0.0232) (0.0379) (0.0840) (0.0840) (0.0725) (0.0459)
Post * Median HHI -0.00192 -0.00390 0.00125 -0.0206*** -0.0184 -0.00893 0.0419*** -0.0135
(0.0153) (0.00827) (0.00370) (0.00705) (0.0157) (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.00992)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.471 0.553 0.487 0.175 0.481 0.792 0.363 0.311
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.151* 0.0482 0.0242 0.0632 0.0884 -0.209*** 0.152** 0.146**
(0.0808) (0.0444) (0.0191) (0.0538) (0.0703) (0.0638) (0.0724) (0.0645)
NTR rate -0.437 -0.0278 -0.285 -0.270 0.424 -0.623 -0.422 0.752
(1.401) (0.827) (0.401) (1.086) (1.209) (1.434) (1.116) (1.122)
MFA rate 289.4 714.0 434.9 559.5 4,868** 572.4 -2,258 -171.7
(2,509) (1,294) (677.6) (1,814) (2,373) (2,583) (1,387) (1,901)
Post * No College -0.0405 -0.0267* -0.0112 0.0144 0.00965 -0.186*** -0.00826 0.0366*
(0.0310) (0.0143) (0.00813) (0.0232) (0.0270) (0.0301) (0.0244) (0.0209)
Post * Veteran 0.159** 0.101*** 0.0513** 0.0854 0.119* 0.142* 0.0265 0.133***
(0.0741) (0.0372) (0.0203) (0.0581) (0.0635) (0.0766) (0.0538) (0.0501)
Post * Median HHI -0.00671 -0.00444 0.00174 -0.0124 0.00959 0.0114 -0.00358 -0.0273**
(0.0165) (0.00750) (0.00410) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0150) (0.0106) (0.0109)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.460 0.550 0.481 0.205 0.440 0.805 0.332 0.426
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.191** 0.0738* 0.0518** 0.169 0.0603 -0.0363 0.0317 0.145***
(0.0830) (0.0436) (0.0253) (0.116) (0.0472) (0.0973) (0.0567) (0.0516)
NTR rate 3.094* 1.671* 0.914* 3.481* 1.327* 2.148 -0.188 1.587*
(1.644) (0.852) (0.497) (2.082) (0.749) (1.627) (1.063) (0.954)
MFA rate -2,739 -1,056 -1,213* -3,601 1,050 -1,887 -1,312 467.6
(1,816) (1,074) (623.1) (2,977) (1,234) (3,098) (1,625) (1,668)
Post * No College -0.100*** -0.0556*** -0.0407*** 0.0295 -0.0121 -0.251*** -0.0607*** 0.0158
(0.0380) (0.0213) (0.0120) (0.0494) (0.0199) (0.0555) (0.0229) (0.0185)
Post * Veteran 0.160* 0.0629 0.0685** 0.0928 -0.0218 0.0965 0.107* 0.0402
(0.0906) (0.0470) (0.0279) (0.122) (0.0412) (0.116) (0.0565) (0.0473)
Post * Median HHI 0.000427 -0.0132 0.00389 -0.00635 -0.00630 -0.0305 0.00610 -0.0291***
(0.0235) (0.0125) (0.00755) (0.0323) (0.0100) (0.0270) (0.0110) (0.00958)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.476 0.598 0.525 0.244 0.279 0.822 0.278 0.438
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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24 shows that the MDI changes are mostly driven by higher rates of disability, no high
school diploma, poverty, and unemployment. The results provide another perspective that
the welfare loss of the younger generation does not solely come from labor market out-
comes. In an MSA with higher exposure to trade liberalization, the younger generation
faced higher chances of highschool dropouts, poverty, and disability payment. We believe
that non-labor market outcomes could play an even larger role than labor market outcomes
for younger generations since these dimensions may affect their future incomes. Notably,
high school education deprivation came out as the main driver among the five dimensions.
Education has long been shown as an effective way for poverty alleviation and to increase
individual’s well-being level (Aduke et al., 2012; Hilal, 2012), especially for younger adults
(Chaudhry et al., 2010; Selyutin et al., 2017). Understanding the MDI influencing channel
to young adults is crucial since young adulthood aged 17-24 is a critical developmental
period, bridging adolescence and independent adulthood. Life experience during these
years has profound and long-lasting implications for their future economic security, health,
and well-being (Council et al., 2015). Increasing young adults’ education, as this chapter
suggests, may significantly increase their well-being level.
The results also suggest that unemployment came out as the main driver for age 25-40,
41-55, and age over 65. Unlike results on younger adults on 17-24, middle-aged people
suffer from unemployment significantly due to PNTR, leading to decreased well-being
level. This pattern may suggest their unemployment-originated decreased well-being level
may affect the well-being of their children living within the same household, leading to the
younger generation being deprived of highschool education and being in poverty. We are
going to take a closer look at this pattern in the section Intra-household Dynamics.
Results on Gender
In this section, we further explore our results by gender and compare variations by age.
Table 3.5 reports results for males and females.
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Table 3.5: Gender results
(a) Male
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.188** 0.103*** 0.0522*** 0.119** 0.140** 0.000863 0.0875 0.178***
(0.0764) (0.0385) (0.0193) (0.0589) (0.0542) (0.0608) (0.0576) (0.0462)
NTR rate 0.302 0.569 0.158 1.167 -0.699 1.522 -0.889 1.741**
(1.199) (0.592) (0.334) (0.951) (1.100) (1.091) (0.914) (0.822)
MFA rate -2,390 -249.1 -574.1 -1,604 2,519* -805.7 91.64 -1,446
(1,682) (857.7) (429.3) (1,363) (1,349) (1,291) (1,280) (1,413)
Post * No College -0.0577** -0.0434*** -0.0186*** -0.000994 0.00535 -0.233*** -0.00740 0.0190
(0.0257) (0.0132) (0.00660) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0253) (0.0241) (0.0154)
Post * Veteran 0.152** 0.0793** 0.0471*** -0.00493 0.123** 0.133* 0.112** 0.0329
(0.0624) (0.0305) (0.0165) (0.0530) (0.0592) (0.0690) (0.0460) (0.0387)
Post * Median HHI -0.00336 -0.00633 0.00136 -0.0188* 0.00209 -0.0119 0.0266** -0.0297***
(0.0132) (0.00682) (0.00340) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.00923)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.546 0.637 0.598 0.296 0.517 0.831 0.408 0.453
(b) Female
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.218*** 0.100*** 0.0527*** 0.143*** 0.0280 0.00493 0.148*** 0.165***
(0.0609) (0.0301) (0.0164) (0.0495) (0.0546) (0.0554) (0.0498) (0.0355)
NTR rate 0.0511 0.204 0.0104 1.523* -0.404 0.238 -0.860 0.521
(1.133) (0.590) (0.317) (0.872) (0.954) (1.054) (0.952) (0.723)
MFA rate 443.1 313.9 -44.31 -2,170 3,938** -896.5 530.3 168.1
(1,804) (883.6) (501.2) (1,775) (1,677) (1,229) (1,778) (1,185)
Post * No College -0.0679*** -0.0397*** -0.0253*** 0.00555 0.00287 -0.213*** -0.0258 0.0317**
(0.0235) (0.0122) (0.00646) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0289) (0.0251) (0.0142)
Post * Veteran 0.145** 0.0776** 0.0507*** 0.109* 0.0734 0.0432 0.103* 0.0597*
(0.0622) (0.0312) (0.0176) (0.0610) (0.0473) (0.0678) (0.0571) (0.0342)
Post * Median HHI 0.000952 -0.00604 0.00249 -0.0224* -0.00790 -0.0107 0.0252** -0.0144**
(0.0102) (0.00564) (0.00255) (0.0126) (0.00960) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.00661)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.610 0.699 0.666 0.272 0.588 0.882 0.453 0.491
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Male results by age
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.321** 0.203*** 0.138** 0.0330 0.236* 0.467*** 0.181 0.101
(0.154) (0.0617) (0.0538) (0.0532) (0.131) (0.156) (0.121) (0.0913)
NTR rate -0.294 0.0126 0.618 0.182 -3.883 6.535** -3.459 0.688
(2.704) (1.129) (1.048) (0.950) (2.481) (2.713) (2.682) (1.644)
MFA rate -11,626*** -3,650* -3,615** 2,004 -4,137 -7,518 -630.9 -7,968**
(4,167) (2,145) (1,556) (1,650) (4,547) (6,032) (2,497) (3,798)
Post * No College 0.123* 0.0287 0.0423 0.0271 0.0442 -0.0485 0.0792 0.0413
(0.0696) (0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0670) (0.0697) (0.0488) (0.0450)
Post * Veteran 0.133 0.0191 -0.00258 0.0252 0.170 -0.0799 0.0181 -0.0375
(0.186) (0.0797) (0.0781) (0.0593) (0.180) (0.180) (0.128) (0.108)
Post * Median HHI 0.0531 0.0181 0.0288* 0.00928 -0.00343 0.0185 0.0754*** -0.00928
(0.0378) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0226) (0.0229)
Observations 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652
R2 0.204 0.245 0.214 0.090 0.211 0.293 0.181 0.104
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.182* 0.119** 0.0610** 0.113* 0.151 0.00697 0.0544 0.270***
(0.106) (0.0601) (0.0284) (0.0617) (0.0994) (0.0872) (0.0911) (0.0746)
NTR rate -1.553 -0.0390 -0.0645 0.553 -2.853 1.334 -1.598 2.368*
(1.762) (0.888) (0.479) (0.978) (1.750) (1.553) (1.426) (1.216)
MFA rate -92.42 628.4 -277.8 -1,479 6,169* -916.6 1,473 -2,105
(3,403) (1,722) (1,037) (2,157) (3,583) (3,410) (3,178) (1,901)
Post * No College -0.0622 -0.0449** -0.0143 -0.000140 0.0234 -0.259*** -0.0137 0.0250
(0.0417) (0.0222) (0.0120) (0.0230) (0.0421) (0.0347) (0.0333) (0.0281)
Post * Veteran 0.131 0.0912 0.0439 0.0308 0.103 0.212* 0.136* -0.0263
(0.106) (0.0582) (0.0331) (0.0639) (0.103) (0.109) (0.0739) (0.0724)
Post * Median HHI -0.00349 -0.00298 0.000978 -0.0170* 0.00424 -0.0274 0.0416** -0.0164
(0.0209) (0.0114) (0.00618) (0.0102) (0.0226) (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0145)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.335 0.430 0.342 0.141 0.357 0.697 0.252 0.226
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.117 0.0410 0.0228 0.0640 0.119 -0.258*** 0.140* 0.140
(0.101) (0.0555) (0.0231) (0.0769) (0.0914) (0.0779) (0.0827) (0.0850)
NTR rate 0.444 0.428 -0.0201 -0.440 1.377 -0.646 0.0999 1.750
(1.810) (0.967) (0.444) (1.539) (1.576) (1.749) (1.218) (1.299)
MFA rate -562.2 136.6 623.8 -782.7 3,598 1,512 -2,210 -1,434
(2,965) (1,786) (917.3) (2,599) (2,942) (4,041) (1,502) (2,713)
Post * No College -0.0820** -0.0467** -0.0199* -0.0155 -0.00499 -0.219*** -0.0149 0.0205
(0.0395) (0.0184) (0.0108) (0.0286) (0.0400) (0.0345) (0.0280) (0.0253)
Post * Veteran 0.213** 0.139*** 0.0692*** 0.0843 0.148* 0.175 0.126* 0.159***
(0.0993) (0.0501) (0.0250) (0.0867) (0.0790) (0.106) (0.0646) (0.0594)
Post * Median HHI -0.0238 -0.0112 -0.00465 -0.0183 0.00889 -0.00711 -0.00760 -0.0321**
(0.0214) (0.0104) (0.00574) (0.0162) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0130) (0.0143)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.342 0.420 0.354 0.153 0.327 0.665 0.246 0.304
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.107 0.0375 0.0163 0.118 0.136** -0.0894 -0.0450 0.0682
(0.0961) (0.0525) (0.0265) (0.139) (0.0585) (0.125) (0.0682) (0.0655)
NTR rate 2.838* 1.674** 0.736 3.262 2.173** 1.308 0.00860 1.619
(1.566) (0.826) (0.486) (2.253) (0.995) (1.841) (1.124) (1.050)
MFA rate -855.9 792.5 -577.7 -1,615 1,028 1,042 1,018 2,489
(2,517) (1,468) (807.9) (3,441) (1,635) (3,732) (2,006) (2,402)
Post * No College -0.0992** -0.0527** -0.0275** 0.0185 -0.0179 -0.269*** -0.0186 0.0231
(0.0418) (0.0254) (0.0133) (0.0471) (0.0200) (0.0791) (0.0294) (0.0224)
Post * Veteran 0.101 0.0132 0.0450 -0.0970 0.0176 0.204 0.0244 -0.0830
(0.0974) (0.0522) (0.0288) (0.119) (0.0511) (0.153) (0.0688) (0.0565)
Post * Median HHI -0.000963 -0.0112 0.00308 -0.00661 -0.0163 -0.00864 0.00910 -0.0336***
(0.0208) (0.0132) (0.00733) (0.0273) (0.0109) (0.0387) (0.0154) (0.0106)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.320 0.445 0.361 0.176 0.188 0.703 0.174 0.287
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.7: Female results by age
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.398*** 0.171** 0.132*** 0.109** -0.180 0.524*** 0.251** 0.151**
(0.143) (0.0671) (0.0500) (0.0496) (0.140) (0.157) (0.127) (0.0767)
NTR rate -2.336 -1.317 -1.161 0.658 -3.651 0.309 -2.229 -1.674
(3.336) (1.380) (1.328) (0.978) (2.743) (4.013) (2.309) (1.634)
MFA rate 4,360 1,844 1,614 -514.3 4,453 -2,527 5,747 2,060
(4,957) (2,325) (2,010) (1,527) (3,204) (4,580) (4,784) (2,650)
Post * No College -0.108* -0.0381 -0.0444** -0.0317* -0.0137 -0.160*** 0.0193 -0.00472
(0.0598) (0.0252) (0.0198) (0.0190) (0.0553) (0.0601) (0.0543) (0.0337)
Post * Veteran 0.00103 -0.00109 -0.00977 -0.0178 0.0614 0.0281 -0.0412 -0.0360
(0.144) (0.0620) (0.0470) (0.0436) (0.126) (0.138) (0.125) (0.0777)
Post * Median HHI 0.0231 0.0120 0.0120 -0.0141* 0.00388 -0.0185 0.0620*** 0.0269
(0.0309) (0.0135) (0.0108) (0.00829) (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0234) (0.0179)
Observations 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652 4,652
R2 0.241 0.266 0.258 0.070 0.213 0.317 0.190 0.109
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.148** 0.0997*** 0.0421** 0.0688 0.0507 -0.122 0.262*** 0.238***
(0.0677) (0.0338) (0.0200) (0.0459) (0.0808) (0.0845) (0.0928) (0.0392)
NTR rate -1.314 -0.0570 -0.269 0.266 -0.609 -1.894 0.549 1.403*
(1.699) (0.842) (0.445) (1.048) (1.312) (1.923) (1.570) (0.826)
MFA rate 781.6 1,599 489.2 -253.2 3,449 3,399 1,901 -498.8
(3,494) (1,857) (1,017) (1,921) (3,303) (3,132) (2,978) (1,846)
Post * No College -0.0379 -0.0290 -0.0114 0.0220 -0.0100 -0.209*** 0.0201 0.0315
(0.0358) (0.0177) (0.0103) (0.0192) (0.0334) (0.0354) (0.0425) (0.0219)
Post * Veteran 0.181** 0.101** 0.0437* 0.0746 0.174* 0.102 0.168* -0.0128
(0.0882) (0.0408) (0.0254) (0.0544) (0.0972) (0.0863) (0.0942) (0.0520)
Post * Median HHI -0.00394 -0.00620 -7.49e-05 -0.0238** -0.0388** 0.000256 0.0383** -0.00694
(0.0138) (0.00720) (0.00355) (0.0103) (0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0171) (0.0108)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.402 0.489 0.418 0.105 0.428 0.748 0.321 0.225
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.164* 0.0501 0.0232 0.0527 0.110 -0.204** 0.157** 0.135**
(0.0921) (0.0499) (0.0248) (0.0661) (0.0834) (0.0813) (0.0788) (0.0658)
NTR rate -1.664 -0.595 -0.654 -0.382 -0.0691 -0.996 -1.123 -0.408
(1.702) (1.016) (0.556) (1.412) (1.403) (1.680) (1.301) (1.476)
MFA rate 1,155 1,015 123.8 1,557 5,545** -42.06 -2,772 789.8
(2,883) (1,401) (736.2) (1,643) (2,812) (2,223) (1,914) (2,058)
Post * No College 0.000357 -0.00312 -0.00165 0.0358 0.0314 -0.134*** -0.00169 0.0533*
(0.0362) (0.0170) (0.00986) (0.0298) (0.0350) (0.0424) (0.0278) (0.0271)
Post * Veteran 0.133 0.0718 0.0447 0.103 0.0961 0.0766 -0.0464 0.130*
(0.0985) (0.0482) (0.0281) (0.0723) (0.0864) (0.0896) (0.0648) (0.0689)
Post * Median HHI 0.0101 0.00240 0.00737* -0.00760 0.0113 0.0319* 0.000378 -0.0240**
(0.0174) (0.00755) (0.00418) (0.0125) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0118) (0.0110)
Observations 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659
R2 0.374 0.486 0.408 0.153 0.382 0.785 0.266 0.328
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.227** 0.0972** 0.0711** 0.203 0.0161 0.00614 0.0683 0.193***
(0.0990) (0.0483) (0.0330) (0.131) (0.0554) (0.104) (0.0707) (0.0609)
NTR rate 2.944 1.605 0.899 3.775* 0.642 2.747 -0.346 1.208
(1.986) (1.004) (0.603) (2.253) (0.871) (1.967) (1.372) (1.163)
MFA rate -3,423 -2,205 -1,418* -5,089 674.0 -2,714 -2,621 -1,273
(2,740) (1,585) (830.6) (4,312) (1,356) (3,577) (2,265) (1,897)
Post * No College -0.0901* -0.0571** -0.0469*** 0.0282 -0.00211 -0.241*** -0.0822*** 0.0113
(0.0466) (0.0234) (0.0150) (0.0609) (0.0228) (0.0579) (0.0265) (0.0238)
Post * Veteran 0.209* 0.106* 0.0903** 0.237 -0.0428 0.0387 0.157** 0.140**
(0.123) (0.0572) (0.0389) (0.156) (0.0537) (0.128) (0.0669) (0.0646)
Post * Median HHI 0.00109 -0.0156 0.00328 -0.00848 0.00274 -0.0503* 0.00592 -0.0277**
(0.0298) (0.0142) (0.00947) (0.0399) (0.0108) (0.0263) (0.0121) (0.0134)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.410 0.543 0.463 0.195 0.244 0.793 0.254 0.362
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Overall, both male and female estimates turn out to be significantly positive, and the
magnitudes do not differ very much. The results suggest that both males and females
experienced significant multidimensional deprivation due to PNTR. When we take a deeper
dive into the dimensions, the results suggest different channels of influence. For males, the
main driving forces are disability, lack of medical insurance, and unemployment, with the
magnitude of unemployment being the largest. In contrast, for females, the main driving
forces are disability, poverty, and unemployment.
Males are the main population who got displaced from their original work, as studied
in Pierce and Schott (2016, 2020). Results here suggest that loss of medical insurance
coverage may also contribute to a male’s well-being status. It is more or less related to
unemployment status since medical insurance coverage is usually required/provided by
employers. Especially when the loss of medical insurance is combined with disability sta-
tus, maintaining their original well-being status may solely depend on the possibility of
social insurance programs. Concerning females, PNTR significantly increased their un-
employment, poverty level, and disability status, leading to increased multidimensional
deprivation. These results may be explained by Besedeš, Lee, and Yang (2021), who found
trade liberalization increased female workers’ unemployment rate while their employment
rate remained unchanged. Concurrently, both male and female spent less overall time work-
ing. The deteriorated labor market conditions for both male and female induced a series of
changes in welfare dimensions, which may ultimately lead to well-being deprivation.
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 further report male results by age and female results by age
respectively. For males, MDI measures for both age 17-24 and age 25-40 turn out signifi-
cant, while the magnitudes on the younger adult of 17-24 are the largest. The contributing
dimensions for MDIs are different for these two age groups. For 17-24, no medical insur-
ance and highschool education deprivation are the main driving forces, while for age 25-40,
disability and unemployment are significant. These results present a clear picture that even
though younger adults and middle-aged population are experiencing overall well-being re-
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duction, the reduction of younger adults mainly comes from non-labor market dimensions.
At the same time, labor-market-related factors mainly drive that of middle-aged people.
This pattern may be due to the social characteristics of different age groups and may be
related to their different roles played within the household.
Results on female show that age groups of 17-24, 25-40, and age over 56’s deprivation
measures are significant, while younger adults aged 17-24 still show the largest magnitude.
The driving forces for age 17-24 include disability, no highschool diploma, poverty, and
unemployment, with no highschool diploma being the main driving force. In comparison,
females tend to have a higher probability of being in poverty in the presence of income
shocks due to different characteristics in vulnerability, labor productivity, social networks,
and education, etc. (Devereux, 2002; Philip and Rayhan, 2004).
Results on Race
In this section, we explore results on race. We separately report our estimates on whites
and nonwhites in Table 3.8. Results on both white and nonwhite are significant, while the
nonwhite population experienced a larger PNTR-induced deprivation than the white pop-
ulation. The driving forces for whites are mainly disability and unemployment, and that
of the nonwhite people are disability, poverty, and unemployment. The MDI results may
suggest a different pattern as studied in similar papers. Pierce and Schott (2020) showed
PNTR induced larger socio-economic effects for white males since they are the main pop-
ulation who are working in the sectors with higher trade exposure, such as manufacturing.
Therefore, we expect a larger magnitude for white people in this section. The differences in
these results confirm that MDI measures capture multiple dimensions besides work-related
parameters. Various socio-economic indicators such as medical insurance coverage, educa-
tion, poverty status, and disability all enter into the dimensions of MDI indices, which play
significant roles. Danziger et al. (1982) found a substantially higher increase in poverty in
nonwhites than whites given benefit reduction and lack of labor market opportunity.
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Table 3.8: Race results
(a) White
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.142** 0.0654** 0.0374** 0.122** 0.0531 -0.0504 0.0651 0.137***
(0.0646) (0.0321) (0.0159) (0.0504) (0.0481) (0.0514) (0.0465) (0.0360)
NTR rate 0.380 0.314 0.149 1.398* -0.492 0.654 -0.796 0.804
(0.951) (0.505) (0.260) (0.827) (0.923) (0.961) (0.779) (0.609)
MFA rate 345.5 700.8 -17.05 -1,726 4,370*** -434.9 1,256 38.97
(1,606) (814.5) (415.0) (1,518) (1,372) (1,148) (1,807) (1,162)
Post * No College -0.0644*** -0.0423*** -0.0210*** 0.00564 0.00396 -0.225*** -0.0184 0.0218*
(0.0217) (0.0127) (0.00537) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0249) (0.0222) (0.0125)
Post * Veteran 0.118** 0.0646** 0.0387*** 0.0500 0.0927** 0.0455 0.0839* 0.0509*
(0.0534) (0.0290) (0.0137) (0.0502) (0.0457) (0.0640) (0.0507) (0.0282)
Post * Median HHI 0.00551 -0.00314 0.00300 -0.0190* 0.00599 -0.00805 0.0205* -0.0151**
(0.0118) (0.00700) (0.00276) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.00708)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.639 0.714 0.693 0.320 0.610 0.883 0.499 0.525
(b) Non-white
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.527*** 0.296*** 0.177** 0.332** 0.193 0.0727 0.474*** 0.409***
(0.194) (0.0892) (0.0865) (0.137) (0.183) (0.146) (0.167) (0.120)
NTR rate -5.387 -1.525 -2.813* 1.238 -4.739* -1.604 -2.877 0.358
(3.883) (1.855) (1.572) (2.164) (2.509) (2.902) (3.473) (2.507)
MFA rate -8,145* -4,358** -3,574** -6,239 -4,055 -1,210 -2,406 -7,878**
(4,475) (2,047) (1,745) (3,920) (4,984) (5,455) (3,916) (3,119)
Post * No College 0.0255 0.0231 -0.00768 0.0197 0.0477 -0.113* 0.0959 0.0648
(0.0676) (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0492) (0.0532) (0.0634) (0.0740) (0.0441)
Post * Veteran 0.0912 0.0440 0.00652 0.0581 0.0785 0.00388 0.0646 0.0148
(0.153) (0.0764) (0.0685) (0.104) (0.141) (0.153) (0.159) (0.107)
Post * Median HHI -0.0499 -0.0281** -0.00976 -0.0417* -0.0696** -0.00134 0.0551* -0.0828***
(0.0318) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0246) (0.0274) (0.0331) (0.0299) (0.0186)
Observations 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524 4,524
R2 0.219 0.266 0.209 0.152 0.130 0.487 0.177 0.188
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: White results by age
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.220* 0.120** 0.0888** 0.0583 -0.0233 0.407*** 0.0728 0.0845
(0.129) (0.0574) (0.0398) (0.0376) (0.126) (0.148) (0.0960) (0.0689)
NTR rate -2.028 -1.039 -0.390 -0.0608 -3.745* 3.023 -3.200 -1.211
(2.731) (1.149) (0.900) (0.657) (2.203) (2.628) (2.350) (1.225)
MFA rate 50.02 761.9 136.0 368.3 3,482 -3,938 5,448 -1,551
(3,461) (1,818) (1,320) (1,207) (3,123) (4,315) (3,955) (2,573)
Post * No College 0.0391 0.00732 0.00979 0.00932 -0.000210 -0.0442 0.0367 0.0351
(0.0552) (0.0242) (0.0181) (0.0203) (0.0428) (0.0642) (0.0468) (0.0335)
Post * Veteran 0.0213 -0.0202 -0.0273 -0.00185 0.113 -0.129 0.0384 -0.122
(0.146) (0.0679) (0.0492) (0.0411) (0.129) (0.153) (0.114) (0.0806)
Post * Median HHI 0.0573* 0.0227* 0.0228** -0.00303 0.00847 0.0301 0.0557*** 0.0222
(0.0302) (0.0134) (0.00968) (0.00854) (0.0245) (0.0303) (0.0209) (0.0185)
Observations 44,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R2 0.292 0.321 0.300 0.088 0.277 0.365 0.253 0.138
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.0907 0.0681* 0.0252 0.0877** 0.0548 -0.0909 0.0885 0.201***
(0.0767) (0.0391) (0.0173) (0.0376) (0.0717) (0.0638) (0.0791) (0.0450)
NTR rate -1.389 -0.205 -0.198 0.524 -1.763 -0.527 -0.875 1.619**
(1.340) (0.701) (0.338) (0.809) (1.327) (1.517) (1.219) (0.772)
MFA rate 1,002 1,501 472.4 -1,277 5,490* 3,044 1,528 -1,282
(3,286) (1,771) (1,023) (1,516) (2,903) (2,812) (3,415) (1,359)
Post * No College -0.0621* -0.0422** -0.0157** 0.0124 -0.00535 -0.241*** -0.00739 0.0309
(0.0332) (0.0183) (0.00770) (0.0143) (0.0342) (0.0317) (0.0291) (0.0187)
Post * Veteran 0.132 0.0912** 0.0452* 0.0713* 0.115 0.103 0.117* 0.0504
(0.0867) (0.0462) (0.0234) (0.0394) (0.0958) (0.0839) (0.0684) (0.0499)
Post * Median HHI 0.00674 0.00212 0.00233 -0.0177*** -0.00285 0.00182 0.0337** -0.00435
(0.0161) (0.00954) (0.00366) (0.00656) (0.0210) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.00933)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.463 0.546 0.474 0.168 0.461 0.775 0.362 0.289
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.100 0.0126 0.0149 0.0243 0.0746 -0.250*** 0.114* 0.0995
(0.0772) (0.0429) (0.0172) (0.0548) (0.0701) (0.0623) (0.0646) (0.0607)
NTR rate 0.425 0.146 -0.0475 -0.239 0.925 -0.0127 -0.253 0.311
(1.233) (0.747) (0.325) (1.149) (1.274) (1.403) (1.043) (0.980)
MFA rate 4,022 2,627* 1,398* 2,956 5,758*** 1,772 712.9 1,938
(3,206) (1,574) (823.2) (1,941) (2,207) (2,420) (2,403) (2,759)
Post * No College -0.0618** -0.0354** -0.0154** -0.000270 0.0245 -0.202*** -0.0193 0.0201
(0.0303) (0.0144) (0.00702) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0286) (0.0226) (0.0189)
Post * Veteran 0.152** 0.0928** 0.0508*** 0.0966 0.0953 0.117 0.0337 0.121**
(0.0745) (0.0411) (0.0180) (0.0633) (0.0667) (0.0823) (0.0554) (0.0487)
Post * Median HHI -0.00490 -0.00448 0.000533 -0.00994 0.0111 0.00697 -0.0101 -0.0205*
(0.0159) (0.00772) (0.00360) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0101) (0.0107)
Observations 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659
R2 0.447 0.537 0.481 0.180 0.416 0.784 0.328 0.368
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.166* 0.0488 0.0386 0.157 0.0449 -0.0963 0.00161 0.137***
(0.0868) (0.0445) (0.0241) (0.126) (0.0563) (0.1000) (0.0515) (0.0506)
NTR rate 3.339** 1.584* 0.943** 3.412* 1.321* 1.622 0.127 1.438
(1.525) (0.804) (0.443) (2.016) (0.796) (1.616) (1.000) (0.882)
MFA rate -3,041 -1,382 -1,088* -3,572 602.0 -2,914 -1,520 492.8
(1,970) (1,091) (622.2) (3,139) (1,308) (3,254) (1,637) (1,880)
Post * No College -0.0978** -0.0540** -0.0407*** 0.0372 0.0114 -0.274*** -0.0510** 0.00605
(0.0410) (0.0222) (0.0114) (0.0525) (0.0229) (0.0533) (0.0247) (0.0177)
Post * Veteran 0.136 0.0564 0.0517** 0.110 -0.0113 0.0771 0.0529 0.0534
(0.0907) (0.0483) (0.0260) (0.123) (0.0412) (0.116) (0.0585) (0.0443)
Post * Median HHI 0.00183 -0.0135 0.00312 -0.00800 0.0103 -0.0440* 0.00129 -0.0272***
(0.0239) (0.0131) (0.00708) (0.0337) (0.00916) (0.0257) (0.0119) (0.00939)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.447 0.581 0.515 0.223 0.269 0.806 0.255 0.368
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.10: Non-white results by age
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.487* 0.244** 0.199 0.0544 0.131 0.209 0.587** 0.237*
(0.254) (0.106) (0.123) (0.104) (0.257) (0.314) (0.276) (0.130)
NTR rate -7.709 -3.163 -3.247 -0.209 -7.532** -9.666 -1.466 3.058
(5.116) (2.401) (2.361) (1.676) (3.724) (6.117) (6.411) (3.738)
MFA rate -12,896* -6,261* -6,804** 1,663 -12,526 -3,313 -6,560 -10,569*
(7,621) (3,491) (3,065) (3,464) (8,050) (9,894) (7,723) (5,516)
Post * No College -0.131 -0.0253 -0.0559 -0.0239 0.105 -0.245* 0.124 -0.0864
(0.113) (0.0477) (0.0540) (0.0588) (0.121) (0.131) (0.104) (0.0688)
Post * Veteran 0.426 0.199* 0.196 0.132 0.272 0.0444 0.0903 0.454***
(0.268) (0.108) (0.124) (0.0894) (0.261) (0.254) (0.266) (0.165)
Post * Median HHI -0.0263 -0.0243 -0.0105 -0.000967 0.0267 -0.132** 0.0835* -0.0991***
(0.0557) (0.0214) (0.0239) (0.0252) (0.0544) (0.0514) (0.0477) (0.0312)
Observations 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997
R2 0.148 0.169 0.167 0.101 0.110 0.183 0.140 0.094
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.472** 0.284*** 0.169* 0.160 0.247 -0.0748 0.547*** 0.542***
(0.212) (0.102) (0.0949) (0.129) (0.220) (0.186) (0.192) (0.152)
NTR rate -0.955 1.228 -0.765 1.376 -3.061 -0.559 5.412 2.972
(4.971) (2.293) (1.927) (1.812) (4.041) (3.286) (3.826) (4.324)
MFA rate 874.8 -729.7 -586.2 -4,476 1,797 2,715 5,617 -9,301*
(5,177) (2,867) (2,032) (3,120) (5,907) (6,215) (4,832) (4,750)
Post * No College -0.00609 -0.0183 -0.00751 -0.0107 -0.0177 -0.146** 0.0519 0.0313
(0.0903) (0.0406) (0.0382) (0.0512) (0.0852) (0.0722) (0.0940) (0.0611)
Post * Veteran 0.0252 -0.0844 -0.0423 -0.0205 -0.0333 -0.0433 -0.0904 -0.235
(0.190) (0.0972) (0.0869) (0.127) (0.191) (0.176) (0.218) (0.155)
Post * Median HHI -0.0336 -0.0311* -0.00554 -0.0439** -0.112*** -0.00405 0.0686 -0.0639*
(0.0388) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0213) (0.0405) (0.0331) (0.0420) (0.0328)
Observations 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320
R2 0.150 0.183 0.165 0.083 0.112 0.378 0.162 0.122
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.455** 0.297** 0.187* 0.445** 0.0424 -0.0105 0.541*** 0.468**
(0.218) (0.120) (0.0992) (0.193) (0.211) (0.305) (0.200) (0.192)
NTR rate -10.07** -4.237 -5.908** -2.219 -9.129** -7.007 -3.618 0.789
(5.041) (2.688) (2.300) (3.209) (4.322) (4.550) (4.388) (3.131)
MFA rate -16,888** -7,770* -8,570** -12,138 -10,976* -1,625 -14,303* 189.1
(7,488) (4,458) (4,151) (7,612) (6,082) (8,456) (7,706) (5,949)
Post * No College 0.173** 0.0354 0.0385 0.107 -0.0570 -0.0260 0.0425 0.110*
(0.0849) (0.0460) (0.0397) (0.0743) (0.0894) (0.114) (0.0896) (0.0660)
Post * Veteran 0.650*** 0.275** 0.272** 0.0934 0.370 0.219 0.360* 0.332**
(0.215) (0.120) (0.112) (0.200) (0.230) (0.246) (0.204) (0.140)
Post * Median HHI -0.0356 -0.0202 0.00431 -0.0326 -0.0675 0.0384 0.0262 -0.0652***
(0.0404) (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0364) (0.0437) (0.0568) (0.0386) (0.0249)
Observations 4,166 4,166 4,166 4,166 4,166 4,166 4,166 4,166
R2 0.165 0.186 0.171 0.138 0.129 0.374 0.129 0.181
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.330 0.218* 0.164 0.0499 0.0615 0.437 0.147 0.392*
(0.275) (0.130) (0.137) (0.299) (0.164) (0.294) (0.256) (0.207)
NTR rate -1.386 0.151 -0.774 -0.379 1.632 5.531 -4.138 -1.890
(6.136) (2.721) (3.296) (5.436) (2.947) (5.307) (4.962) (3.815)
MFA rate -5,998 -2,904 -3,753 -14,339** 11,827* 2,695 -5,768 -8,936
(8,049) (4,352) (3,995) (6,712) (6,373) (12,268) (6,840) (6,054)
Post * No College -0.118 0.0186 -0.0280 0.0728 -0.0504 -0.0795 0.0360 0.114
(0.138) (0.0626) (0.0717) (0.115) (0.0740) (0.134) (0.123) (0.0785)
Post * Veteran -0.0108 0.0321 0.00120 -0.0516 0.0904 0.341 -0.0547 -0.165
(0.383) (0.169) (0.190) (0.263) (0.168) (0.351) (0.329) (0.164)
Post * Median HHI -0.0139 -0.00831 0.00729 0.0583 -0.0981*** -0.0212 0.0842 -0.0647**
(0.0728) (0.0307) (0.0350) (0.0653) (0.0326) (0.0755) (0.0544) (0.0323)
Observations 3,928 3,928 3,928 3,928 3,928 3,928 3,928 3,928
R2 0.185 0.222 0.203 0.135 0.114 0.383 0.151 0.182
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 report results on race by age groups. For results on white
people, we find the MDI indices are only significant for the younger adults of 17-24. While
for nonwhites, MDI results are significant for ages 17-24, 25-40, and 41-55, with the coef-
ficient estimates of approximately the same magnitude. In comparison, the younger adults’
MDI estimates are larger for nonwhites. These results may indicate different channels of
influence for the inter-generational effect for white and nonwhite households. In white
households, being displaced from their original work for the parent generation may deliver
a spillover effect to their children. While for nonwhite households, well-being deprivation
may be the main channel of influence from parents to children.
Intra-household Dynamics
A critical question of our particular interest is whether the multidimensional deprivation
patterns on young adults are inter-generational spillover effects from their parents, either
being displaced from their original work or suffering from well-being deprivation? To that
extent, we conduct regression on intra-household dynamics.
Our data allows us to do household-level analyses. Within the household, we can link
young adults to their parents and know their parents’ working status. Therefore, we can
identify if parents’ employment status affects young adults’ well-being. Specifically, we
restrict our sample to young adults aged 17-24 who live with their parents in the same
household and identify their parents’ working status as being employed or unemployed.
Then we conduct difference-in-difference analysis using Equation 3.1.12
Results are reported in Table 3.11. Panel (a) and Panel (b) present results for young
adults with their father and mother being unemployed, respectively. Regarding MDI in-
dices, young adults with their father being unemployed are subject to significant well-being
deprivation. The main driving forces are dimensions of highschool dropout and poverty.
In comparison, we do not see any pattern for those whose mother is unemployed. While it
12In the ideal case, we can compare results between young adults who are living with their parents and
those who are not. Our data limitation precludes us from making a comparison.
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Table 3.11: Intra-household dynamics
(a) Father unemployed
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 1.303* 0.552* 0.722** 0.174 0.0151 1.419** 1.211** -0.0603
(0.717) (0.317) (0.348) (0.248) (0.577) (0.659) (0.614) (0.536)
NTR rate 15.53 6.320 7.227 2.539 13.24 12.89 6.439 -3.509
(11.48) (4.679) (5.614) (4.400) (11.42) (10.53) (9.378) (10.90)
MFA rate -52,725*** -13,846** -24,740*** -4,427 -18,666 -7,738 -24,040* -14,358
(16,296) (5,979) (7,332) (7,362) (13,233) (17,244) (14,511) (12,838)
Post * No College 0.0522 -0.0281 -0.0225 0.135* 0.346 -0.00949 -0.342* -0.270
(0.325) (0.128) (0.153) (0.0787) (0.304) (0.328) (0.204) (0.232)
Post * Veteran 0.790 0.101 0.309 -0.209 0.255 0.250 0.166 0.0424
(0.738) (0.319) (0.364) (0.241) (0.723) (0.598) (0.588) (0.518)
Post * Median HHI 0.153 0.0894 0.0766 -0.00761 0.230* 0.257* -0.0107 -0.0219
(0.147) (0.0563) (0.0679) (0.0436) (0.126) (0.131) (0.118) (0.111)
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720
R2 0.193 0.194 0.204 0.150 0.197 0.191 0.177 0.147
(b) Mother unemployed
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap -0.00614 0.202 -0.0238 0.365* 0.0272 -0.0370 -0.0522 0.709
(0.705) (0.295) (0.330) (0.205) (0.702) (0.722) (0.552) (0.520)
NTR rate 1.932 1.812 -1.812 6.926** -9.008 4.933 -7.362 13.57
(11.40) (5.348) (5.695) (3.200) (8.991) (15.64) (10.86) (8.313)
MFA rate -8,690 -3,570 -3,496 -3,289 -11,788 18,590 -7,545 -13,819
(18,414) (6,773) (9,084) (3,607) (15,337) (21,286) (16,592) (12,810)
Post * No College -0.164 0.0563 -0.00431 0.119 -0.0261 0.342 0.109 -0.263
(0.297) (0.115) (0.147) (0.129) (0.275) (0.281) (0.215) (0.238)
Post * Veteran 0.712 0.265 0.145 0.226 0.166 0.614 0.0982 0.222
(0.647) (0.278) (0.333) (0.267) (0.605) (0.658) (0.504) (0.548)
Post * Median HHI -0.0343 0.00557 0.0157 0.0394 -0.232* 0.217** 0.0930 -0.0894
(0.120) (0.0482) (0.0591) (0.0456) (0.124) (0.109) (0.0904) (0.120)
Observations 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606
R2 0.177 0.180 0.188 0.168 0.216 0.189 0.204 0.135
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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is tricky to conclude that a parent’s poor performance affects a 20-year-old who is already
an independent individual, one potential mechanism may be that the 20-year old is still
living with their parents and helping their parents financially or participating in household
finances. If that is taking place, the inter-generational spillover effect could occur, espe-
cially when it comes to non-labor well-being parameters. Padilla-Walker, Son, and Nelson
(2021) found the well-being status of parents impacts their children’s life and well-being
(anxiety, stress, loneliness, depression, and GPA). This finding is consistent with Family
Systems Theory. Heinrich (2014) argued that parents’ job loss presents a significant shock
to the family subsystem - the stress associated with job loss can seriously undermine chil-
dren’s health and family relationships.
3.4.2 Difference-in-difference-in-difference results
In this section, as in Chapter 2, we explore the roles of higher minimum wage and welfare
programs on MDI indices and dimensions. Table 3.12 reports estimates for µ1 and µ2 in
Equation 3.3 for the MDI indices (columns 1-3) and dimensions (columns 4-8) for the
whole sample population.
The coefficient estimates on minimum wage in Table 3.12 do not show significant pat-
terns concerning deprivation indices and dimensions. As Dhongde and Haveman (2017)
found, there was not much overlap between individuals who were income poor and those
who were multidimensionally deprived. Almost 30% of individuals with income slightly
above the poverty threshold experienced multiple deprivations. Specifically, triple-difference
results by age group show a similar pattern - there is no significant result on people aged
17-24, as reported in Table 3.13. Young people typically constitute the minimum wage-
bounded workforce, while higher minimum wage may not help with their multidimensional
deprivation status. Two reasons might back up this pattern. First, a higher minimum wage
may necessarily increase the income level of minimum wage-bounded workers. At the
same time, it may only account for a single dimension for MDI indices which also contain
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Table 3.12: Triple-difference: baseline results
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage 0.0431 -0.00286 0.0103 -0.102 0.00147 -0.231 0.147 0.170*
(0.152) (0.0774) (0.0401) (0.119) (0.163) (0.156) (0.124) (0.0961)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 0.0223 0.0157 -0.0113 0.148 -0.0856 0.266* -0.121 -0.129
(0.206) (0.101) (0.0479) (0.173) (0.163) (0.151) (0.142) (0.121)
Post * NTR Gap 0.135 0.116 0.0284 0.363 0.0567 0.533* -0.187 -0.184
(0.269) (0.135) (0.0692) (0.241) (0.301) (0.287) (0.208) (0.172)
Post * Swspending -0.00720 -0.00725 0.00159 -0.0196 0.00227 -0.0637*** 0.0198 0.0250
(0.0297) (0.0142) (0.00690) (0.0273) (0.0242) (0.0214) (0.0201) (0.0175)
Post * MinWage -0.0309 -0.00899 -0.00754 -0.00113 -0.00628 0.0367 -0.0332 -0.0410**
(0.0273) (0.0138) (0.00721) (0.0207) (0.0280) (0.0266) (0.0206) (0.0164)
NTR rate 0.233 0.393 0.106 1.174 -0.485 0.538 -0.582 1.319*
(1.153) (0.593) (0.331) (0.846) (0.941) (1.006) (0.919) (0.714)
MFA rate -1,265 -51.83 -388.8 -2,141 3,235** -606.2 71.13 -817.9
(1,561) (776.0) (418.3) (1,380) (1,258) (1,000) (1,432) (1,198)
Post * No College -0.0631*** -0.0403*** -0.0224*** 0.00105 0.00679 -0.215*** -0.0173 0.0226*
(0.0216) (0.0116) (0.00592) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.0236) (0.0240) (0.0134)
Post * Veteran 0.151*** 0.0764*** 0.0506*** 0.0510 0.0975** 0.0593 0.116** 0.0581**
(0.0563) (0.0281) (0.0157) (0.0473) (0.0465) (0.0599) (0.0482) (0.0290)
Post * Median HHI 0.00305 -0.00348 0.00279 -0.0199* 0.000566 -0.00247 0.0274** -0.0229***
(0.0107) (0.00587) (0.00273) (0.0110) (0.00981) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.00722)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.651 0.725 0.691 0.357 0.621 0.895 0.492 0.574
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
information on insurance, education, disability, and poverty status. Second, the deprivation
level of the young adults may be delivered from their parents’ employment status, which
we found earlier. Raising the minimum wage for young adults may not necessarily affect
their well-being.13
13We notice that coefficient estimates of social welfare spending are not significant. It is expected that the
general social safety net, such as unemployment insurance and welfare programs, may help those who are
multidimnesionally deprived. However, the variable “social welfare spending” we used here includes many
other factors such as cash assistance, Medicaid, and non-health social services. This variable may bring too
much noise to the estimation and cannot be used to inform policy. We use this variable to control for other
confounding characteristics from finding an effect on minimum wage.
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Table 3.13: Triple-difference: age results
(a) Age 17-24
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage 0.177 0.0489 0.0650 0.105 -0.146 -0.138 0.207 0.217
(0.341) (0.150) (0.113) (0.103) (0.332) (0.318) (0.362) (0.203)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending -0.156 -0.136 -0.112 -0.0151 -0.475 0.266 -0.265 -0.190
(0.438) (0.182) (0.133) (0.111) (0.340) (0.349) (0.342) (0.164)
Post * NTR Gap -0.0281 0.0423 -0.0386 -0.115 0.114 0.782 -0.251 -0.319
(0.664) (0.291) (0.221) (0.194) (0.624) (0.596) (0.685) (0.371)
Post * Swspending 0.0176 0.0208 0.0166 0.000749 0.0568 -0.0244 0.0499 0.0211
(0.0655) (0.0277) (0.0199) (0.0166) (0.0535) (0.0553) (0.0489) (0.0270)
Post * MinWage -0.145** -0.0639** -0.0498** -0.0221 -0.0456 -0.0924 -0.0992* -0.0600*
(0.0584) (0.0258) (0.0192) (0.0196) (0.0574) (0.0652) (0.0567) (0.0361)
NTR rate -1.195 -0.692 -0.338 0.442 -3.553 2.070 -2.262 -0.155
(2.580) (1.089) (0.863) (0.625) (2.264) (2.765) (1.918) (1.216)
MFA rate -4,563 -1,503 -1,766 551.2 -1,745 -5,062 1,819 -3,079
(3,089) (1,534) (1,074) (1,076) (2,986) (4,147) (2,955) (2,763)
Post * No College 0.0147 -0.00146 0.000642 0.00166 0.0197 -0.0983* 0.0436 0.0260
(0.0537) (0.0217) (0.0178) (0.0188) (0.0497) (0.0594) (0.0442) (0.0317)
Post * Veteran 0.108 0.0364 0.0196 0.0177 0.175 -0.0390 0.0359 -0.00802
(0.131) (0.0576) (0.0459) (0.0363) (0.126) (0.139) (0.0988) (0.0716)
Post * Median HHI 0.0578* 0.0203 0.0216** -0.00574 0.0162 0.0111 0.0715*** 0.00830
(0.0312) (0.0124) (0.0103) (0.00954) (0.0298) (0.0285) (0.0192) (0.0172)
Observations 34,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658
R2 0.310 0.351 0.337 0.099 0.296 0.435 0.256 0.149
(b) Age 25-40
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage 0.0715 0.0875 0.0373 0.0479 -0.121 -0.111 0.364* 0.258*
(0.217) (0.113) (0.0631) (0.110) (0.255) (0.297) (0.190) (0.139)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 0.0976 0.0192 0.00331 0.135 0.227 9.40e-05 -0.153 -0.113
(0.237) (0.124) (0.0564) (0.120) (0.290) (0.188) (0.221) (0.191)
Post * NTR Gap 0.0678 -0.0414 -0.0191 0.0393 0.431 0.139 -0.559 -0.257
(0.387) (0.201) (0.111) (0.208) (0.468) (0.555) (0.342) (0.249)
Post * Swspending -0.00899 -0.00150 0.000937 -0.00430 -0.0472 -0.00874 0.0300 0.0228
(0.0350) (0.0179) (0.00830) (0.0177) (0.0438) (0.0250) (0.0320) (0.0270)
Post * MinWage -0.0179 -0.0166 -0.00334 -0.00329 0.0174 0.0266 -0.0735** -0.0504**
(0.0380) (0.0195) (0.0105) (0.0196) (0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0327) (0.0222)
NTR rate -1.136 0.164 -0.0502 0.459 -1.399 -0.443 0.0593 2.145**
(1.599) (0.846) (0.438) (0.742) (1.244) (1.719) (1.352) (0.893)
MFA rate 232.4 1,013 376.5 -1,056 4,763* 1,411 1,475 -1,526
(3,051) (1,597) (950.0) (1,287) (2,819) (2,539) (2,769) (1,365)
Post * No College -0.0533 -0.0374** -0.0142 0.00473 0.00764 -0.223*** -0.000428 0.0236
(0.0335) (0.0173) (0.00891) (0.0147) (0.0279) (0.0297) (0.0357) (0.0207)
Post * Veteran 0.155* 0.0960** 0.0446* 0.0678* 0.120 0.130 0.165** - 0.00304
(0.0848) (0.0431) (0.0233) (0.0386) (0.0828) (0.0843) (0.0727) (0.0467)
Post * Median HHI -0.00334 -0.00427 0.000471 -0.0264*** -0.0137 -0.00665 0.0404** -0.0150
(0.0158) (0.00855) (0.00390) (0.00726) (0.0157) (0.0149) (0.0160) (0.0105)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.471 0.553 0.487 0.177 0.481 0.792 0.364 0.313
(c) Age 41-55
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage 0.315 0.169 0.0759 0.390** -0.0223 -0.119 0.276 0.318**
(0.216) (0.117) (0.0542) (0.164) (0.202) (0.184) (0.180) (0.152)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending -0.0325 -0.0436 -0.00114 0.0582 -0.188 0.0982 -0.223 0.0368
(0.235) (0.127) (0.0548) (0.190) (0.218) (0.218) (0.153) (0.177)
Post * NTR Gap -0.410 -0.254 -0.107 -0.616** 0.0835 0.0960 -0.411 -0.425
(0.381) (0.215) (0.0952) (0.284) (0.360) (0.353) (0.342) (0.268)
Post * Swspending -0.00446 -0.00308 -0.00287 -0.00404 0.00709 -0.0554* 0.0259 0.0110
(0.0323) (0.0177) (0.00778) (0.0271) (0.0314) (0.0329) (0.0214) (0.0265)
Post * MinWage -0.0441 -0.0113 -0.0103 -0.0662** 0.00983 0.0953*** -0.0407 -0.0545*
(0.0381) (0.0212) (0.0106) (0.0278) (0.0362) (0.0350) (0.0298) (0.0277)
NTR rate 0.0533 0.290 -0.163 0.194 0.585 -0.433 0.0527 1.052
(1.435) (0.843) (0.413) (1.179) (1.303) (1.490) (1.023) (1.142)
MFA rate 613.0 1,114 529.0 596.1 5,211** 2,122 -2,034 -326.0
(2,497) (1,277) (657.4) (1,804) (2,388) (2,605) (1,371) (1,870)
Post * No College -0.0380 -0.0225 -0.0103 0.0101 0.0190 -0.165*** -0.00528 0.0286
(0.0316) (0.0145) (0.00848) (0.0235) (0.0275) (0.0296) (0.0248) (0.0211)
Post * Veteran 0.157** 0.0946** 0.0499** 0.0922 0.109 0.0958 0.0296 0.147***
(0.0762) (0.0391) (0.0214) (0.0576) (0.0658) (0.0762) (0.0552) (0.0503)
Post * Median HHI -0.00469 -0.00295 0.00246 -0.0142 0.0161 0.0181 -0.00181 -0.0330***
(0.0169) (0.00764) (0.00427) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.460 0.551 0.481 0.206 0.441 0.806 0.333 0.428
(d) Age over 56
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap * MinWage -0.429* -0.300** -0.110* -0.465* -0.0813 -0.564** -0.193 -0.195
(0.226) (0.132) (0.0582) (0.272) (0.185) (0.283) (0.159) (0.182)
Post * NTR Gap * SWspending 0.148 0.139 0.0170 0.395 -0.0725 0.608** -0.0572 -0.181
(0.316) (0.152) (0.0800) (0.430) (0.109) (0.295) (0.144) (0.136)
Post * NTR Gap 1.025** 0.673*** 0.258** 1.148** 0.186 1.248** 0.359 0.422
(0.449) (0.246) (0.110) (0.546) (0.349) (0.524) (0.264) (0.338)
Post * Swspending -0.0378 -0.0345 -0.00576 -0.0719 0.00554 -0.140*** 0.00789 0.0262
(0.0484) (0.0230) (0.0127) (0.0694) (0.0162) (0.0416) (0.0212) (0.0203)
Post * MinWage 0.0681* 0.0473** 0.0203** 0.0370 0.0234 0.111** 0.0567** 0.00848
(0.0353) (0.0200) (0.00915) (0.0474) (0.0287) (0.0454) (0.0274) (0.0301)
NTR rate 2.586 1.323 0.789 2.779 1.290* 1.576 -0.380 1.350
(1.658) (0.828) (0.505) (2.174) (0.760) (1.612) (1.074) (0.944)
MFA rate -2,672 -971.0 -1,171* -4,056 1,224 -1,073 -1,031 80.37
(1,843) (1,055) (632.4) (2,880) (1,245) (3,076) (1,665) (1,641)
Post * No College -0.0935** -0.0502** -0.0389*** 0.0309 -0.00849 -0.233*** -0.0570** 0.0164
(0.0383) (0.0217) (0.0122) (0.0519) (0.0204) (0.0549) (0.0234) (0.0196)
Post * Veteran 0.143 0.0480 0.0642** 0.0792 -0.0267 0.0408 0.0995* 0.0471
(0.0891) (0.0456) (0.0272) (0.118) (0.0418) (0.108) (0.0564) (0.0489)
Post * Median HHI 0.00637 -0.00815 0.00489 0.00198 -0.00534 -0.0153 0.00429 -0.0264***
(0.0239) (0.0125) (0.00779) (0.0325) (0.0104) (0.0271) (0.0117) (0.00960)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.477 0.600 0.526 0.246 0.279 0.823 0.279 0.439
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 Timing of impacts
Our sample period includes the Great Recession of 2008, another considerable income
shock to local economies. It would be hard to generalize our claims if our empirical re-
sults are driven by the coincidence of two large exogenous shocks. Hence, we separately
estimate different time effects from the trade liberalization by running the following speci-
fication:
LHSmt = (θa · 101≤year≤07 + θb · 108≤year≤10 + θc · 111≤year≤13 ×NTRGapm (3.5)
+(γa · 101≤year≤07 + γb · 108≤year≤10 + γc · 111≤year≤13 ×Zm
+βXmt + δm + δt + εmt
where 101≤year≤07 refers to an indicator variable for the pre-Great-Recession period, 108≤year≤10
is indicator for Great Recession years, and 111≤year≤13 refers to the post-Great-Recession
period. Hence, the DID estimates on θa, θb, θc are of interest. LHSmt refers to the depen-
dent variables of MDI measure and dimensions.
Figure 3.2 presents a matrix of graphs for reviewing the results of the estimates visually
from the difference-in-difference estimation in Equation 3.5. The graphs for three MDI
measures are positioned on the first row, and five dimensions on the second and third row.
Each figure plots the three-period coefficient estimates of θa, θb, and θc along the full sample
year 1990-2013. The graphs also display the 95 percent confidence interval. If the results
are not driven by other concurrent incidences during 1990-2013, graphs should present a
pattern where there is no pre-trend before 2000, a significant jump/dive on the conferral of
the PNTR in 2000, and a stable increase/decrease after 2000. As indicated in Figure 3.2,
estimates in all graphs are statistically indistinguishable from zero before 2000, but take a
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spike around the time of the change in policy in 2000, and remain elevated through 2013.
The graphs confirm that the robustness of the difference-in-difference regression results
that PNTR increased multidimensional deprivation and that other concurrent incidences do
not drive our findings in Section 3.4.
Note. Figures display the 95 percent confidence interval of the implied impact of an interquartile shift in a
MSA’s exposure to PNTR on crime rates using estimates from Equation 3.5 for three measures of MDI and
each of five dimensions
Figure 3.2: Implied impact of PNTR on MDI and dimensions
3.5.2 Additional controls
To the extent that the differences in MDI impact are driven by the concentration of those
demographics in certain regions, we include additional controls to account for the MSA-
level demographics. Specifically, we control for the 1990 share of residents younger than
25 years old, the 1990 share of whites, the 1990 share of blacks, and the 1990 share of
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males.14
Table 3.14 report the results for the whole sample. In comparison to the baseline re-
sults in Table 3.3, it is clear that the significant patterns on MDI indices remain, and the
main driving forces are dimensions of disability, no medical insurance coverage, poverty,
and unemployment, consistent with the baseline results. In regards to the magnitude of the
coefficient estimates, we find that the estimates are about the same level while the baseline
results in Table 3.3 are slightly larger. Results in this section confirm that regional dif-
ferences in demographics are negligible and they does not influence any of the significant
patterns.
Table 3.14: Robustness: additional controls
MDI Index Dimensions
MDI A A*MDI Disability NoInsurance NoHighschool Poverty Unemployment
Post * NTR Gap 0.174*** 0.103*** 0.0407** 0.128** 0.0845* 0.0208 0.0987** 0.184***
(0.0655) (0.0332) (0.0157) (0.0514) (0.0484) (0.0546) (0.0476) (0.0381)
NTR rate -0.152 0.300 -0.0110 1.294 -0.719 0.946 -1.028 1.007
(1.043) (0.546) (0.294) (0.818) (0.915) (0.937) (0.845) (0.687)
MFA rate -968.8 -71.72 -281.3 -1,888 2,997** -720.3 162.4 -909.7
(1,570) (784.7) (415.6) (1,414) (1,250) (956.0) (1,408) (1,142)
Post * Age 25+ -0.0203 -0.0262 0.00817 0.0121 -0.0741 -0.123** 0.00861 0.0451
(0.0534) (0.0293) (0.0144) (0.0428) (0.0631) (0.0601) (0.0519) (0.0384)
Post * White 0.0797** 0.00519 0.0297*** 0.0214 0.00154 -0.0610 0.0595** 0.00446
(0.0349) (0.0179) (0.0102) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0394) (0.0298) (0.0223)
Post * Black 0.110*** 0.0272 0.0382*** 0.0370 0.0329 -0.0594 0.0682** 0.0573**
(0.0345) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0333) (0.0297) (0.0421) (0.0312) (0.0239)
Post * Male 0.468* 0.0956 0.173** 0.108 -0.0146 0.373 0.0608 -0.0497
(0.280) (0.147) (0.0677) (0.253) (0.252) (0.250) (0.243) (0.195)
Post * No College -0.0557** -0.0388*** -0.0204*** 0.00381 0.00535 -0.204*** -0.0185 0.0196
(0.0231) (0.0121) (0.00566) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0250) (0.0242) (0.0125)
Post * Veteran 0.123** 0.0842*** 0.0353** 0.0423 0.127** 0.104 0.0951* 0.0520
(0.0583) (0.0309) (0.0143) (0.0480) (0.0523) (0.0638) (0.0527) (0.0332)
Post * Median HHI 0.00189 -0.00445 0.00226 -0.0214* -0.000217 -0.000664 0.0260** -0.0260***
(0.0115) (0.00631) (0.00281) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.00698)
Observations 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
R2 0.652 0.725 0.693 0.357 0.622 0.895 0.493 0.576
Note. Standard errors clustered on MSAs in parentheses, MSA and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
3.6 Conclusion
The increased import competition from China brought severe labor market disruptions in
the US. While previous studies mainly focus on labor market outcomes, this research fills
14Data are from the 1990 Decennial Census.
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the gap. It provides nuanced analyses that trade exposure may also impact people’s well-
being and deliver an inter-generational effect on the younger generation.
We employ the Multidimensional Deprivation Index (MDI) by Dhongde and Haveman
(2017) and estimate MSA’s multidimensional deprivation effect of PNTR on different age-,
gender-, and race groups. Results show that PNTR does have a significant impact on the
well-being of people who live in more exposed regions, with driving forces of disability
payment, no medical insurance coverage, poverty, and unemployment. Young adults aged
17-24 are the most impacted population, and lack of highschool education is the main con-
tributing factor. Overall, results on males and females are both significant and of similar
magnitude. In regards to race, nonwhite people are subject to higher well-being deprivation.
To better explore the possible inter-generational effects, we conduct an intra-household
analysis for the young adults. Results suggest that the inter-generational spillover effects
may exist. Parents’ employment status may have a significant impact on their children’s
life. Additionally, estimates on higher minimum wage and social welfare expenditures are
not significant, which shows that income poor individuals are not necessarily multidimen-
sionally deprived at the same time.
Our results have broad policy implications. First, supporting young adults will benefit
society. Young adults, during challenging times, may be struggling to find a path to em-
ployment, economic security, and well-being. Policies that are oriented towards helping
young adults maintaining healthy, productive, and skillful are critical to the nation’s work-
force. Second, policies of multiple dimensions are crucial to help those who are multidi-





SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES FOR “DOES MINIMUM WAGE
INCREASE OR REDUCE CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM A NEGATIVE INCOME
SHOCK”
Table A.1: Commuting Zones with the highest and lowest NTR gaps
Commuting Zone NTR Gap Name of largest place in Commuting Zone
Highest
1301 0.235 Bennettsville city, SC
1002 0.234 Morganton city, NC
602 0.234 Galax city, VA
1100 0.222 Hickory city, NC
8402 0.219 Washington city, GA
Lowest
35905 0.009 Loa town, UT
34112 0.007 Bethel city, AK
27605 0.006 Rosebud CDP, SD
27604 0.005 Murdo city, SD
34105 0.004 Kotzebue city, AK












Note. Estimates according to Chalfin, 2015 and Heeks et al., 2018. Table reports the unit cost of index crimes
in the United States in 2010 given the number of Uniform Crime Reports.
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The mean of Property crime per 1,000 resident is 3.90 and its standard deviation is 2.57 (Q1=1.92, Q2=3.83,
Q3=5.62).
For violent crime, the mean is 1.25 and the standard deviation is 1.42 (Q1=0.43, Q2=1.04, Q3=1.68).
























Commuting Zone Violent Crime Rates Per 1,000 People
Note. The number of Commuting Zones is 741. Statistics are generated from the 1990-2013 Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR).
Figure A.2: Distribution of overall crime rates
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Figure A.3: Diff-Diff-Diff coefficients and 95% CI for age group
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Figure A.4: Diff-Diff-Diff coefficients and 95% CI for gender
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Figure A.5: Diff-Diff-Diff coefficients and 95% CI for race
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES FOR “MULTIDIMENSIONAL
IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON YOUNG ADULTS”
Note. Statistics used in this figure are from MDIm3
Figure B.1: MDI distribution in MSA, 2001
Note. Statistics used in this figure are from MDIm3
Figure B.2: MDI distribution in MSA, 2007
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Figure B.3: Percent of individuals deprived in ≥ 2 dimensions
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